Naming without necessity by Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel
 1 
 
 
 
NAMING WITHOUT NECESSITY 
 
By 
 
NIGEL SABBARTON-LEARY 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham  
for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Philosophy 
School of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies 
College of Arts and Law 
The University of Birmingham 
March 2010 
 2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning 
natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection 
between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by 
constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics – that is, a 
nontrivial version of essentialism – found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the 
standard criticisms. 
With my version of descriptivism in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable 
version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call ‗thin‘ essences. I claim that 
thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are 
sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is 
an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting 
things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus 
whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind 
terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions in meaning. 
Furthermore, whilst Kripke thinks there is a dichotomy between de re and de dicto necessity, 
and that theoretical identities are necessary de re, I think this distinction is both misleading 
and inaccurate, and that the necessity of theoretical identities is neither entirely de re nor 
entirely de dicto. By separating and insulating questions concerning meaning from questions 
concerning essence I show that whilst scientific discoveries are contingent and a posteriori, 
the definition of scientific terms are both necessary and a priori.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis engages with two key topics in contemporary philosophy: the first is the semantics 
of natural kind terms, particularly those for substances (‗tungsten‘, ‗water‘, ‗fosterite‘), the 
second is natural kind essentialism, specifically those brands of natural kind essentialism 
which claim that essences are both a posteriori and metaphysically necessary.  
Examples of so-called natural kinds are, for the most part, intuitive and obvious. 
Substances like gold, iron and water, species such as tigers, whales and chimpanzees, and 
fundamental particles like photons, muons and electrons are all traditionally supposed to be 
natural kinds. But what do all of these examples have in common? At work in each of the 
examples is an intuitive notion (of a natural kind) that is intended to capture the salient facts 
of our experience (including scientific experience) that inspire us to group particular 
individuals together, on the basis of similarity. For instance, if I drink two glasses of water, 
from a single glass, over the course of an hour, then I take it that although the two glasses, or 
rather the two bodies of liquid that fill the glass at different times, are not numerically 
identical, the substance I have drunk is one kind of thing. Similarly, if my dog has puppies I 
take it that each of the puppies is a member of the same kind, despite all of them being 
obviously distinct individuals.  
This idea of a natural kind is supposed to be ‗basic to thought and language‘ (Quine 
1977: 157). Furthermore, it is closely connected to the notion of similarity or resemblance – 
according to Quine, they are ostensibly ‗variations or adaptations of a single notion‘ (ibid.). 
Thus we might say that when someone identifies two objects as of the same kind, what they 
are claiming is that the two objects are similar in some relevant respect.  
 8 
Of course, similarity alone does not get us to natural kinds. For instance, both sugar 
and salt are soluble in water, and thus have at least one property in common. However, they 
hardly seem to form a natural kind on that basis. Traditionally, what is thought to distinguish 
the natural kinds like gold from the artificial kinds (pencil, fridge) and the gerrymandered 
kinds (things-in-my-fridge) is their application in scientific inductions, and their independent 
existence (see Bird 1998; Collier 1996). Inductions about pencils and things-in-my-fridge are 
less likely to be reliable, since members of each kind can be radically different, than 
corresponding inductions about gold, where we take it that all instances of gold are similar in 
some (scientifically) important respect that serves to ground inductions, making our 
classifications of objects into kinds, and subsequent predictions on that basis, highly reliable. 
The intuitive contrast, then, should be clear enough. On the one hand we have the 
natural kinds, which include natural substances that exist independently of us, and are 
susceptible to induction and scientific theorising. On the other hand we have the artificial and 
gerrymandered kinds, which exist because of us, are inductively unreliable, and not the 
subject of scientific theorising. 
The rekindled interest in natural kind essentialism
1
 – that view that natural kinds have 
essences, and objects get to be members of said kinds by possessing the relevant kind essence 
– and natural kind semantics2, stems from Saul Kripke‘s seminal work Naming and Necessity 
(1980), where he convinced the majority of the analytic philosophical community that there 
                                                          
1
 Natural kind essentialism is typically attributed to the scholastics, in particular Aristotle. Locke‘s discussion of 
essentialism in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, for example, aims to criticise the Aristotelian view. 
More recently, David Oderberg (2007) has mounted a contemporary defence of Aristotelian essentialism.  
2
 Although one might think that an interest in natural kind semantics stems solely from Kripke this is not strictly 
true. For example, John Stuart Mill, in A System of Logic (1843), explicitly discussed the semantics of natural 
kind terms. David Charles (2000) also argues that Aristotle had a particular semantics of (natural) kind terms. 
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could be certain necessary truths, those concerning identity and theoretical identity, that are 
nevertheless knowable only a posteriori. Put another way, Kripke argued that there are two 
brands of necessity: metaphysical and epistemic, and moreover they can come apart. So, 
whilst ‗all bachelors are unmarried men‘ is both metaphysically and epistemologically 
necessary, identity sentences like ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ and theoretical identities like 
‗water is H2O‘ are metaphysically necessary but epistemically contingent. 
These conclusions about the a posteriori necessity of theoretical identities have often 
been taken to motivate a return to a version of Aristotelian essentialism: the thesis that the 
world is objectively arranged into kinds, and that what it is to be a member of a particular 
kind is to instantiate the relevant kind essence. Indeed Hilary Putnam (1973), like Kripke, 
endorsed precisely this conclusion, albeit stemming from his independently developed, but 
clearly parallel, semantics for natural kind terms. In effect, both philosophers claimed to have 
derived metaphysically necessary truths from semantic and empirical premises, Kripke 
concerning individuals and natural kinds, Putnam concerning kinds. Whilst most philosophers 
were convinced by the Kripke‘s semantic theses concerning proper names3, and the 
metaphysical necessities they generate, the parallel conclusions for natural kinds and 
theoretical identities – what we might call the Kripke-Putnam programme – continues to be 
more controversial. That controversy concerns both the semantic claims about the reference of 
natural kind terms, and in the derivation of a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds. 
However, the Kripke-Putnam programme was not just about the derivation of a 
posteriori necessities concerning names and natural kind terms. Both Kripke and Putnam 
                                                          
3
 There are, of course, some exceptions. For instance, Harold Noonan (1981) maintains that a Fregean account of 
names is still possible.  
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were also interested in undermining the then traditional theories of meaning and reference 
developed by Gottlob Frege (1948), which we can label (broadly) as descriptivism: the thesis, 
roughly, that name-like terms have descriptive meanings. Putnam, in addition, was also 
concerned with the problem of Kuhnian incommensurability (1996), the problem of 
referential stability across scientific theory change. Together they offered a host of objections 
to descriptivism, and their own semantic thesis – the causal theory of direct reference – is now 
the contemporary orthodoxy. 
In chapter 1 of this thesis I will start be analysing Kripke‘s Naming and Necessity, 
presenting his semantic theses (first for proper names, and then extended to natural kind 
terms), and show how we are supposed to draw conclusions concerning natural kinds that are 
necessary yet a posteriori. I will then point out a number of puzzles that Kripke‘s initial 
account raises, many of which have already been identified in the literature. 
In chapter 2, rather than move on directly to answer the puzzles raised at the end of 
chapter 1, I will present and analyse Putnam‘s semantic thesis, developed specifically for 
natural kind terms (rather than extended from names to natural kind terms, as Kripke‘s is). I 
will also take time to point out the dissimilarities between Kripke‘s project and Putnam‘s, 
since this is often neglected in the literature, and I will also discriminate between early and 
later Putnam, and present Putnam‘s later arguments against the conclusion that there are 
metaphysically necessary truths about natural kinds. 
In chapter 3 I will discuss the first of the puzzles identified in chapter 1 – that natural 
kind terms and theoretical identities have some obvious dissimilarities with proper names and 
identity sentences. I will analyse and object to a recent strategy developed by Scott Soames 
(2002) to extend Kripke‘s less controversial conclusions about proper names to natural kind 
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terms, since it recognises the sorts of dissimilarities I identify, but nevertheless attempts to 
maintain the overall semantic thesis. I will conclude that this strategy is unsuccessful, and 
argue that the metaphysical necessities it purports to derive purely from linguistic premises 
(Soames 2002: 279) are, in fact, the product of controversial metaphysical presuppositions, 
which were identified by Nathan Salmon (originally published in 1982, all references to 2005 
edition) to be implicit in Putnam‘s and, to a lesser extent, Kripke‘s original work. 
In chapter 4, after identifying these implicit metaphysical assumptions in Soames, I 
turn to Nathan Salmon, and the second of the main puzzles raised at the end of chapter 1 and 
chapter 2: the implicit essentialism in Kripke and Putnam. As is well known, Salmon, in 
Reference and Essence, identified a key essentialist premise in Putnam‘s derivation of 
necessary a posteriori truths concerning natural kind terms. In this chapter I will present that 
analysis, and show (in more detail than Salmon) how it extends to Kripke. However, I will 
argue that Salmon‘s alternative thesis, which endorses the Kripke-Putnam semantics without 
the metaphysics, is unsuccessful for a number of reasons (both exegetical and philosophical). 
I will conclude that the most successful versions of the causal theory of direct reference, 
(CDR) for short, from the variations considered, are those that contain an essentialist premise. 
In chapter 5 I will present and defend a novel version of descriptivism, based upon the 
conclusion of chapter 4, and a general objection to the sort of semantics that (CDR) offers for 
natural kind terms, which I take to be taxonomic terms. I contend that classificatory terms are 
intended to communicate descriptive information. My own thesis, descriptivist essentialism, I 
claim, captures the main desiderata of a taxonomy,  in comparison to (CDR), where the notion 
of reference is simply assumed to be unproblematic. I will also demonstrate how this novel 
descriptivism avoids the standard objections identified in chapters 1 and 2. My main strategy 
is to use the same metaphysical assumptions, particularly essentialism, as proponents of 
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(CDR), to avoid both the modal and semantical arguments. I will then present a new 
metasemantic story about how taxonomic names, at least for chemical kinds, are introduced. 
By introducing a sharp division between a posteriori scientific investigation, and a priori 
naming events, I will claim that theoretical identities are plausibly a priori. 
In chapter 6, having identified in chapter 4 the implicit natural kind essentialism of 
Kripke, Putnam and Soames (which does all the heavy lifting in the derivation of necessary a 
posteriori truths concerning natural kinds), and having rejected Salmon‘s version of (CDR) as 
implausible for taxonomic terms, and used this same essentialism myself to defend a version 
of descriptivism in chapter 5, I now identify the root of this a posteriori essentialism in John 
Locke. However, I will argue that, in fact, Locke was an anti-essentialist, and that the various 
appeals to essentialism, and the notion of a ‗real essence‘, that have been made are speciously 
associated with Locke‘s philosophy of essence. In this chapter I show precisely why Locke is 
not an essentialist, and diagnose where the misunderstanding has occurred. I conclude that 
Lockean ‗real essences‘ cannot do the work that either (CDR) or descriptivist essentialism 
requires. 
In chapter 7, having dismissed Locke‘s notion of essence as the relevant (metaphysical 
essentialist) notion to feature in theoretical identifications, I turn to a recently developed 
brand of natural kind essentialism – Brian Ellis‘s scientific essentialism – that purports to be 
concerned with ‗the scientific practice of theoretical identification‘ (Ellis 2001: 54), and 
further claims that truths about natural kinds are metaphysically necessary, yet knowable only 
a posteriori. I offer a variety of counterexamples to his essentialist theses, and argue that the 
empirical facts refute the theory. I conclude that the appeal to a posteriori essences to derive 
necessary a posteriori theoretical identities is unsuccessful.  
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In chapter 8 I conclude the thesis, mapping out a metaphysically thin notion of 
essence, where the notion of an ‗essence‘ is treated as a species of definition, generated by the 
conjunction of intellectual fiat and the physical facts. I then take this notion and apply it to 
descriptivist essentialism, noting that when we treat the notion of an essence as a species of 
definition, the so-called essentialism loses its more metaphysically suspicious elements. In 
effect, I endorse Locke‘s antiessentialism, albeit without its nominalist trappings, employ the 
notion of a ‗real essence‘ as a philosophical term of art, intended to communicate the notion 
of a ‗definition‘, and relativise definitions to particular theories (in this case, contemporary 
chemistry). The conclusion of my thesis is that there is just no interesting connection between 
the semantics and metaphysics of natural kinds. 
Some of the work in this thesis has already appeared in print, in the form of both book 
chapters and articles. Chapters 5 and 8 both contain material that also appears in the paper 
‗The Abuse of the Necessary A Posteriori‘, co-authored with Helen Beebee, in The Semantics 
and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, edited by Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, 
published by Routledge in 2010. The majority of chapter 6 appears in the article ‗How 
Essentialists Misunderstand Locke‘ in History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 
273 – 292, published in 2009. The defence of promiscuous realism for chemical kinds that 
takes place in chapter 7, and the distinction between thick and thin essentialism sketched in 
chapter 8, had their first outing in my article ‗Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or 
Promiscuous Realism‘ in Philosophical Writings Vol. 34 pp. 5 – 12, published in 2007 
(which, incidentally, won the prize for best paper at the British Postgraduate Philosophy 
Association annual conference in 2007).     
CHAPTER 1 
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In this chapter I expound Saul Kripke‘s semantic thesis as found in Naming and Necessity 
(first published in 1972, but all references to 1980 edition). I present Kripke‘s thesis as a 
response to a descriptivist theory of meaning and reference which, in turn, was introduced in 
response to Frege‘s Puzzle. I demonstrate how Kripke‘s account is supposed to extend to 
natural kind terms, and use this extension to generate various questions that will set the topic 
for subsequent chapters. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows: in section 1 I give a brief account of Frege‘s 
Puzzle in order to motivate the discussion of identity and co-referring names. In section 2 I 
present the Fregean response to the puzzle. In section 3 I introduce Kripke‘s response to 
Frege‘s theory of meaning and reference, and present each of Kripke‘s objections in turn. In 
section 4 I present Kripke‘s positive thesis, the Causal Theory of Direct Reference (CDR). In 
section 5 I outline how Kripke‘s positive thesis is supposed to solve Frege‘s Puzzle. Finally, 
in section 6 I will extend the account to natural kind terms. In section 7 I will raise a number 
of puzzles, setting the agenda for the following chapters. 
 
1.1 Frege’s Puzzle 
We can start this investigation by asking what a name contributes to the meaning of a 
sentence containing it: does the name merely contribute its referent, or does it have some 
further meaning? 
According to Frege, if ‗a‘ is a name then an identity statement ‗a = a‘ is knowable a 
priori and necessary. A (minimally competent) language user who has acquired the name ‗a‘ 
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can come to know the truth of the identity statement ‗a = a‘ merely be reflecting on the 
meaning of the name ‗a‘. But consider the identity statement ‗a = b‘. As Frege noted, this 
second identity statement ‗contains a valuable extension of our knowledge and cannot always 
be established a priori‘ (Frege 1948: 209). That the second identity statement is an extension 
of our knowledge demonstrates that the names ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ have different cognitive values. 
However, if identity is understood as a relation between whatever names happen to refer to 
(i.e. what the name denotes), and ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ have the same referent, then the claim that ‗a = a 
and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value‘ (Frege 1948: 209) appears, 
false: if all there is to the meaning of a name is its referent, and ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ have the very same 
referent, then the identity statements ‗a = a‘ and ‗a = b‘ express the same proposition, and 
cannot differ in cognitive value. Consequently we are faced with what has traditionally been 
dubbed as Frege’s Puzzle. Consider the following identity statements: 
 
(1) Marie Curie is Marie Curie 
(2) Marie Curie is Maria Sklodowska  
 
If the meaning of a name is that to which it refers, and the names ‗Marie Curie‘ and 
‗Maria Sklodowska‘ refer to the same person, then the meanings of sentence (1) and (2) are 
identical – they express the same proposition. But (2) cannot be a useful extension of our 
knowledge and yet express the same proposition as (1), since (1) is knowable a priori, and is 
not a useful extension of our knowledge. But (2) is knowable only a posteriori. Hence there is 
a cognitive asymmetry between (1) and (2): while the truth of the proposition expressed by (1) 
is knowable a priori the truth of the proposition expressed by (2) is knowable only a 
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posteriori. Were the two identity statements expressing the very same proposition there would 
be no such cognitive asymmetry. That there is an asymmetry indicates that the thesis that the 
meaning of a name is simply that to which it refers must be false. 
The cognitive asymmetry can be made even more obvious by considering the 
following example: 
 
(3) Marie Curie won the Nobel Prize in Physics. 
(4) Maria Sklodowska won the Nobel Prize in Physics. 
 
Both (3) and (4) express propositions that are potentially valuable extensions of our 
knowledge, but it is entirely possible to understand both (3) and (4) yet think that (3) is true 
and (4) is false without being accused of irrationality. But if ‗Marie Curie‘ and ‗Maria 
Sklodowska‘ meant the same thing, (3) and (4) would express the same proposition. If (3) and 
(4) express the same proposition then to believe that (3) is true, and yet maintain that (4) is 
false (or even merely to remain agnostic about whether it is true) would be inconsistent. That 
it is not inconsistent shows, again, that (3) and (4) do not express the same proposition. 
 
1.2 Description theory of meaning and reference 
Frege‘s solution to the problem of cognitive asymmetry is to argue for something ‗besides 
that to which the sign refers, which may be called the referent of the sign, wherein the mode 
of presentation is contained‘ (Frege 1948: 210). In the Marie Curie/Maria Sklodowska 
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example the solution would work as follows. While the referent of the names ‗Marie Curie‘ 
and ‗Maria Sklodowska‘ is the same, the sense of the name ‗Marie Curie‘ is different to the 
sense of the name ‗Maria Sklodowska‘. Consequently Frege can account for the cognitive 
asymmetry between co-referring names by arguing that singular terms do not solely denote 
objects in the world but all carry a sense, which ‗is the manner in which the term presents its 
denotation to the listener or reader‘ (Salmon 2005: 9). Thus there is a distinction between the 
sense of singular terms such as the name ‗Marie Curie‘, and that name‘s referent. The sense 
and the referent of a singular term are related insofar as while the sense is conceptual, and it is 
possible for ‗the sense of ordinary proper names [to vary] from person to person‘ (Burge 
1977: 357), the referent of the singular term is ‗whatever uniquely fits the concept‘ (Salmon 
2005: 9) contained in the sense. The sense of a singular term should therefore be understood 
as playing at least a dual role within the Fregean thesis: it is both the ‗mode of presentation to 
the speaker‘ (Burge 1977: 356) and that which is ‗determining the referent or denotation 
associated with the expression‘ (ibid.).  
 The general Fregean picture, what we might call a description theory of meaning and 
reference (or just descriptivism for short), then, is that the sense of a term supplies ‗a set of 
conditions, or properties, and the denotation, if any, is what uniquely satisfies those 
conditions‘ (Salmon 2005: 9). In the case of the name ‗Marie Curie‘ the sense might be ‗the 
first woman to be awarded the Nobel Prize‘. Thus, whosoever uniquely satisfies the 
description by being the first woman to be awarded the Nobel Prize is Marie Curie. Since the 
sense of the name ‗Maria Sklodowska‘—perhaps ‗the woman who earned a physics degree in 
1893 and a maths degree in 1894 at the Sorbonne‘ – is not the same as the sense of ‗Marie 
Curie‘, we can explain why one can believe (3) to be true, whilst thinking that (4) is false. 
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Similarly, this explains why (2) is a posteriori and an extension of our knowledge, whilst (1) 
is merely a priori. 
 There are two possible ways to construe the Fregean thesis. It can be held as either (i) 
a theory of reference, or (ii) a theory of meaning (cf. Kripke 1980: 53-54). While the two 
options are not mutually exclusive – a proponent of (i) could also subscribe to (ii) – it is 
important to distinguish between them. If we were to subscribe to the Fregean thesis solely as 
a theory of reference this entails only that the object satisfying the description is the referent 
of the name. However, if we also subscribe to the thesis as a theory of meaning then this 
entails that a name can be replaced, within a sentence, by the description which is its sense, 
without changing the meaning of that sentence. As such if we substitute, within a sentence, 
some name for its synonymous description there will be no change of truth value since the 
description (which is the sense) is synonymous with the name. For the sake of this discussion 
we will be considering the Fregean thesis as one of reference and meaning, and considering 
the problems associated with the claim that names are synonymous with descriptions.  
 
1.3 Kripke’s objections 
The main objector to the Fregean account of semantics is Saul Kripke (1980). Following 
Nathan Salmon (2005: 23-31) I shall divide and label Kripke‘s arguments as follows: (a) the 
modal argument, (b) the epistemological argument, and (c) the semantical argument. In the 
following sections I will expound and discuss each in turn. 
 
1.3.1 The Modal Argument 
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The modal argument targets the Fregean‘s use of some simple set of properties to form the 
basis of a description which, when uniquely satisfied by some person (or object), (i) denotes 
the referent of a name, and (ii) is considered to be synonymous with some particular name. 
Consider, for example, the name ‗John Locke‘, and assume that the sense of the name is ‗the 
author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first 
Earl of Shaftsbury‘. Thus according to (i) and (ii) we can say that the description ‗the author 
of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of 
Shaftsbury‘ both denotes the referent of the name, and is synonymous with it. As such, 
consider the following three sentences: 
 
(5) John Locke, if he exists, is the author of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury. 
 
(6) If anyone is the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and 
personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury, then he is John Locke. 
 
(7) Someone is the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and 
personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury if and only if he is the author of 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first 
Earl of Shaftsbury. 
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Given (ii) we are able to derive (7) from (5) and (6) by substituting the description ‗the 
author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the 1
st
 Earl 
of Shaftsbury‘ with its apparently synonymous name ‗John Locke‘. However, (7) is evidently 
a necessary truth, and as the only difference between (7) and (6) or (5) is the substitution of 
‗John Locke‘ for its synonym ‗the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
and personal physician to the 1
st
 Earl of Shaftsbury‘ then both (6) and (5), like (7), must be 
necessary. 
But if we consider (5) then it seems obvious that we can imagine a possibility where 
John Locke was not the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding because, 
while at Oxford, he discovered a passion for literature, and never came to do philosophy. 
Furthermore we can also imagine that Locke, as a result of his all encompassing passion for 
literature, never studied medicine. As such he was of no use to the first Earl of Shaftsbury 
when he came to Oxford seeking medical treatment, and thus never became his personal 
physician. 
The result of the argument, given the possible situation in which (5) turns out to be 
false, is that (5) cannot be necessarily true
4
; any proposition that can be false cannot be 
necessarily true! Therefore, since (5) comes out as necessary on the Fregean thesis (assuming, 
of course, that the Fregean would pick that description), that thesis must be false. 
What motivates Kripke‘s modal argument is the (Millian) intuition that names like 
‗John Locke‘ still refer to the same person notwithstanding any counterfactual scenarios in 
which, for example, Locke failed to become the author of An Essay Concerning Human 
                                                          
4
 An analogous argument can be run for sentence (6), where someone else does all the things cited in the 
description, which according to the Fregean are sufficient for picking out the referent, but is not John Locke 
(perhaps David Hume did, in some counterfactual scenario) do all the things that John Locke did in this world. 
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Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury. In other words names 
such as ‗John Locke‘ continue to denote their referents in counterfactual scenarios where the 
referent failed to do the things which we (contingently) associate with them in this world. 
 
1.3.2 The Epistemological Argument 
The epistemological argument  is similar to the modal argument, but targets a language user‘s 
ability to know the truth of a given proposition expressed by some sentence. If we again 
consider (7) and either (5) or (6), the Fregean claims that the name ‗John Locke‘ is 
synonymous with the description ‗the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury‘. Hence not only is (7) is knowable a 
priori, but since (5) and (6) express the same proposition as (7), the truths of (5) and/or (6) are 
also knowable a priori. In other words, to imagine John Locke without the attributes of being 
the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first 
Earl of Shaftsbury ‗should be as difficult as imagining a ―married bachelor‖ or an ―unmarried 
husband‖‘ (Salmon 2005: 28). The commitment of the Fregean thesis is that the meaning of 
the name ‗John Locke‘ precludes Locke not having the properties of being the author of An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and being the personal physician to the 1
st
 Earl of 
Shaftsbury in just the same way as it is precluded of anyone to whom the term ‗bachelor‘ 
truly applies that they have the property of being a married man. 
However, not only do we think that we can imagine a situation where John Locke 
failed to do the things we commonly attribute to him, and that this counterfactual scenario is 
possible, we also do not think that such reflections are precluded merely by reflection on the 
meaning of the terms in sentences like (5) and (6). The point is that sentences like (5) and (6) 
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may have the prima facie appearance of sentences like ‗a bachelor, if he (or one) exists, is an 
unmarried man‘, but while the bachelor sentence is knowable a priori, (5) and (6) are 
knowable only a posteriori. We do not think that sentences such as ‗John Locke, if he exists, 
is the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the 
first Earl of Shaftsbury‘ are true by definition (and hence knowable a priori). Therefore, 
mutatis mutandis for names in general, we should admit that the Fregean theory of semantics 
misrepresents what it is to be a singular term such as a name, as illustrated by the Locke 
example.  
 
1.3.3 The Semantical Argument 
The semantical argument differs from both the modal and epistemological arguments in that it 
targets the notion of reference directly and is, according to Salmon, ‗the strongest and most 
persuasive of the three kinds of argument from the primary thesis of the direct reference 
theory‘ (Salmon 2005: 29). 
Consider the following example: take the name ‗Charles Darwin‘ and consider the 
properties that a language user might associate with the name that make up the Fregean notion 
of sense. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that the description was something like ‗the 
British naturalist who theorised that evolution was the effect of natural selection on 
advantageous traits‘. According to the Fregean thesis of reference, the name ‗Charles Darwin‘ 
denotes whomsoever satisfies the description ‗the British naturalist who theorised that 
evolution was the effect of natural selection on advantageous traits‘. But suppose that Charles 
Darwin did not theorise that evolution was the effect of natural selection, although we 
mistakenly think that he did. Suppose further that some other British naturalist did so theorise 
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about evolution, say, Alfred Russell Wallace. Finally suppose that we are totally unaware of 
Alfred Russell Wallace‘s existence, and a fortiori totally unaware that he had any theories on 
evolution. 
The problem facing the Fregean is that they are committed to saying that the name 
‗Charles Darwin‘ refers to Alfred Russell Wallace if he satisfies the description ‗the British 
naturalist who theorised that evolution was the effect of natural selection on advantageous 
traits‘ because the Fregean holds that ‗precisely whom a name denotes depends entirely on 
whoever happens to have certain properties uniquely‘ (Salmon 2005: 37). In the scenario 
outline above it is Alfred Russell Wallace who uniquely satisfies the description associated 
with the name ‗Charles Darwin‘. As a result the name ‗Charles Darwin‘ denotes Alfred 
Russell Wallace – despite us having no knowledge that such a man even exists. 
Kripke‘s point is that the fact that Alfred Russell Wallace happens to have the 
properties referred to in the description ‗the British naturalist who theorised that evolution 
was the effect of natural selection on advantageous traits‘ should have no bearing on who the 
referent of the name ‗Charles Darwin‘ is. Even if Alfred Russell Wallace did have Charles-
Darwin-like properties, this should be irrelevant to the denotation of the name ‗Charles 
Darwin‘. That the particular properties do play such a prominent role in the Fregean thesis is 
sufficient to show, given the previous example, and mutatis mutandis other examples 
involving names, that the theory is false. Thus we require an alternative thesis. It is to this – 
Kripke‘s positive thesis – I now turn. 
 
1.4 The Causal Theory of Direct Reference 
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Kripke takes the preceding three arguments to be a refutation of the Fregean view of 
semantics, and uses the problems left by the three arguments to motivate his own alternative 
account, first of proper names, and then natural kind terms. In what follows I will present 
Kripke‘s alternative picture of semantics, show how it purports to avoid the modal, 
epistemological and semantical arguments, and in so doing start to discriminate between what 
I take, in fact, to be two separate concerns within the Kripkean thesis.  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, let us label Kripke‘s semantic thesis as the 
Causal Theory of Direct Reference (CDR). The thesis provides an account of both the 
meaning – claiming that the meaning is the referent – and the reference of names, and 
presents us with an idealised picture of how reference to the bearer of a name is achieved. The 
theory is aptly characterised as causal since the meaning of a name is passed causally from 
speaker to speaker though a community of language users. The claim is that speakers along 
the causal chain intend to refer to exactly the thing that the initial speaker referred to when 
they first deployed the name. In other words, ‗there is a causal chain of reference-preserving 
links leading back from‘ some speaker‘s use to the first use of the name as deployed by the 
introducer of that name (Evans 2008: 316). The ‗first use‘ alludes to what Evans terms a 
‗name-acquiring transaction‘ (ibid.) where some object, x, is picked out by some language 
user, Lu, in what Kripke calls an ‗initial ―baptism‖‘ (Kripke 1980: 96) where some object is 
‗named by ostension, or the reference of a name may be fixed by a description‘ (ibid.). 
However, even in cases where reference is fixed via a description, on Kripke‘s view ‗the 
description used is not synonymous with the name‘ (Kripke 1980: 96 n42), and nor is it 
uniquely identifying of just that object. The fundamental thought is that in most cases a 
language user ‗is acquainted in some sense with the object he names and is able to name it 
ostensively‘ (ibid.) without the mediation of any description – hence the direct reference. 
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A rough statement of the theory might be the following: An initial ‗baptism‘ takes 
place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may 
be fixed by a description. When the name is ‗passed from link to link‘, the receiver of 
the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the 
man from whom he heard it. (Kripke 1980, p. 96) 
 
The first thing to note about Kripke‘s positive account is that it is an ‗as-if‘ account. 
Kripke is not claiming that these dubbing ceremonies literally take place, conceding rather 
that there are ‗artificialities in this whole account‘ (Kripke 1980: 139 n70). The point is 
simply that names (and, in due course, natural kind terms) ‗behave semantically as if they 
were introduced in Kripke style definitions‘ (Brown 1998: 279 emphasis added). 
The second, and more important, thing to note is the apparent force of the Kripkean 
picture in relation to the modal, epistemological and semantical arguments used against the 
Fregean. Kripke ‗endorses Mill‘s view of singular terms‘ (Kripke 1980: 135) where ‗names 
do not refer to their referent by specifying a condition which their referent uniquely satisfies‘ 
(Hughes 2004: 1) but rather refer directly. As such ‗there is no reason why we cannot stipulate 
that, in talking about what would have happened to [a person P] in a certain counterfactual 
situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him‘ (Kripke 1980: 44). 
Consider, again, the name ‗John Locke‘. If meaning and reference accords with the Kripkean 
semantic picture then the name ‗John Locke‘ was fixed to a particular person during an initial 
baptism, and refers directly to him. Language users who are causally downwind of this event 
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intend, when deploying the name, to refer to whomever the initial dubber – presumably John 
Locke‘s parents – referred to when they introduced the name. 
By telling this type of meta-semantic story about how the reference of a term is fixed, 
Kripke can avoid the semantical argument. The semantical argument, which targets reference 
simpliciter, demonstrated a particular problem with a semantic thesis committed to the view 
that the referent of a name is whatever uniquely satisfies some description. The problem was 
that if singular terms such as names have a sense – which is a description picking out some set 
of properties – then should that sense, through ignorance or error, be uniquely satisfied by 
some other person or object (as in the Charles Darwin/Alfred Russell Wallace case), then that 
other person is the referent of the name. On the Kripkean view there is no sense. Names refer 
directly, and are non-descriptive (their reference is not mediated by description). Therefore 
irrespectively of our abilities to discern any necessary (and perhaps sufficient) conditions,  
which the referent of the term actually does uniquely satisfy, we can refer simply in virtue of 
the meta-semantic story about how the reference of the name was fixed. 
However, there is a further corollary of the non-descriptiveness of names (cf. Salmon 
2005, Soames 2002) such that we can ask counterfactual questions about this or that person 
without worrying whether we can identify them in any given counterfactual scenario. So, as 
Kripke says: 
 
[A]lthough the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that 
he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called ‗Nixon‘)… [and] 
it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what 
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might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that ‗transworld 
identifications‘ are unproblematic in such cases. (Kripke 1980, p. 49) 
 
Thus Kripke introduces his notion of referring rigidly such that reference across possible 
worlds in unproblematic. The notion of rigid reference, or of being a rigid designator, is just 
the idea that a term is rigid if ‗in every possible world it designates the same object‘ (Kripke 
1980: 48). Since ‗names are always rigid designators‘ (Kripke 1980, p. 58), any 
counterfactual scenario concerning a person, be it John Locke, Richard Nixon or Marie Curie, 
does not raise problems of identity, because in asking questions about what might have 
happened to them, we have stipulated that it is exactly them we are talking about. 
The introduction of the notion of rigidity to Kripke‘s semantic thesis (CDR) serves to 
explain why the modal and epistemological arguments have no force against this view. The 
epistemological argument, recall, targeted a language user‘s ability to know the truth of a 
proposition express by some sentence, concluding that the Fregean was committed to saying 
that (5), (6) and (7) all express the same proposition because a name is synonymous with its 
sense, and can be substituted within a sentence with no loss of truth value. As such given that 
the truth of (7) was obviously knowable a priori, and expressed the same proposition as (5) 
and (6), their truth was also knowable a priori. The modal argument, on the other hand, 
revealed the Fregean‘s commitment to the necessary truth of certain propositions which, 
under normal circumstances, we consider to be contingent. Thus, again, the synonymy of a 
name with a description, and the substitutions from (5) and (6) to (7) entailed that since (7) 
was necessary so too were (5) and (6). 
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For Kripke although the referent of a singular term can, in some cases, be fixed via 
description, the meaning of the name just is the referent, and thus is never synonymous with 
some description. Names, ‗as a corollary of the more central thesis that they are 
nondescriptional, together with an account of how their reference is fixed in the actual world‘ 
(Soames 2002: 264) are always rigid designators. The point can be neatly illustrated using the 
previous example. 
In the example, sentence (5) states that John Locke is the author of An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury. It 
might be that the description ‗is the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury‘ is the convention we used to affix the 
reference of the name ‗John Locke‘. Does it follow from the adoption of this convention that 
what it is to be John Locke consists in being the author of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury? Intuitively, the answer 
is no. The reference of the name ‗John Locke‘ is being fixed by an accidental (contingent) 
property of him, that he authored a particular book and was the physician of a particular 
person. But what we are trying to denote is that man, rather than whomsoever has the 
properties we associate with him. Hence there is an intuitive and obvious difference between 
the name ‗John Locke‘ and the phrase ‗is the author of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury‘. While ‗John Locke‘ 
qualifies as a rigid designator, picking out the same man in all possible worlds, the phrase ‗is 
the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first 
Earl of Shaftsbury‘ does not designate anyone rigidly, since authoring An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding and being the physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury is a contingent 
property of John Locke, and hence not one he possesses in all possible worlds. 
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Thus we can clearly demonstrate why Kripkean semantics do not fall foul of the three 
objections to the descriptivist. On Kripke‘s story although the name ‗John Locke‘ may have 
been fixed using the description ‗is the author of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and personal physician to the first Earl of Shaftsbury‘, they are not synonyms. 
As such (5) does not express an equivalent proposition to (7), and thus (5) is neither knowable 
a priori (the conclusion of the epistemological argument), nor is it necessary (the conclusion 
of the modal argument). Although John Locke may be individuated via the property of being 
the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and personal physician to the first 
Earl of Shaftsbury, it would be a mistake to identify Locke with this property. 
But this still leaves the original problem of cognitive asymmetry that troubled Frege: 
by endorsing Mill‘s view of names, and arguing that the meaning of a name is simply the 
referent, it would seem, prima facie at least, that (CDR) will have a problem explaining why 
knowing the truth ‗a = b‘ is a useful extension of our knowledge if ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ are co-referring 
names, and thereby contribute the same content (the referent) to a proposition. 
 
1.5 A Solution to Frege’s Puzzle? 
Frege‘s Puzzle, as discussed in the opening section, is a puzzle about the apparent cognitive 
asymmetry of co-referring names. The puzzle was aimed specifically at an account of the 
meaning of names which subscribed to the view that the meaning of a name is just that to 
which it refers. As Kripkean semantics endorses such a view it seems to invite the problem all 
over again: if two names ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ denote the same referent, then the identity statement ‗a = 
b‘ should be no more an extension of our knowledge than ‗a = a‘, because if they have the 
same denotation, and all there is to the meaning of a name is its referent, then they also 
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express the same proposition. However, ‗a = b‘ does seem to extend our knowledge, so there 
is some puzzle as to why it does. 
Kripke‘s solution to the problem, and his view on identity, is clear from his discussion 
of Hesperus and Phosphorus. The statement ‗Hesperus is Hesperus‘ is an identity statement 
that is analytic and its truth is knowable a priori, whereas the identity statement ‗Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ is, if true, knowable only a posteriori, as no amount of reflection on either of the 
terms reveals the truth of the identity claim. The point is that while ‗Hesperus‘ names the 
morning star, and ‗Phosphorus‘ the evening star, both the morning and evening stars 
respectively turn out to be a single heavenly body, the planet Venus. That the morning star 
and the evening star are Venus remains hidden from view until we engage in empirical 
investigation. However, once we have found out that there are not, in fact, two heavenly 
bodies here, but one which occupies different positions at different times of year, we also 
discover that the terms we used to pick out these two heavenly bodies are in fact co-
referential. If all names are rigid designators, then it follows that identity statements 
containing two names which are co-referential, such as ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘, are, if true 
in this world, true in all possible worlds. In other words, the truth of the identity statement 
‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘, the rigidity of the names ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘, and the 
necessity of identity entail that necessarily Hesperus is Phosphorus. Furthermore, since 
knowing the truth of the identity statement takes some empirical investigation, it turns out that 
there are some necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori.  
Kripke‘s answer to the problem of cognitive asymmetry, then, stems from the wedge 
he drives between the notion of identity and the semantic fact that, say, ‗Hesperus‘ and 
‗Phosphorus‘ are co-referential. So, while the identity statement ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ is 
necessary because Hesperus is Phosphorus – there is only a single referent, and necessarily 
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everything is self identical – that the two names are in fact co-referential is not immediately 
obvious from reflection on the terms. In order to find out that the two names are co-referential 
we need to engage in some empirical investigation, tracking back two distinct causal chains of 
reference to two unique baptismal events. That this investigation is a prerequisite of judging 
whether the identity statement ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ is true demonstrates that the identity 
statement lacks epistemic necessity: it is not knowable a priori. 
The important distinction, then, is between two types of necessity: metaphysical and 
epistemic. The identity statement ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ is metaphysically necessary – true 
in all possible worlds – given that it is true in this world, that ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘ are 
both rigid designators, and that everything is necessarily self identical. However, it is not 
epistemically necessary since mere reflection on the terms does not reveal the truth of the 
identity statement. By contrast the identity statement ‗a bachelor is an unmarried man‘ is both 
metaphysically and epistemically necessary: it is true in all possible worlds, and its truth is 
knowable merely by reflecting on the terms ‗bachelor‘ and ‗unmarried man‘ respectively. The 
latter case, then, is an example of the necessary a priori, whereas the former is an example of 
the necessary a posteriori. 
The crux of the distinction is that in the case of some a posteriori necessities ‗we can 
say that under appropriate qualitatively identical evidential situations, an appropriate 
corresponding qualitative statement might have been false‘ (Kripke 1980: 142). Kripke 
illustrates this distinction using the Hesperus/Phosphorus case as follows: If ‗H‘ and ‗P‘ are 
rigid designators then if ‗H = P‘ is true it is also necessary. However, imagine further that the 
references ‗H‘ and ‗P‘ had been fixed using the non-rigid descriptions ‗DH‘ and ‗DP‘ 
respectively i.e. ‗the heavenly body in such-and-such a position in the sky in the evening 
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(morning)‘ (Kripke 1980: 143). Although ‗H = P‘ is necessary, ‗DH = DP‘ is contingent, and 
thus Kripke says: 
 
The inaccurate statement that Hesperus might have turned out not to be Phosphorus 
should be replace by the true contingency mentioned earlier in these lectures: two 
distinct bodies might have occupied, in the morning and the evening, respectively, the 
very positions actually occupied by Hesperus-Phosphorus-Venus. (Kripke 1980: 143) 
 
Thus although the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus guarantees the metaphysical necessity of 
the identity statement ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ it does not guarantee epistemic necessity, and 
this is sufficient to explain the cognitive asymmetry of the identity statement ‗Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ in comparison to the identity statement ‗Hesperus is Hesperus‘, given that both 
express the very same proposition. 
 
1.6 Natural Kinds 
[M]y argument implicitly concludes that certain general terms, those for natural kinds, 
have a greater kinship with proper names than is generally realized. This conclusion 
holds for certain for various species names, whether they are count nouns, such as 
‗cat‘, ‗tiger‘, ‗chunk of gold‘, or mass terms such as ‗gold‘, ‗water‘, ‗iron pyrites‘. 
(Kripke 1980, p. 134) 
 
 33 
According to Kripke his thesis about proper names is ‗supposed to extend to 
theoretical identity statement like ―Gold = the element with atomic number 79‖ and ―Water = 
H2O‖‘ (LaPorte 2004: 36). The basic line of argument is that ‗terms for natural kinds are 
much closer to proper names than is ordinarily supposed‘ (Kripke 1980: 127), and that ‗[t]he 
old term ‗common name‘ is thus quite appropriate for predicates marking out species or 
natural kinds, such as ―cow‖ or ―tiger‖…[and]… mass terms for natural kinds, such as ―gold‖, 
―water‖ and the like‘ (ibid.). If natural kind terms are a species of name then given that 
‗names are always rigid designators‘ (Kripke 1980: 58) we should be able to derive an 
analogue of Kripke‘s conclusion concerning proper names – that identity statements can be 
necessary but, nevertheless, knowable only a posteriori – for natural kind terms. 
Thus Kripke introduces a sub-species of identity statement: the theoretical identity 
statement. A theoretical identity statement is a statement ‗representing [a] scientific discovery 
about what this stuff is‘ (Kripke 1980: 125), where this stuff is some natural kind. These new 
identities are ‗identities between terms for substances, and also the properties of substances 
and of natural kinds‘ (Kripke 1980: 166), and are ‗generally identities involving two rigid 
designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori‘ (Kripke 1980: 140). 
Kripke presents various examples of these ‗types of identity statement expressing scientific 
discoveries‘ (Kripke 1980: 128) including ‗light is a stream of photons‘, ‗water is H2O‘, 
‗lighting is electrical discharge‘ and ‗gold is the element with atomic number 79‘. The basic 
point is the same in all cases: if terms for natural kinds are analogous to names, and all names 
are rigid designators, then theoretical identifications will be, if true, necessary. As such, at 
least according to Kripke, ‗statements representing scientific discoveries about what this stuff 
is are not contingent truths but necessary truths in the strictest possible sense‘ (Kripke 1980: 
125). 
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Consider, by way of illustration, the theoretical identification sentence ‗tungsten is the 
element with atomic number 74‘. If we apply Kripke‘s story about proper names to this case 
we might say something like the following: the theoretical identity ‗tungsten is the element 
with atomic number 74‘ is a species of identity containing two natural kind terms ‗tungsten‘ 
and ‗the element with atomic number 74‘ respectively. Each natural kind term, being 
analogous to a proper name, is also a rigid designator, which is to say that it designates that 
same thing in all possible worlds. After some empirical (scientific) investigation it has been 
discovered that the identity sentence ‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 74‘ is true. 
The conjunction of the true identity sentence, both ‗tungsten‘ and ‗the element with atomic 
number 74‘ being rigid designators, and the necessity of identity, is sufficient to guarantee 
that tungsten is the element with atomic number 74 in all possible worlds. In other words, it 
turns out to be necessary that tungsten is the element with atomic number 74, but nevertheless 
a posteriori.  
As in the proper names case Kripke distinguishes cases where the reference of the 
rigid designator is fixed using a non-rigid designator which gives an illusion of contingency. 
The contrast in Kripke‘s discussion is between water, and so called fool‘s water, i.e., 
polywater
5
. According to Kripke‘s (intuitive) account, when we originally identified the 
natural kind water we did so via its characteristic properties, its ‗feel, appearance and perhaps 
taste‘ (Kripke 1980: 128). Much later we made the discovery that water is H2O. But now 
consider two distinct scenarios: Firstly, imagine an actual substance with a ‗completely 
different atomic structure from that of water‘, but which resembles water in all characteristic 
                                                          
5
 Polywater was hypothesised during the 1960‘s by Nikolai Fedyakin, and later by Boris Derjaguin (who called it 
‗anomalous water‘). However, this polymerised water was later found, by Denis Rousseau, not to be polymerised 
water at all, but just water containing certain impurities. 
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respects (ibid.); secondly, imagine a substance with the same atomic structure as water, but 
with ‗very different identifying marks from that of what we now call water‘ (ibid.: 129). 
Kripke‘s view is that in the first scenario, the substance with the identifying marks of water, 
but a different atomic constitution, is not water. Rather, ‗just as there is a fool‘s gold there 
could be a fool‘s water‘ (ibid.: 128). Once we have discovered that water is H2O, nothing 
lacking that atomic structure could be water. In the second scenario the situation is the same, 
regardless of what identifying marks the substance happens to have, if it is H2O then it is 
water. The description of the appearance of water, by which we might have originally 
identified it, may well have helped us fix the reference of the natural kind term ‗water‘, but it 
was a non-rigid designator. These considerations are, in effect, the analogues of those found 
in Kripke‘s three arguments against the Fregean. 
Consider the following three sentences: 
 
(8)  Tungsten, if it exists, is the silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China. 
 
(9)  If anything is the silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China then it is tungsten. 
 
(10) Something is the silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China if and only if it is 
the silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China. 
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If, when we identify tungsten, we treat the identifying description as the meaning of ‗tungsten‘ 
(in Frege‘s terminology, as the sense), then from (8) and (9) we can derive (10). As in the 
proper names case this valid substitution has three counterintuitive consequences. Firstly, 
since (10) is necessary, and both (8) and (9) express the same proposition – given that 
‗tungsten‘ is synonymous with ‗the silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China‘ – then (8) 
and (9) are also necessary (the modal argument). Secondly, since the truth of (10) is knowable 
a priori, and both (8) and (9) express the same proposition, they too are knowable a priori 
(the epistemic argument). Finally, as whatever satisfies the description ‗the silvery-white, 
lustrous metal found in China‘ is tungsten then were there, in the actual world, to be some 
other substance which uniquely satisfied this description then it would be the referent of the 
natural kind term ‗tungsten‘. Thus if gold satisfied the description ‗the silvery-white, lustrous 
metal found in China‘ then it would be the referent of the natural kind term ‗tungsten‘ (the 
semantical argument).  
Kripke‘s response is evident from the discussion of water earlier. It is not a 
metaphysically necessary property of tungsten that it be the silvery-white, lustrous metal 
found in China. While it might be true that the properties of being silvery-white, lustrous and 
found in China were used to fix the reference of ‗tungsten‘ the description ‗the silvery-white, 
lustrous metal found in China‘ is a non-rigid designator, and as such even if (10) happens to 
be true it is not necessarily so. Secondly, nothing about the meaning of ‗tungsten‘ appears to 
preclude something to which the natural kind term truly applies lacking any one (or even all) 
of the properties listed in (10). The meaning of ‗tungsten‘ does not tell us what properties 
tungsten has; finding tungsten‘s properties is a matter of empirical investigation. In effect, any 
theory of meaning and reference that treats ‗tungsten‘ and ‗the silvery-white, lustrous metal 
found in China‘ as synonyms is committed to the necessity of obviously contingent properties 
 37 
(the modal argument), and the a priority of identity statements that are a posteriori (the 
epistemological argument). 
The a posteriority of theoretical identifications such as ‗tungsten is the element with 
atomic number 74‘ plays a positive role in Kripke‘s alternative to a description theory of 
meaning and reference in that it explains why there is a cognitive asymmetry between  
theoretical identities like (10) and ‗tungsten is tungsten‘, despite both expressing the same 
proposition. Finally, an application of Kripke‘s story about how name-acquiring transactions 
takes place, despite being an ‗as-if‘ story, gives us a clear picture of why the properties an 
object contingently has play either (a) no role, or (b) a minimal role as reference fixers, in the 
naming of natural kinds.  
 
1.7 Puzzles 
There are a number of puzzles that arise from Kripke‘s application of his semantics of proper 
names to natural kinds. The first and most obvious question begins with the observation that 
many of Kripke‘s examples of theoretical identification sentences seem, quite obviously, to 
contain descriptions. For example the theoretical identification sentence ‗tungsten is the 
element with atomic number 74‘ (and any other theoretical identification for an element on 
the periodic table) looks to contain an attributive description i.e. ‗the element with atomic 
number 74‘. If this observation is correct then we require some explanation of why a 
description like ‗the element with atomic number 74‘ can be a rigid designator whereas ‗the 
silvery-white, lustrous metal found in China‘ cannot, given that there is no significant 
grammatical difference between them. 
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This observation, however, is part of a broader question concerned with precisely how 
we should view the semantics of natural kind terms, and it that respect it is not new. There are 
two popular opposing views on the market. 
The first, defended by Scott Soames (cf. Soames 2002), argues that Kripke did not 
give us an adequate account of the rigidity of natural kind terms. Soames argues that natural 
kind terms are most naturally treated as predicates, rather than general names. Furthermore, 
the ‗notion of rigidity to characterize the semantic similarities between natural kind predicates 
and proper names was unsuccessful‘ (Soames 2002: 264) leaving a significant lacuna in 
Kripke‘s thesis. That is not to say that natural kind predicates are not rigid – on Soames‘ view 
they are indeed rigid. But the rigidity of predicates, and the semantic similarity that grounds 
an analogy between names and natural kind terms, stems from the more central thesis that 
names and natural kind terms are non-descriptional. As Soames says, when setting out his 
investigation, ‗the important parallel between names and natural kind predicates may be their 
nondescriptionality, and the way their reference is fixed‘ (Soames 2002: 265)6. Prima facie 
the claim that natural kind predicates are nondescriptional is odd – after all, don‘t predicates 
ascribe properties to objects, and thus receive a fairly natural treatment as descriptional? 
Soames‘ view is that natural kind predicates are introduced in much the same way as 
proper names – that is, ‗either ostensively or via a description‘ (Soames 2002: 267). When 
natural kind predicates are introduced, in contrast to proper names, typically a speaker will 
ostend a sample of individuals that are presumed ‗to be instances of a single natural kind‘ 
(ibid.). With proper names, only a single individual is ostended. However, this does not 
                                                          
6
 Although as we shall see in chapter 3, Soames (2002) is not consistent in his treatment of natural kind 
predicates as nondescriptional, claiming explicitly that certain natural kind terms are synonymous with 
descriptions.  
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constitute a metasemantic difference, merely a practical one. Moreover, when natural kind 
terms are introduced, although speakers might associate descriptive properties with the term, 
the extension of that natural kind term is determined independently of any description that a 
speaker happens to associate with it (ibid.: 266). Hence, according to Soames at least, ‗a 
speaker can successfully use a natural kind predicate to say something about members of a 
kind, even if he lacks the ability to accurately describe either the kind itself or its instances‘ 
(ibid.).
7
   
The second view, defended by Nathan Salmon (originally published in 1982, all 
references to 2005 edition), treats natural kind terms as straightforwardly analogous to proper 
names, and argues that Kripke ‗intended his notion of rigidity to apply to general as well as 
singular terms‘ (Salmon 2005: 384). Salmon agrees with Soames that ‗Kripke‘s thesis that 
proper names and certain general names alike, including natural kind terms, are rigid 
designators is secondary to a more fundamental thesis: that these names are nondescriptional‘ 
(Salmon 2005: 386). However, he thinks that theoretical identifications such as ‗water = H2O‘ 
are analogous to identities like ‗Hesperus = Phosphorus‘ in that both contain names, albeit of 
different types.  
There is, then, a decision to be made as to whether natural kind terms are (a) 
predicates (Soames), or (b) general names (Salmon); and this question of the semantics of 
natural kind terms will have important ramifications for the necessity of theoretical 
identifications. If we decide that natural kind terms are predicates, then we require an 
explanation of the necessity of theoretical identities such as ‗tungsten is the element with 
                                                          
7
 It should be noted, however, that Soames, initially at least, is not particularly clear about what the denotation of 
a natural kind predicate is; is it the kind or is it the extension? I discuss this issue in detail in chapter 3.  
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atomic number 74‘. If we decide that natural kind terms are general names rather than 
predicates we need an argument as to why, given that general terms are standardly thought of 
as predicates. I will discuss (a) and (b) in turn in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
There is also a question as to whether or not rigidity really is a corollary of non-
descriptionality. Prima facie, or so I will argue, this seems not to be the case. When Kripke 
gives his story about gold he says that ‗we discover that certain properties were true of gold in 
addition to the initial identifying marks by which we identified it‘ (Kripke 1980: 119) and 
further that we have discovered that ‗it is part of the nature of gold as we have it to be an 
element with atomic number 79‘ (Kripke 1980: 125). He goes on to say that: 
 
[A] material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is 
that with atomic number 79. Here the ‗if and only if‘ can be taken to be strict 
(necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find 
the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. (Kripke 1980: 
138) 
 
This suggests that the phrase ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is being used as a 
description. After all, Kripke claims that having atomic number 79 is the essence of gold, and 
that science discovered this property by investigating basic (presumably atomic) structural 
traits. Indeed he even claims that ‗science can discover empirically that certain properties are 
necessary‘ (Kripke 1980: 128). If ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is in fact a description, 
and, following Kripke, a rigid designator, then it looks like some descriptions can be rigid, but 
as a corollary of the properties they pick out being necessary. The contrast is with the more 
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obviously name-like natural kind terms, for instance ‗gold‘ or ‗tungsten‘, which are supposed 
to be rigid as a product of how they were introduced (their metasemantics) and their 
nondescriptiveness.  
This will create problems for both Salmon‘s and Soames‘ account, albeit for different 
reasons. Salmon‘s account treats ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ as a ‗logically proper 
general name‘ (Salmon 2005: 396/7), whereas Soames argues that ‗the element with atomic 
number 79‘ is a description of sorts. Prima facie, then, Soames‘ account looks better than 
Salmon‘s, given Kripke‘s reference to ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ as the essence of 
a kind. However, as both Soames and Salmon agree that rigidity is a corollary of non-
descriptionality (which, in turn, raises a question for Soames concerning how natural kind 
terms can be descriptive and rigid) if phrases like ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ are 
descriptions and are rigid, then it looks like both accounts have serious faults. 
This last issue also has some significant metaphysical implications. If the rigidity of 
certain terms is the product of the essential properties to which they refer, then there is a 
question as to precisely what role essentialism is playing in Kripke‘s semantic thesis.8 Nathan 
Salmon (2005) has argued forcefully that essentialism cannot be derived from semantics – we 
will look at this in more detail in Chapter 4 – but Kripke claims on various occasions that ‗the 
origin of an object is essential to it‘ (Kripke 1980: 114 n57), that a belief in ‗essentialism, [is] 
the belief in modality de re‘ (Kripke 1980: 39) and that statements representing scientific 
discoveries are ‗necessary in the non-epistemological sense‘ (Kripke 1980: 123) i.e. 
metaphysically necessary. If theoretical identifications ‗resemble ―Cicero is a product of the 
                                                          
8
 I am, until chapter 6, when I discuss the notion of ‗real essence‘, and chapter 7, where I distinguish between 
brands of essence and essentialism, simply going to appeal to the same essentialism implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) in Kripke. 
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egg and sperm that generated him‖ rather than ―Cicero = Tully‖ in respect that they aim to 
expose essence‘ (LaPorte 2004, p. 37) then it looks like (i) essences are what make theoretical 
identifications metaphysically necessary (which, when combined with the empirical 
investigation required to ascertain their truth, makes them part of the category of the 
necessary a posteriori), and (ii) that the proper names case and the natural kinds case are 
actually rather disanalogous.  
Finally, it is worth noting (briefly) some of the issues I‘m not going to talk about. 
Unlike some authors (Besson 2010; López de Sa 2007; Martí  2004; Martí and Martínez-
Fernández 2010; Schwartz 2002: Wikforss 2010) I am not explicitly interested in whether or 
not there is a special category of natural kind terms, as compared to other general terms. 
Indeed, for the most part (other than a criticism of Salmon‘s view in Chapter 4, which appears 
to entail that there is not a special category) I simply assume that there is. Similarly, although 
I will discuss the notion of natural kind terms as predicates in Chapter 3, I am not going to 
engage with the recent debate concerning essentialist predicates, and whether or not they 
capture Kripkean intuitions (cf. Gómez Torrente 2006; Ahmed 2009).  
I am also side stepping the debate concerning proper names, and whether or not 
descriptivism about proper names is tenable in light of Kripke‘s criticisms (cf. Hughes 2004 
for the case that it is untenable, and Dummett 1981 for the case that it is). Although my 
interest here is in part semantic, I am only concerned with the semantics of natural kind terms, 
and do not take anything I say here to automatically apply to names. 
Likewise, I am also avoiding at least one way that the debate over the tenability of 
descriptivism has developed, namely two-dimensional semantics. Although I recognise that 
some issues in that debate reflect on some of what I say here – for instance, that one way to 
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get a broadly Fregean distinction between sense and reference again is to adopt the two-
dimensional framework proposed by, say, David Chalmers (1996) – my overarching interest 
is with demonstrating that there is no interesting connection between metaphysical 
essentialism and the semantics of natural kind terms. Hence, when I defend descriptivism in 
Chapter 5, and later modify it in Chapter 8, I am, to all intents and purposes, ignoring 
contemporary developments in two-dimensional semantics (cf. Chalmers 1996, and Soames 
2006 for a response to the project). However, in part my decision to ignore this contemporary 
development is motivated by my confidence that with the metaphysics appropriately isolated 
from the semantics, a much simpler version of descriptivism is available (more on this in 
Chapter 5). For now, though, I move on to a discussion of Hilary Putnam, and his thesis 
concerning the meaning and reference of natural kind terms.   
 44 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Before unravelling the puzzles raised at the end of chapter 1, I will first present Hilary 
Putnam‘s account of the semantics of natural kind terms, developed independently but 
concurrently with Kripke‘s. Putnam, like Kripke, had an axe to grind with the descriptivist 
concerning the meanings of names and natural kind terms. However the majority of Putnam‘s 
arguments are addressed towards natural kind terms directly, rather than to proper names and 
then, by extension, to natural kind terms. As such, Putnam‘s thesis is of particular relevance 
to this investigation. In this chapter I begin, in section 1, by sketching Putnam‘s account of 
the semantics of natural kind terms, and show, through sections 2, 3 and 4, how his 
conclusions concerning the necessity of theoretical identities are the same as Kripke‘s. 
However, in section 5 of this chapter I argue that Putnam‘s account is markedly different to 
Kripke‘s in its remit. In section 6 I present a recent challenge from LaPorte concerning the 
modal intuitions we apparently have in Twin Earth style thought experiments. Finally, in 
section 7, I distinguish between early and later Putnam, and point out that while Putnam‘s 
early account of natural kind terms endorses the necessity of theoretical identity sentences, 
later Putnam rejects de re metaphysically necessary theoretical identities.  
 
2.1 Putnam’s semantics of natural kind terms 
Putnam‘s discussion of the semantics of natural kind terms begins with the claim that there is 
a (traditional) ambiguity in the notion of ‗meaning‘, namely that it is the conjunction of two 
distinct concepts: ‗intensions‘ on the one hand, and ‗extensions‘ on the other.  Consider, by 
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way of illustration, the term ‗nickel‘. The extension of ‗nickel‘ is precisely the set of things 
that the term is true of, while the intension of the term is what we more commonly refer to as 
the meaning i.e. a concept associated with the term, grasped by an individual psychological 
act. 
Putnam notes that while there are ‗timeworn examples‘ (Putnam 1975: 218) where 
two terms have the same extension (and so the same meaning in one sense of ‗meaning‘), but 
have obviously different intensions (and so a different meaning in another sense of 
‗meaning‘), there were no examples (at the time) where two terms had the same intension, but 
nevertheless possessed different extensions. The standard example of the former, which 
Putnam refers to, is the renate/cordate case. The general term ‗cordate‘ (defined as a ‗creature 
with a heart‘) has the same extension as the general term ‗renate‘ (‗creature with a kidney‘) 
since every creature with a heart is also a creature with a kidney. But clearly the intension of 
‗cordate‘ is different from the intension of ‗renate‘ since the concept of having a heart is 
different from the concept of having a kidney. This, says Putnam, highlights an important 
assumption implicit in traditional theories of meaning and reference, namely that the intension 
of a term ‗must always provide a necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the 
extension of the term‘ (Putnam 1973: 700), and that while two terms with different intensions 
can have the same extension, no two terms with different extensions can have the same 
intension. 
Reflecting on this type of example, Putnam identifies two unchallenged 
presuppositions that traditional theories of meaning had come to rest upon: 
 
(i) to know the meaning of a term is to be in a particular psychological state, 
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and, 
(ii) the intension of a term determines the extension of that term. 
 
Putnam‘s contention is that these two conditions cannot be satisfied by any notion, and a 
fortiori cannot be satisfied by the notion of meaning. According to the dominant tradition in 
theories of meaning before the Kripke-Putnam revolution, to understand the meaning of a 
term like ‗tungsten‘ consisted in the grasping, via a psychological state, of some public 
meaning (or Fregean ‗sense‘, or intension). However, these traditional theories of meaning 
also assumed that ‗no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any 
individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed‘ (Putnam 1975: 220). 
Psychological states, then, were construed as fairly solipsistic sorts of states, having only 
narrow content. That is, the content of the psychological state does not depend upon the 
environment within which the individual having it is located. 
The contrast is with ‗psychological state[s] in the wide sense‘ (ibid.). That is, mental 
states with broad content – where the content of the mental state depends both upon the 
individual having the mental state, and on the environment within which the individual 
happens to be situated. The wide/narrow content distinction is important because, according 
to Putnam, assumption (i) amounts to a claim about narrow content, namely that knowing the 
meaning of some term A is to grasp the intension of A, and to know that the concept one has 
grasped is the intension of A. More simply, assumption (i) is the claim that meanings are in 
the head, and that to know the meaning of a term is to be in the narrow content mental state 
‗knowing that I is the meaning of A, where I is an ‗intension‘ and A is a term‘ (Putnam 1975: 
221). If meanings are in the head, then an identical set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
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for falling within the extension of a term are supplied whenever (and in whatever possible 
world) there is an individual in that (narrow content) psychological state. The narrow content 
of the mental state determines the intension I of the term A, and the intension I determines the 
extension, which is the set of individuals to which the term A truly applies. 
Putnam claims, however, that the intension of a term does not determine the extension, 
and that we can construct examples where two typical speakers, s1 and s2, are in the same 
narrow psychological state, but where the extension of the term A in s1‘s idiolect is different 
from the extension of A in s2‘s idiolect. Putnam‘s (in)famous illustration of this claim – that 
extensions are not determined by the psychological states of particular speakers – is the well 
discussed Twin Earth thought experiment. There have been a few variations, but the central 
theme is as follows: imagine a planet that is a molecule by molecule duplicate of Earth, except 
that on this distant planet, call it Twin Earth, what speakers refer to as ‗water‘ is not H2O, but 
a liquid with a long and complicated chemical formula, abbreviated (for simplicity) to XYZ. 
So, on Twin Earth it is XYZ, and not H2O, that falls from the sky, and flows in the lakes and 
rivers. 
Now consider a typical language user on Earth, call her Sally1, who refers to stuff with 
the chemical composition H2O when she uses the term ‗water‘, and consider her Twin Earth 
counterpart, Sally2, who uses the syntactically identical term ‗water‘, but picks out some other 
stuff, with the chemical formula XYZ. Since water on Earth is H2O, and water on Twin Earth 
is XYZ we can say that on Earth ‗water‘ refers to H2O, and that on Twin Earth ‗water‘ refers 
to XYZ. However, although the extension of water on Earth is different to that on Twin Earth, 
the example stipulates that in all other ways Twin Earth and Earth are precise duplicates. This 
means that Sally1 and Sally2 are intrinsically exactly alike, and as such there is no belief that 
Sally1 has about water that Sally2 does not have about what she calls ‗water‘ (as typical 
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language users, neither Sally1 nor Sally2 know anything about chemical composition). But the 
extension of ‗water‘ on earth is H2O, not XYZ (whether anyone knows it or not). But if this is 
correct then (ii) must be false, since both Sally1 and Sally2 are in identical psychological 
states, but nevertheless the extension of ‗water‘ on Earth is not the same as that on Twin 
Earth. To put it another way, the identical mental states of Sally1 and Sally2 respectively, 
underdetermine the reference of ‗water‘, since the extension of ‗water‘ on Earth is a different 
kind of stuff to the extension of ‗water‘ on Twin Earth. 
That water is H2O, however, is (as Putnam notes) a fairly recent discovery made the 
empirical sciences. Thus consider a scenario in which we ‗roll the time back to about 1750‘ 
(Putnam 1973: 701), to where nobody knows what water is made of, and so no one associates 
water with H2O (or, if you‘re on Twin Earth, XYZ). If, as in the previous example, 1750-
Sally1 and 1750-Sally2 are in identical psychological states, being, as they are, exact 
duplicates, then is the extension of ‗water‘ on Earth really distinct from its extension on Twin 
Earth? According to Putnam the answer is yes: ‗the extension of the term ―water‖ was just as 
much H2O on Earth in 1750 as in 1950‘ (ibid.). Putnam‘s claim is that although Sally1 and 
Sally2 are in identical psychological states, the reference of ‗water‘ is still different, even in 
1750, since water was always H2O on Earth, and always XYZ on Twin Earth (despite no one 
in 1750 knowing that there was such a difference). The discovery on Earth that water is H2O, 
then, is both a discovery about the kind water, and the discovery, at least in our fictional 
example, that ‗water‘ on Earth does not mean the same thing as ‗water‘ on Twin Earth – for 
Putnam, recall, the notion of meaning is the conjunction of intension on the one hand, and 
extension on the other. Hence, since the extension of water on Earth is different to that on 
Twin Earth, ‗water‘ does not mean the same thing on Earth as it does on Twin Earth. Of 
course, before the relevant scientific discovery (about the constitution of water) no language 
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user could have articulated (nor, indeed, would they have asserted) the difference in 
extension, and hence meaning, of ‗water‘ as it was used on Earth, call it ‗waterE‘, compared to 
how it was used on Twin Earth, call it ‗waterTE‘. Nevertheless, the meanings were always 
quite distinct, whether speakers knew it or not.  
What the Twin Earth thought experiment allegedly shows is that assumptions (i) and 
(ii) are false. Firstly, it purports to show that despite Sally1 and Sally2 being in identical 
psychological states, ‗water‘ nevertheless refers to H2O on Earth, and XYZ on Twin Earth, 
and since H2O is not XYZ, that the psychological states of Sally1 and Sally2 underdetermine 
the reference of ‗water‘. In other words, the conclusion is that rather than intension, or 
meaning, being determined by extension, extension determines, or rather is, meaning; thus 
assumption (ii) is false. Secondly, the example also shows that assumption (i) is false: even in 
1750, when the facts about water on Earth were not known, there was still some physical fact 
of the matter that determined what it was for a substance to be water. Since the physical facts 
about the substance called ‗water‘ on Earth are different to those on Twin Earth, but Sally1 
and Sally2 have identical sets of beliefs about what they call ‗water‘, to know the meaning of 
‗water‘ cannot consist of being in a certain psychological state. Thus assumption (i), like 
assumption (ii), is false. 
The Twin Earth thought experiment is, in essence, a version of Kripke‘s semantical 
argument – both purport to demonstrate that descriptions always underdetermine reference9. 
Where the two arguments differ is that Putnam‘s version is explicitly directed towards the 
internalist assumption contained within descriptivism: the claim that meanings are the sorts of 
things we grasp via our psychological states. Nevertheless, the basic moral is the same: 
                                                          
9
 I argue, in chapter 5, that this conclusion is false. 
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descriptivist theories of meaning and reference are untenable. However, it is not just Putnam‘s 
objections to descriptivism that are similar to Kripke‘s, but his positive story also has much in 
common with, and can rightly be characterised as a version of, the causal theory of direct 
reference (CDR). In the next section we shall consider Putnam‘s metasemantic story, which, 
like Kripke‘s, has some dramatic consequences for cross-world reference and necessary truth. 
 
2.2 Cross-world reference 
Putnam, like Kripke, claims that the reference of natural kind terms is fixed via an ‗ostensive 
definition‘ (Putnam 1973: 701). However, more explicitly than Kripke Putnam notes that the 
ostensive definitions of natural kind terms come with important ‗empirical presuppositions: 
that the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness relation (...) to most of the 
stuff I and other speakers in my linguistic community have on other occasions called ―water‖‘ 
(ibid.). Putnam cashes out the sameness relation as a same liquid relation, given his water 
example, but nothing significant is supposed to hang on the example per se. So, we can 
simply generalise the relation to a sameness of natural kind relation – sameNK. The nub of the 
relation is that when we consider two particular substance samples, x and y, x and y are of the 
same kind if and only if x and y bear the relation sameNK to one another. Similarly, where x is 
on Earth and y is on Twin Earth, the question as to whether x and y are samples of the same 
kind is, again, decided by whether or not x and y bear the sameNK relation to one another. If 
they do (in either case), then they are samples of the same kind; if they do not, then they are 
not of the same kind. In effect, the ‗necessary and sufficient condition for being [of the same 
kind as x] is bearing the relation [sameNK] to the stuff‘ (ibid.) that was originally ostended and 
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named within our environment. Moreover, this sameNK relation is both an intra-world and an 
inter-world relation. 
Consider, to illustrate, the relation of being faster than (or just faster). Let x be Usain 
Bolt, and let y be Linford Christie, and let their personal bests (for the 100 metre sprint) be 
9.58 seconds and 9.87 seconds respectively. Thus we can say that x bears the relation of being 
faster to y, since x ran the 100 meters in 9.58 seconds, rather than 9.87 seconds. Now, imagine 
that Usain Bolt is on Earth and that Linford Christie is on Twin Earth. Is Bolt still faster than 
Christie? The answer, obviously, is yes, since the faster relation holds not only within a 
world, but across worlds. Now, had Christie run the 100 metres in 9.58 seconds, then he 
would bear the relation of being as fast as to Bolt, and just as the faster relation was a cross-
world relation, so too is the being as fast as relation. By analogy, the sameNK relation is both 
an inter-world and an intra-world relation: if two objects x and y bear the relation sameNK to 
one another, then no matter where they are located (Earth or Twin Earth), provided they bear 
that relation to one another they will qualify as members of the same kind. 
Since natural kind terms only refer to members of the relevant kind, and what it is to 
be a member of such-and-such a kind is dictated by bearing an appropriate physical sameness 
relation to some paradigm instance (an instance which is taken to be, with some degree of 
certainty, representative of the kind), the meaning and reference of natural kind terms is 
intimately connected with the members of natural kinds within the environment. On Putnam‘s 
model, when a natural kind term has been introduced by ostending some sample with which 
we are acquainted, the term can only truly apply to all those things which are suitably similar 
to the originally ostended sample, the archetypal member (or paradigm) of the kind. The 
account does not require speakers to know what this sameness amounts to, just to introduce 
the term with the empirical presupposition that there is some appropriate sameness relation. 
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Hence, there will be some physical fact of the matter, which will take more or less empirical 
investigation to discover, that determines whether or not a natural kind term has been 
correctly applied, once the initial introductions have been made. Further, this hidden fact of 
the matter ‗determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, not only in the actual 
world, but in all possible worlds … it determines what we can and cannot counterfactually 
suppose about the natural kind‘ (Putnam 1975: 241). 
The cross-world force of Putnam‘s account begins by giving a meaning explanation of 
a particular natural kind term by ostending samples within the environment. Using Kaplan‘s 
(1978) demonstrative version of ‗that‘, dthat, the ostensive definition might be ‗dthat is 
water‘. Now, consider two possible worlds: the actual world, w1, and some other possible 
world, w2. Putnam offers us two alternative theses about the meaning of ‗water‘. Either, 
‗water‘ is ‗world-relative but constant in meaning‘ (Putnam 1996: 16) such that the word 
‗water‘ means the same thing in w1 and w2, where water is H2O in w1 and is XYZ in w2; or, 
alternatively, water is H2O in all possible worlds, and ‗water‘ means one thing at w1 and 
something else at w2. The Twin Earth thought experiment is intended to convince us of the 
latter thesis: ‗water‘ means H2O, since that is what water has turned out to be at the actual 
world: the relevant physical sameness relation consists in having the same molecular 
composition as the stuff with the composition H2O. Hence, since XYZ is not H2O, ‗water‘ 
means something else on Twin Earth. 
The nub of the thesis is that there is an indexical component to the ostensive definition 
that fixes the ostensive definition to the actual world, rather than any possible world. Putnam 
characterises the difference between the two options as one of scope, by formalising the two 
theses as follows: 
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(A) (For every world w) (For every x in w) (x is water ↔ x bears the relation sameNK to the 
entity referred to as ‗this‘ in w). 
(B) (For every world w) (For every x in w) (x is water ↔ x bears the relation sameNK to the 
entity referred to as ‗this‘ in the actual world w1). (Putnam 1996: 16) 
 
In (A) the ostensive definition of the natural kind term is within the scope of the phrase ‗for 
every world w‘, whereas in (B) the ostensive definition is only within the scope of the actual 
world. In other words, as Putnam says, in thesis (A) the ostensive definition is within the 
scope of the bound variable, whereas in (B) the definition has ‗a reference independent of the 
bound variable ―w‖‘ (1996: 16).  
As far as Putnam is concerned, that we intend (B) rather than (A) when we ostensively 
define out natural kinds indicates that we intend our natural kind terms to be what Kripke 
called rigid designators. Thus he says that if ‗we extend the notion of rigidity to substance 
names, then we may express Kripke‘s theory and mine by saying that the term ―water‖ is 
rigid‘ (Putnam 1996: 16). The term ‗water‘ designates H2O in the actual world, and gets to 
refer to H2O in all possible worlds since it was introduced with the empirical presupposition 
that all samples of the kind would bear some appropriate sameness relation to one another, 
and science has discovered that the property grounding that relation for water is being 
constituted of H2O molecules. 
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2.3 A posteriori necessity 
According to Putnam, the theory of meaning for natural kind terms that he and Kripke 
developed independently ‗has startling consequences for the theory of necessary truth‘ (1996: 
17).  That consequence is that there are some truths which are necessary yet knowable only a 
posteriori (rather than a priori, as was traditionally supposed). Putnam‘s explanation of this 
consequence runs as follows. 
Firstly, we note that the theoretical relation sameNK (as stated above) is a cross-world 
relation: that is, for some object x in w1, and some object y in w2, if y has the same ‗important 
physical properties‘ in w2 as x has in w1, then y bears the relation sameNK to x, and thus x and 
y are of the same kind. So, whatever the ‗important‘ properties of, say, water are in the actual 
world, for some object y in some arbitrarily selected possible world to be water, it must have 
the same important physical properties. 
Whilst it might be debatable as to precisely what Putnam means by ‗important 
physical properties‘, his discussion suggests a distinction between an operational definition 
(the description of some set of properties, which are standardly thought to be indicative of the 
kind e.g. falls from the sky, flows in the lakes and rivers) and a microstructuralist definition 
(the particular microstructure, e.g. H2O, without which a sample of a substance could not be a 
member of the kind in question). The basic point is that provided we agree that the 
microstructure of a substance defines that substance, whether or not we know what the 
structure of a particular substance is, then we can agree that even in situations where a 
substance satisfies the operational definition, unless that substance has the relevant 
microstructure, it is of a different kind. To quote Putnam:  
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The operational definition, like the ostensive one, is simple a way of pointing out a 
standard – pointing out the stuff in the actual world such that for x to be water, in any 
world, is for x to bear the relation [sameNK] to the normal member of the class of local 
entities that satisfy the operational definition. (Putnam 1996: 17)   
 
The discovery that water is H2O, then, in conjunction with both the assumption that 
microstructure is what demarcates natural (substance) kinds, and the cross-world force of the 
sameNK relation, amounts to the discovery that ‗nothing counts as a possible world in which 
water isn’t H2O‘ (1996: 18). This effectively drives a wedge between the notion of 
conceivability and the notion of possibility, and as Putnam famously observed, conceivability 
turns out to be ‗no proof of logical possibility‘ (ibid.).  What this means is that whilst we 
might be in an epistemic situation such that for all we know water could be XYZ, since it is 
necessary that water is H2O (given that this is what water has turned out to be), this 
epistemically possible situation is not a metaphysically possible situation: since one cannot 
rule out a priori that water is not H2O, the truth that water is H2O is epistemically contingent, 
and hence knowable only a posteriori. However, since it turns out to be necessary that water 
is H2O, as a product of the indexical component of our ostensive definition and the empirical 
presuppositions we make when introducing terms for substances, there are no possible worlds 
in which there is water but no H2O: the truth that water is H2O, then, is metaphysically 
necessary. 
The underlying empirical presuppositions about the microstructure of a substance  
(that the hidden structure of a substance determines what it is to be a member of a substance-
kind), in cases where that presupposition is satisfied, generates a ‗defeasible necessary and 
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sufficient condition‘ (1975: 225) for being a member of a given natural kind. Moreover, 
where that condition is satisfied, since meaning explanations are given ostensively – for 
instance, dthat is water (again, to use Kaplan‘s indexical ‗that‘) – the satisfaction of those 
conditions also determine whether or not we have successfully referred with our use of the 
term
10
. The hidden structural property that determines what it is to be a member of the natural 
kind is the what Putnam calls the ‗essence‘ (1996: 20) of that kind, and the essence of the 
kind fixes the conditions captured by the sameNK relation, which are (eventually) fleshed out 
by scientific investigation. Thus, when Putnam claimed that the ‗this‘ in ‗this is water‘ was ‗a 
de re ―this‖ – i.e. the force of my explanation is that ―water‖ bears a certain equivalence 
relation (…) to the piece of liquid referred to as ―this‖ in the actual world‘ (1975: 231), 
plausibly what he intended was that ostensive definitions latch onto the essence of the kind in 
question, as possessed by each individual member of the kind with which a speaker is 
acquainted. 
What precisely the essence of the kind is, on this view, is a matter for scientific 
investigation. Nevertheless, a speaker‘s ability to introduce a kind term does not require that 
the speaker knows what the essence of the kind is. All that is required is that they assume that 
there is such an essence to be found, after some indeterminate amount of empirical 
investigation, since it is this assumption that underpins the introduction of the kind term. In 
effect, one of the things rigid designators allow us to do is ‗to believe in essences without 
having to know what they are‘ (de Sousa 1984: 567). Provided that the assumption is made, 
science, it turns out, is in the business of discovering metaphysical necessities, and 
                                                          
10
 Of course, what is meant here is not simply that I manage to refer to, say, dthat object (whatever dthat object 
happens to be) with any arbitrarily selected term. So, for instance, I manage to refer to my telephone with the 
word ‗frog‘ insofar as I draw your attention to the object I intended to, with a random word. Rather, by 
successful reference I mean of the word that I am using, that I am using it correctly. 
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representing these claims via theoretical identity sentences, such as ‗water is H2O‘, that are 
necessarily true, but knowable only a posteriori. Hence, if ‗a ―logically possible‖ statement is 
one that holds in some ―logically possible world‖, it isn’t logically possible that water isn’t 
H2O‘(Putnam 1996: 18), since there is no possible world in which water exists without being 
H2O.    
 
2.4 The Kripke-Putnam programme 
The commonalities between Putnam‘s and Kripke‘s semantics are obvious: both have a 
similar metasemantics, both offer a version of (CDR), and both endorse the necessity and a 
posteriority of theoretical identities. Indeed, reference to the ‗Kripke-Putnam‘ programme is 
commonplace (Donnellan 1983: 85; Mumford 2005: 428, Soames 2002: vii). However, 
Putnam‘s motivations appear quite distinct from Kripke‘s, and in his later work Putnam 
actually rejects an essentialist reading of his claim that theoretical identities are necessary yet 
knowable only a posteriori, effectively distancing himself from Kripke. 
Firstly, there is a distinctly different motive driving Putnam‘s semantic thesis about 
natural kind terms: while both Kripke and Putnam objected to what they saw as descriptivist 
psychologism, Putnam‘s concerns are primarily with referential stability and theories of 
meaning, rather than with theories of necessary truth (Putnam 1996: 17). Consider, for 
instance, the way Putnam sets up the Twin Earth thought experiment. He says: 
 
The fact than an English speaker in 1750 might have called XYZ ―water,‖ whereas he 
or his successors would not have called XYZ water in 1800 or 1850 does not mean 
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that the ―meaning‖ of  ―water‖ changed for the average speaker in the interval. In 1750 
or in 1850 or in 1950 one might have pointed to, say, the liquid in Lake Michigan as 
an example of ―water‖. What changed was that in 1750 we would have mistakenly 
thought that XYZ bore the relation [sameNK] to the liquid in Lake Michigan, whereas 
in 1800 or 1850 we would have known that it did not. (Putnam 1973: 702/3) 
 
This version of the Twin Earth thought experiment speaks directly to the threat of Thomas 
Kuhn‘s incommensurability thesis (Kuhn 1996: 117) – the claim that science undergoes so-
called ‗paradigm shifts‘ where the postulates of the previous scientific worldview, Wv1, are 
incommensurable with the current scientific world view, Wv2, and as such the words used to 
denote the scientific entities of Wv1 have no meaning in, and are untranslatable into, the 
language of Wv2. 
One standard diagnosis of this problem is that incommensurability is a product of an 
internalist notion of meaning (the thought that meanings are in the head), indicative of 
descriptivism. The plausibility of this interpretation is made more obvious by considering 
Putnam‘s other variations on the Twin Earth thought experiment. Consider, first, the non-
science-fiction example Putnam gives (Putnam 1973: 704), where he invites us to consider 
someone, call him Hilary (since it is Putnam himself that features in the example), who cannot 
tell the different between elm and beech trees. Putnam then asks us to accept three plausible 
assumptions: (i) that the extension of ‗elm‘ in Hilary‘s idiolect is the same as anyone else‘s, 
namely the set of all elm trees, (ii) similarly, that the extension of ‗beech‘ in Hilary‘s idiolect 
is the same as anyone else‘s; the set of all beech trees, and (iii) that the extension of ‗elm‘ in 
Hilary‘s idiolect is distinct from the extension of ‗beech‘ in everyone else‘s idiolect. The 
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challenge, says Putnam, is to give a credible account of how  Hilary‘s concepts are 
responsible for the difference in extension between ‗elm‘ and ‗beech‘, given the earlier 
concession that Hilary cannot, himself, differentiate between the two species of trees. The 
claim is that since Hilary‘s elm-concept is identical to his beech-concept, but that, 
nevertheless, the extension of ‗elm‘ in Hilary‘s idiolect is not the same as the extension of 
‗beech‘ in his idiolect, Hilary‘s concepts are not responsible for the extensions of his (natural 
kind) terms.  
The second, relevant, science fiction example distinguishes between sub-groups of 
speakers within the linguistic community: the ordinary group and the expert group. In this 
example we are asked to imagine that aluminium and molybdenum are indistinguishable to 
non-experts, at least as they occur when used to make kitchen pots and pans. We then suppose 
that on Twin Earth molybdenum is as abundant as aluminium is on Earth, and that aluminium 
on Twin Earth is as rare as molybdenum is on Earth. Moreover, the role that aluminium plays 
on Earth is played by molybdenum on Twin Earth: so, whereas on Earth kitchen pots are 
made from aluminium, on Twin Earth they are made from molybdenum. Finally, on Twin 
Earth ‗aluminium‘ is the name of molybdenum, and ‗molybdenum‘ is the name of aluminium. 
Unlike the initial Twin Earth case, however, an expert from either community can tell the 
difference between aluminium and molybdenum. As such, were one of these experts, call her 
Lisa, to be transported from Earth to Twin Earth, or vice versa, she would soon realise that 
what people call ‗aluminium‘ on Earth is not what people call ‗aluminium‘ on Twin Earth, 
and similarly for what they call ‗molybdenum‘. The distinction between experts and non-
experts in the example means that although there is a decisive meaning of ‗aluminium‘ known 
by a specialist within the Earthian linguistic community, normal (non-specialist) speakers on 
either Earth or Twin Earth will be in the same psychological state when they use the word 
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‗aluminium‘, despite ‗aluminium‘ having the extension aluminium on Earth and molybdenum 
in on Twin Earth. 
Putnam takes the Twin Earth thought experiments to show that the psychological 
states of individuals cannot determine the reference of natural kind terms.
11
 The crux of each 
variation of the thought experiment is that we can hold psychological states
12
 constant while 
varying the extensions of our natural kind terms. The conclusion is that there is a general 
underdetermination of reference by psychological states. But how does this speak to the 
problem of incommensurability? 
 
2.5 Reference and Kuhnian incommensurability 
Consider the shift from alchemy to chemistry, which might aptly be considered a paradigm 
shift (i.e. a radical change from one sort of research programme to another), and assume a 
descriptivist theory of meaning. On Kuhn‘s view, although alchemists and chemists alike used 
the word ‗gold‘, we might think that ‗gold‘ meant one thing to the alchemist and another to 
the chemist. Let ‗gold‘1 be alchemical-gold, which has a meaning M1 (perhaps, ‗the 
yellowish, malleable, metallic, precious metal that can be transmuted from lead‘). Let ‗gold‘2 
be chemical-gold, with a meaning M2 (perhaps, ‗the element with atomic number 79‘). Now, 
although ‗gold‘1 and ‗gold‘2, as they appear in natural language (simply as ‗gold‘), are 
syntactically and phonetically identical, since M1 is not identical to M2, we can say that ‗gold‘ 
                                                          
11
 I say ‗Putnam‘ here, explicitly, since the distinction between expert and non-expert speakers only goes to show 
that the extension of a natural kind term is not determined by the psychological states of non-expert speakers. It 
could still be the case that it is the psychological states of experts that determine the extension of natural kind 
terms, as noted by Mellor (1977), and discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
12
 Again, the psychological states of non-expert speakers. 
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meant one thing for the alchemists and another for the chemists. On a descriptivist theory of 
meaning and reference, since ‗gold‘1 and ‗gold‘2 mean different things they literally refer to 
different kinds of substances. The threat of Kuhnian incommensurability is that, as such, 
alchemists and chemists cannot communicate with one another about gold. When chemists 
discovered that gold is the element with atomic number 79 it was not that they discovered 
some additional facts about the stuff alchemists had been calling ‗gold‘. Rather, they 
discovered a new substance which they called also called ‗gold‘. Moreover, or so the Kuhnian 
claim goes, the alchemists‘ notion of ‗gold‘, what I have called ‗gold‘1, is not even 
translatable to the chemists‘ notion of ‗gold‘, ‗gold‘2.
13
 In a sense, chemists and alchemists are 
as distant from one another as people on Earth and Twin Earth respectively.
14
 
The Kuhnian worry as Putnam identifies it stems from two intuitions. The first, is the 
descriptivist thesis that meaning (or sense) determines extension – where M1 is the meaning 
of ‗gold‘1, M1 determines the extension of ‗gold‘1. The second, and in this case more 
significant, intuition is the antirealist intuition about the status of scientific theories. 
According to the antirealist intuition, where we have two theories like alchemy and chemistry, 
it is not the case that there are ‗two approximately correct descriptions of some fixed real or 
theory-independent entities‘ (Putnam 1996: 20),  because the notion of a ‗correct‘ or ‗true‘ 
                                                          
13
 In some sense the example I have given is odd, since there was no substance which could correspond to the 
alchemists‘ notion of ‗gold‘, since gold cannot be transmuted from lead! However, I view this as actually 
somewhat helpful to the example. Provided we assume that alchemists had something like the notion I propose 
in mind, then it looks to be a postulate of their worldview that such a substance exists (much like, say, 
phlogiston). However, since gold cannot be transmuted from lead, the alchemists‘ gold-postulate is nothing like 
the chemists‘. Hence ‗gold1‘ and ‗gold2‘ are incommensurable. 
14
 That isn‘t to say that solutions to incommensurability have not been proposed – they have. Rachel Cooper 
(2007), for example, suggests that when paradigm shifts occur a pidgin language forms, facilitating 
communication across paradigms. The classic response, however, is from Donald Davidson (1973-4), who 
claims that we cannot make sense of the thought that a theory cannot be translated from one language into 
another, and hence that we can make no sense of incommensurability (see also Miller 2007 for an explanation of 
Davidson‘s response). 
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description is intra-theoretic, not inter-theoretic. In other words, the antirealist intuition is that 
the notion of truth only makes sense within a particular theory. Putnam‘s general objection to 
this intuition is that ‗scientists use terms as if the associated criteria were not necessary and 
sufficient conditions, but rather approximately correct characterizations of some world of 
theory-independent entities‘ (ibid.). They are, in effect, appealing to the notion of ‗extension‘ 
when they deploy natural kind terms, and ‗extension‘  is intimately connected to the notion of 
‗truth‘, since the extension of a term is precisely the set of objects of which that term is true. 
If we accept the antirealist intuition, says Putnam, this leaves us in a peculiar position 
where we are unable to say of some object, x, that it does not lie within the extension of a 
particular natural kind term, ‗tungsten‘ say, as used by a particular language user outside of 
our theory, and similarly we cannot judge whether that language user‘s statement ‗x is 
tungsten‘ is true or false (again, when they are outside of our theory). For Putnam, if attempts 
to make the notion of ‗truth‘ compatible with antirealist intuitions about intra-theoretic kind 
terms makes for a theory of meaning that is incompatible with basic observations of scientific 
progress, then such a theory (of meaning) is untenable on that basis. 
Take, for instance, Sir Martin Frobisher‘s hapless voyages between Canada and 
England, and his shipping of around 1500 tonnes of what he took to be gold ore, but which 
turned out to be mere iron pyrites, back to England. Intuitively, we wish to say of the set of 
objects x, filling the holds of Frobisher‘s ships, that despite Frobisher referring to them as 
gold, he was wrong to do so, since x was not within the extension of ‗gold‘. Similarly, we 
want to say that when Frobisher stated that ‗x is gold‘, where x refers to the cargo of his 
ship(s), he said something false. If we assume, plausibly, that we do not have the same 
theoretical outlook as Frobisher – after all, this all took place in the 16th Century – then we 
can imagine that Frobisher thought that anything satisfying the description ‗heavy, metallic, 
 63 
shiny, yellow-coloured substance‘ was gold. If we accept a paradigm-relative notion of truth, 
then it turns out that we are not in a position to say whether or not sentences like ‗x is gold‘, 
as uttered by Frobisher, are true or false, since truth is only intra-theoretic, rather than inter-
theoretic. But this seems plainly false! It is not that Frobisher was right that he had gold 
relative to his paradigm, but the meaning of the word ‗gold‘ changed sometime after he 
shipped the substance back to England. Rather, Frobisher was simply mistaken from the 
outset, despite no one within his community being in a position to say what gold actually was 
(the community were, remember, operating within the alchemy paradigm).
15
 
Putnam appeals to the distinction between verification on the one hand, and truth on 
the other, to illustrate the objection. Consider Putnam‘s own, more extreme, gold example, 
involving Archimedes. Assume, for the sake of argument, that Archimedes has roughly the 
same operational definition of gold as we do, and consider some object, x, that satisfies that 
definition, but which is not gold but fool‘s gold. In Archimedes‘ time there may not have been 
the means to distinguish gold from fool‘s gold, and thus no means by which Archimedes 
could have reasoned that ‗x is gold‘ was false. 
But, says Putnam, this is a problem with verification rather than truth (Putnam 1996: 
22). There are various situations that we could have described to Archimedes or Frobisher to 
put the hypothesis that ‗x is not gold‘ back in the running. Regardless of whether either 
grasped the theory, we could illustrate out claim with empirical evidence. Once we had done 
                                                          
15
 This is not completely accurate. Experts were, eventually, able to tell that the samples Frobisher shipped back 
were not gold. However, that Frobisher went back to Canada for a second visit, with more ships, indicates that, 
at least initially, the cargo really was mistaken for gold by various members of the community. to Canada for a 
second visit, with more ships, indicates that, at least initially, the cargo really was mistaken for gold by various 
members of the community. 
 64 
so, we could explain to them how the empirical results were produced via our atomic theory, 
leaving it in no ‗doubt that he would have agreed with us that x isn‘t gold‘ (ibid.).  
The point, according to Putnam‘s (CDR), is that when we use terms like ‗gold‘ it is 
our intention that ‗―we us the name rigidly‖ to refer to whatever things share the nature that 
things satisfying the description normally possess‘ (ibid.). Since there is some fact of the 
matter about what that nature is, there will be some fact of the matter that determines whether 
a sentence such as ‗x is gold‘ is true or false. Indeed, even when we are not in a position to 
know what that truth is – imagine, for instance, trying to discern how many electrons there are 
in the universe; just because we cannot verify how many there are does not entail that there is 
not some actual quantity – that does not change the point that there is some mind-independent 
fact of the matter, which makes the relevant sentence true or false. 
The aim of Putnam‘s thesis, then, is to respond to Kuhnian incommensurability, and 
he does so by claiming that natural kind terms,  such as ‗gold‘, were introduced with the 
intention that they refer to a particular natural kind, in this case the gold-kind, instantiated by 
samples with which a speaker was acquainted. As science has progressed, or so the story 
goes, we have come to discover additional facts about those kinds, and even discovered that 
some of the objects we thought to be within the extension of the kind are, in fact, not 
members of that kind (as in the Frobisher case). Putnam‘s metasemantic story, the claim that 
kind terms are introduced by ostension to samples with which we are acquainted, in 
conjunction with his claim that true application of a kind term (to other samples/members of 
the kind) depends upon whether a sample bears the relevant sameness relation to the original, 
effectively moves the notion of meaning not only outside the head, but outside any particular 
scientific theory. 
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The meanings of kind terms, then, are externalist according to Putnam: whatever the 
kind turns out to be, members of which we find in our environment, since the meaning of a 
kind term just is its referent, it is the kind itself that determines the term‘s content. The upshot 
is that there is no change of reference from a pre-scientific to a scientific community. It might, 
of course, be that some of the objects that people thought were in the extension of a natural 
kind term turn out not to be – just think of poor Sir Frobisher! The empirical discovery of 
gold‘s essence allows us to distinguish between the samples of different kinds that happen to 
satisfy the same operational definition. Since we have always intended our use of the term 
‗gold‘ to apply to samples bearing the appropriate sameness relation, says Putnam, rather than 
satisfying the operational definition (which is more of a heuristic than anything else), where 
we have misapplied the kind term, we do not intend our usage to be accepted. 
Plausibly, then, whilst Putnam‘s semantic thesis has consequences that are obviously 
parallel to Kripke‘s, the motivations of each are quite distinct: while Kripke‘s arguments aim 
to show us that epistemic and metaphysical necessity can come apart, Putnam‘s arguments 
aim to show us how we can avoid Kuhnian incommensurability, although his view has, as a 
corollary, the same implications as Kripke‘s (concerning the distinction between epistemic 
and metaphysical necessity). I shall leave an in-depth analysis of Putnam‘s mechanism for 
generating a posteriori necessities until chapter 4, where, following Nathan Salmon, I will 
identify the key essentialist assumptions within Putnam‘s thesis. The point of the preceding 
analysis is to demonstrate at least one sense in which reference to the ‗Kripke-Putnam‘ 
programme is misleading.  
There is one feature of Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment that I have yet to 
mention: the thesis that the meanings of natural kinds terms ‗depend upon a fact about 
language that seems, surprisingly, never to have been pointed out: that there is division of 
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linguistic labour‘ (Putnam 1973: 704). A discussion of the division of linguistic labour (DLL) 
will be relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it is often thought to be a premise in the argument for 
establishing an externalist theory of meaning, as mentioned indirectly above. We shall see, in 
chapter 5, that this is not the case. Secondly, once (DLL) has been shown not to be a premise 
in any argument for externalism, this will open it up for use within versions of descriptivism. 
Since this is the topic of chapter 5, I reserve my treatment until then. Now I will consider 
LaPorte‘s response to the Twin Earth thought experiment.  
 
2.6 LaPorte on Twin Earth 
Recently, Joseph LaPorte (2004) has argued that there are real world counterexamples to 
Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment. In LaPorte‘s example, although we discover that a 
particular natural kind term has been used to refer to two constitutionally distinct substances, 
we decide, regardless, to maintain our usage in spite of this discovery. 
LaPorte (2004: 94-100) asks us to consider the history of the term ‗jade‘. In particular, 
LaPorte disputes Putnam‘s claim that ‗although the Chinese do not recognise a difference, the 
term ―jade‖ applies to two different minerals: jadeite and nephrite‘ (1975: 241). According to 
LaPorte, although Putnam is correct that ‗jade‘ refers to chemically distinct substances, the 
history of jade is much more akin to Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment, since the 
Chinese were well aware of the difference between nephrite and jadeite. The word ‗jade‘, 
LaPorte tells us, was initially introduced to refer to the stuff with the chemical formula 
Ca2(Mg,Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2, what chemists call ‗nephrite‘. Then, sometime towards the end of 
the eighteenth century a ‗very similar stone with a totally unrelated composition, 
NaAl(SiO3)2, made its way for the first time to China‘ (LaPorte 2004: 95). In 1863 Alexis 
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Damour, LaPorte tells us, named this chemically distinct substance ‗jadeite‘. Prior to this, 
however, the Chinese who worked with jade were able to discriminate between nephrite and 
jadeite (LaPorte 2004: 96). Putnam‘s claim that they were unaware of the difference, then, is 
false. The important question, however, is why the Chinese, who used jade much like the west 
used gold, nevertheless refer to both nephrite and jadeite as jade? As LaPorte reports, when 
jadeite was discovered (after nephrite) the Chinese accepted both as instances of jade, and 
hence the term ‗jade‘ was taken to apply to ‗jadeite as well as nephrite‘ (LaPorte 2004: 96).  
On LaPorte‘s analysis there was, prior to the discovery of jadeite, a ‗hidden 
vagueness‘ (2004: 97) in the application of the word ‗jade‘, and with the later discovery of 
jadeite the meaning of ‗jade‘ was refined. According to the Kripke-Putnam story, when we 
reflect upon our application of natural kind terms for substances, such as ‗water‘, in scenarios 
where the superficial properties of two objects are identical, but their underlying 
microstructure is quite different, our intuition is that ‗water‘ only applies to one of the 
microstructurally demarcated kinds. The jade example, however, appears to produce the 
opposite result. When Chinese speakers find themselves in a position analogous to Twin 
Earth, where there are two superficially similar (not quite identical) substances that are 
microstructurally distinct, they made the converse decision: they maintained that ‗jade‘ should 
apply to both substances, despite their microstructural differences.  
LaPorte‘s conclusion is not that the standard Kripke-Putnam treatment of such cases is 
not open – speakers could indeed judge that where a term T turns out to refer to two 
microstructurally distinct kinds, that the use of T will be restricted to a kind with a single 
microstructure – but he does deny that it is the only available option. Speakers confronted 
with a Twin Earth style case are effectively confronted with semantic vagueness, and there are 
various precisification options open to them: they might decide to affix the term, T, to a single 
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microstructurally defined kind (as in the water case); alternatively, they might decide to affix 
the term, T, to a kind defined by more readily observable properties
16
. If that is right then 
given a case of semantic vagueness, it is open to us, as a linguistic community, to precisify 
our use of a term as we see fit. In other words, ‗we could go either way‘ (LaPorte 2004: 100). 
If LaPorte is right then the force of the Twin Earth thought experiment is effectively 
undermined, since it is open to speakers to precisify their natural kind terms as they see fit 
(‗water‘, then, could have been precisified to include samples of XYZ within its extension). 
However, LaPorte‘s view is controversial (see, for instance, Bird 2010 for criticisms), and as 
he concedes (2004: 99-100) attitudes in the West towards the jadeite/nephrite debate have 
been somewhat closer to the original Kripke-Putnam treatment. At the very least the example 
is suggestive, and the idea of vague natural kind terms that are precisified is one I shall build 
upon later, in chapter 5.  
 
2.7 Later Putnam 
Despite what has been said so far, it is worth noting that Putnam later came to reject much of 
the metaphysical import of the aforementioned view. The nub of Putnam‘s change of heart, I 
hazard, stems from Salmon‘s (2005) criticism that his theory of reference requires a 
commitment to a controversial brand of essentialism (much more on this in chapter 4). 
                                                          
16
 LaPorte‘s jade case is suggestive, but there are a number of routes to the general idea that microstructural 
kinds need not be the kinds to which our natural kind terms are affixed. For instance, the genetic diversity of 
biological species and the assumption that species are natural kinds also undermines the requirement for 
microstructural kinds (see Dupré 1995; LaPorte 2004). Similarly, some philosophers have argued (Needham 
2000; Van Brakel 2000) that classifications in terms of macroscopic properties are needed for chemical kinds, to 
unify microstructurally heterogeneous kinds of substance. Water, for instance, turns out to be microstructurally 
heterogeneous, and hence if chemical kinds were individuated by a unique microstructure, ‗water‘ would not 
pick out a chemical kind.  
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However, Putnam sets up his own critique somewhat differently. Putnam begins by observing 
that there is an ‗incompatibility between metaphysical realism and the denial of intrinsic 
[essential] properties‘ (Putnam 1983: 207). Metaphysical realism is the conjunction of a few 
‗closely associated philosophical ideas about the relations between language and reality‘ 
(Hale and Wright 1998: 472). These ideas are (i) that there is a mind-independent world of 
objects, (ii) that we can think and talk about those objects via ‗a ―correspondence‖ relation 
between the terms in our language and some sorts of mind-independent entities‘ (Putnam 
1983: 205), and (iii) that there is one true description of the way the world is. The denial of 
essential properties goes back to John Locke (more on this in Chapter 6), and as Putnam 
construes it, it is the claim that ‗a thing is not related to any one of its properties (or relations) 
any more ―intrinsically‖ that it is to any of its other properties or relations‘ (1983: 206). The 
problem Putnam identifies is that a metaphysical realist must account for (ii), the 
correspondence relation between thought and thing, and that this is now typically done by 
appeal to the built in ‗similarities and dissimilarities between things in nature‘, which is to say 
the essences of those things (Putnam 1983: 207). 
The problem that Putnam identifies is that the metaphysical realist requires something 
like natural kind essentialism, since their view is incompatible with its denial. However, he 
says, this ‗modern mixture of materialism and essentialism‘ is inconsistent (1983: 207). Here, 
however, I am not interested in Putnam‘s critique of metaphysical realism. Rather, I am 
interested in his comments concerning the causal theory of direct reference (CDR), his 
rejection of essentialism, and his explicit disavowal of the revival of metaphysics which he 
attributes to Kripke (1983: 207), but which most of the philosophical community typically 
attribute to Putnam and Kripke. More simply, I wish to present later Putnam‘s rejection of the 
apparent necessity of theoretical identities, which is to all intents and purposes a rejection of 
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essentialism. In chapter 4, when I present Salmon‘s analysis of (CDR), and his conclusion that 
there are hidden essentialist premises in the derivation of necessary a posteriori truths 
concerning natural kinds, I will highlight, following recent work by Ian Hacking (2007), key 
passages in early Putnam where he seems to connect any necessity to the conventions of our 
classification, as he certainly does in his (1983). For now, though, we shall focus only on 
Putnam‘s rejection of the conclusion that there can be metaphysical necessities about 
theoretical identities. 
Later Putnam endorses Kant‘s attitude towards the rationalists, claiming that while 
medieval philosophers, for instance Duns Scotus (cf. Pini 2009: 255 - 272), thought we had 
some faculty of intuition that allowed us to latch on to the essences of things, ‗there is no such 
faculty‘ (Putnam 1983: 209). Putnam‘s antiessentialist argument begins by identifying an 
important presupposition of the metaphysical realist position, namely that it is standardly 
combined with a correspondence theory of truth. This, says Putnam, results in the claim that 
there is one true (scientific) theory, and that the theory is made true by corresponding to actual 
facts of the matter. But, he goes on to say  (following work by Nelson Goodman (1978)), if 
one believes that there is one true scientific theory – best physics, say – then with the 
correspondence theory of truth this implies that there must be a ‗ready-made world‘ (Putnam 
1983: 211) possessing a determinate and built-in structure for the theory to latch on to. Thus, 
once our theorists discover what it is to be tungsten, then given the earlier framework 
common to Kripke and Putnam, not only does it turn out to be true that tungsten is the 
element with atomic number 74, but that truth is metaphysically necessary i.e. true in all 
possible worlds, yet knowable only a posteriori. 
But here Putnam (or rather later-Putnam), whilst considering whether an ontology of 
objectives individuated by their modal properties can aid materialism, claims both that any 
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such ‗ontology presupposes essentialism‘ and further that modal properties are not part of the 
furniture of the physical world (1983: 220). The most interesting feature of this discussion for 
my purposes is Putnam‘s novel reinterpretation of what he intended when he originally spoke 
of ‗essences‘ in his ‗The Meaning of ―Meaning‖‘; now, he says, the discovering that the 
nature of a natural kind like tungsten is to have atomic number 74 is not to discover 
tungsten‘s essence in any metaphysically robust sense. Rather, that the kind tungsten has any 
essence at all is the product of our original referential intentions when we introduced the name 
‗tungsten‘, namely that we intended it to apply to a (natural) kind of substance the members of 
which are unified by a shared atomic composition. When such a presupposition is borne out 
by the facts, there is an ‗essence‘ of the kind; when it fails to be borne out, then the term 
failed to refer to a natural kind. Vitally, however, the so-called essence of the kind ‗is the 
product of our use of the word, [and] the kinds of referential intentions we have‘ (Putnam 
1983: 220), not any fundamental metaphysical fact about the world. I propose that we call this 
view (that essences are the product of referential intentions) thin essentialism, where the 
contrast is with thick essentialism, which I take to be the view that theoretical identities like 
‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 74‘ are necessary yet knowable a posteriori, but 
where the necessity is the product of some underlying, objective essence that tungsten has 
(rather than the product of how we decide to deploy the word ‗tungsten‘).   
The thin/thick essentialism distinction does not modify Putnam‘s semantic theory per 
se, since he still claims that language users have certain sorts of referential intentions when 
they introduce natural kind terms. What the move to thin essentialism does is to undermine 
the metaphysical important of Putnam‘s original (1975) essence claims concerning natural 
kinds, namely the derivation of essentialism from (CDR) (again, we shall review this explicit 
project in Chapter 4). Putnam concedes that since his semantic theory assumed, from the 
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outset, that direct reference was unproblematic, it could not be employed to derive essentialist 
conclusions. The problem is that metaphysical realism holds that best physics is the true 
description of the world, and moreover that there is a correspondence relation between 
thought and thing. The causal theory of direct reference cannot provide support for such a 
view in a non-question begging fashion, since it presupposed the notion of reference from the 
outset i.e. it  presupposed that there could be a straightforward relation between thought and 
thing. 
The distinction between early and later Putnam, then, is effectively a distinction 
between an essentialist theory of reference that supposes a ready-made world, with a built-in 
modal structure
17
, which can be captured by one true theory, and a metaphysically neutral 
(CDR) that assumes reference is unproblematic, allowing that our initial intentions fix the 
reference of natural kind terms. On this view, what makes it necessarily true that water is H2O 
is (i) the fact that the stuff we call ‗water‘ has the property of being composed of H2O 
molecules, and (ii) the referential intentions we have when we introduced the term. Since (ii) 
is dependent upon us, and our referential intentions do not have some special access to the 
word, the necessity of theoretical identities like ‗water is H2O‘ are the product of both the 
physical facts and our classificatory and referential conventions. 
However, Putnam is also quite deflationary about the role of convention, since he 
wants to avoid any implications that scientific classifications are purely subjective. Rather, he 
says, we should treat truth as an epistemic notion. The basic idea is that claims like ‗tungsten 
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 Putnam attributes the view that the world has a built in modal structure to Kripke (1983: 220). A contemporary 
version of this view has recently been expressed and defended by Brian Ellis (2001). In Chapter 7 I will illustrate 
just why such a thesis is untenable. Nevertheless, it is worth flagging from the outset that these views are closely 
related. 
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is the element with atomic number 79‘ are true, but where the notion of truth is ‗corrigible, 
relative to task and technique, but not subjective‘ (Putnam 1983: 226). Thus, the truths about 
tungsten – such as that tungsten is an element, and that qua element there are 74 protons 
within each atomic nuclei of the atoms that belong to the tungsten-kind – depend upon how 
we define ‗tungsten‘, which in turn depends upon the tasks and techniques of chemistry (or 
perhaps physics). Thus, since instances of tungsten have a variety of properties, there is no 
particular property that is, objectively, the essence of tungsten. Rather, it is only once we have 
defined tungsten as the element with atomic number 74 that the property of having 74 protons 
becomes essential to the kind. This, of course, is only the briefest of sketches of Putnam‘s 
preferred metaphysics. However, in Chapter 6 I argue that, in fact, this is Locke‘s empiricist 
view of essentialism; hence I reserve a full treatment of this notion until Chapter 6. 
To put the issue back into semantic terms, when chemists use ‗tungsten‘ their 
referential intention must be that ‗tungsten‘ is to apply only to a simple substance (an 
element) that is defined by its atomic number. Similarly, the classification of elements via 
their atomic number is also a product of our intentions, but this time the intentions of the 
research programme concerned with classification. Hence, it is the conjunction of referential 
intentions, classificatory intentions (or decisions) and the physical facts, that make the 
sentence ‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 74‘ necessarily true, and make the 
property of having atomic number 74 the essence of the kind. The physical furniture of the 
world, in and of itself, contains no modal properties, and thus is insufficient to ground the 
necessary truth of theoretical identities. 
Although I have attributed this view to later Putnam, Putnam himself, as we have 
seen, reinterprets his initial talk of essence in line with thin essentialism, seemingly indicating 
that this was what he had in mind all along. Similarly Ian Hacking (2007) has argued that this 
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was always Putnam‘s intention. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this very much at odds with the 
now standard interpretation of Putnam as expounded by Salmon (2005). Since both 
interpretations are plausible, and the exegetical evidence is indecisive, I shall simply 
distinguish early-Putnam from later-Putnam, and concede, following Salmon (and contra 
Hacking 2007), that early-Putnam does employ essentialist assumptions in his derivation of 
necessary a posteriori truths concerning natural kinds (more on this in chapter 4). However, 
by distinguishing early from later Putnam, I will employ later-Putnam‘s arguments against 
essentialism, or at least against a semantics grounded in an essentialism that has not been 
independently justified, when, in chapter 8, I offer the conclusions to this thesis (a version of 
descriptivism without a metaphysically suspicious notion of ‗essence‘). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
In this chapter I want to return to some of the puzzles raised at the end of chapter 1. In 
particular, I will explore answers to the questions concerning phrases like ‗the element with 
atomic number 79‘, and ‗H2O‘ which feature in paradigmatic (Kripkean) theoretical 
identification sentences. In chapter 1 I asked how we should treat such phrases: are they 
analogous to proper names, or are they descriptions? If they are descriptions then why are 
only some descriptions rigid? Here I will consider Scott Soames‘ complex semantic thesis 
concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity sentences, which distinguishes between 
the semantics of phrases like ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ and general names like 
‗gold‘, claiming that both types of phrase are rigid designators, but conceding that the former 
are descriptive.
18
 I begin, in sections 1 and 2, by presenting, in more detail, the concerns 
outlined at the end of chapter 1, and contrast those with Soames‘ own motivations for a 
further treatment of natural kind terms, since they are somewhat different. I present, in section 
3, two potential accounts of natural kind terms that Soames rejects, but which have been 
raised elsewhere in the literature. I then proceed to present, in section 4, Soames‘ positive 
semantic thesis. There is, as we shall see, a division between types of theoretical identity: 
firstly, simple-simple theoretical identities, containing two simple (single word) natural kind 
terms, for instance ‗Apatosaurus is Brontosaurus‘; secondly, simple-complex theoretical 
identities, containing one simple natural kind term, and a complex theoretical term, for 
example ‗gold is the element with atomic number 79‘. In section 5 I will consider the first of 
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 Despite also claiming that the similarity between proper names and natural kind terms that allows us to extend 
the conclusions concerning necessity and a posteriority from the former to the latter is their mutual 
nondescriptionality.  
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these categories, and in sections 6 and 7 respectively, consider and criticise two important 
metaphysical premises in Soames‘ argument for the necessity of theoretical identities. In 
section 8 I will argue that on one plausible reading of Soames‘ thesis, simple-simple 
theoretical identities are just straightforwardly false. In section 9 I will highlight the role that 
metaphysical essentialism is playing in Soames‘ account of the necessity of simple-complex 
theoretical identities. The upshot of this chapter will be that although I think Soames is right 
about the descriptive nature of phrases like ‗the element with atomic number 79‘, his theory 
of types (section 6) and his special auxiliary assumption (section 7) are both false. I will 
conclude that  simple-complex theoretical identities rely upon the independent metaphysical 
thesis of essentialism, which will set the scene for my defence, in Chapter 5, of descriptivism. 
 
3.1 Natural kind terms, predicates and identities 
We know, from chapter 1, that theoretical identification sentences are supposed to be, when 
true, necessary, but knowable only a posteriori. This necessity, it is alleged by Kripke, is 
guaranteed by the semantic fact that natural kind terms, such as ‗ammonia‘ and ‗NH3‘ are 
rigid designators – terms that have the same reference in all and every possible world – plus 
the empirical fact that pairs of such terms are co-referential (making the identity sentence 
‗ammonia is NH3‘ true). The a posteriority is the result of the investigation required to 
discover the truth of such statements: the truth of ‗ammonia is NH3‘ cannot be discovered 
from mere reflection on the terms within the identity statement as it can in, say, ‗a bachelor is 
an unmarried man‘. 
The bulk of the detail of Kripke‘s semantic thesis, however, was developed in his 
discussion of proper names, and identity sentences containing them. His intention was that the 
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same considerations which applied to proper names and identity statements were to apply, via 
straightforward analogy, to natural kind terms and theoretical identity statements. Classic 
examples such as ‗Cicero is Tully‘, ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ and ‗Bob Dylan is Robert 
Zimmerman‘ are supposed to act as models for, and be analogous to, theoretical identification 
sentences such as ‗ammonia is NH3‘, ‗gold is the element with atomic number 79‘ and ‗heat is 
molecular motion‘. 
If theoretical identifications are analogous to identity sentences containing proper 
names we should expect them to share important linguistic similarities. Were the analogy 
straightforward we should expect theoretical identification sentences to contain two singular 
name-like terms, which are (i) the products of two separate baptismal events, (ii) connected to 
two distinct causal chains of reference, (iii) both rigid designators, and (iv) flanking the 
identity sign. Unfortunately almost none of the examples of natural kinds that Kripke gives fit 
this model. 
Consider theoretical identifications concerning chemical kinds. These seem to come in 
at least two types: the first, typified by ‗water is H2O‘, contains a general name (‗water‘) and 
a chemical formula (‗H2O‘) flanking the identity sign (provided we take ‗is‘ to be the English 
language expression of the identity sign) e.g. methane is CH4, sulphuric acid is H2SO4, 
Corundum is Al2O3. While the general name ‗water‘ is arguably nondescriptive, and thus 
analogous to the proper name ‗Cicero‘, ‗H2O‘ is a chemical formula, and the semantic 
credentials of chemical formulae receive no treatment in Kripke.
19
 As a result it is not 
immediately obvious that both terms within a theoretical identity sentence are rigid 
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 More recently Nathan Salmon (1987/88, 2005) has developed an account of the rigidity of chemical formulae 
where he argues that they are simply general term versions of proper names. See Chapter 4 for further details.  
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designators, and this is sufficient to raise questions about the modal status of true theoretical 
identification sentences containing chemical formulae. 
There is also a second type of theoretical identification found in Kripke, exemplified 
in his discussion of gold. According to Kripke ‗a material object is (pure) gold if and only if 
the only element contained therein is that with atomic number 79‘ (Kripke 1980: 138, 
emphasis added), and that fact that gold is such an element is metaphysically necessary. This 
second type of identity sentence has the distinctive logical form x (Px ↔ Qx). Formulated 
thus, the alleged identity sentence not only lacks the identity sign, but, as Scott Soames has 
noted (2002, 2004), has ‗gold‘ and ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ in the predicative 
position. Since Kripke‘s account of rigidity was only for singular terms, it does not obviously 
extend to predicates. Hence we have no model for predicate rigidity, and consequently no 
reason to think that theoretical identity sentences constructed using predicates are necessary 
when true.  
Scott Soames, in Beyond Rigidity (2002), recognises this lacuna in Kripkean 
semantics. He argues that we still require an account ‗specifying how the semantic model 
developed for proper names should be extended to a wider class of terms‘ (Soames 2002: 
242). Soames‘ initial argument to establish that there is an unfinished semantic agenda in 
Naming and Necessity is essentially that which has been outlined above: that there are 
examples of theoretical identification sentences where the natural kind terms (i) appear in the 
predicative position, and (ii) appear to flank a universally quantified biconditional, rather than 
the identity sign. The important question, which will determine just how large Kripke‘s 
lacuna is, is: how extensive is the class of natural kind terms that are predicates? 
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According to Soames (2002: 246-248) the majority of natural kind terms are, or 
should be treated as, predicates. He reasons as follows: the class of natural kind terms 
includes mass nouns, count nouns and adjectives, and there is no way to treat all of these as 
singular: Count nouns like ‗human‘ and ‗mammal‘, which are natural kind terms, naturally 
combine with quantifiers to occur in the predicative position e.g. ‗some mammals, but all 
humans, are less than 12ft tall‘; this natural combination of count nouns with quantifiers 
constitutes a plausible argument that the predicative use of such terms is fundamental; Mass 
nouns too combine naturally with quantifiers e.g. ‗all sugar, but only some water, is sweet‘, 
and occur in the predicative position: in unmodified usage they parallel count nouns, and as 
count nouns are treated as predicates so to should mass nouns be; similarly (and more 
obviously) adjectives are always predicative, and can occur naturally with quantifiers e.g. 
‗everyone was amused, but someone was embarrassed, by the comedian‘s political satire‘. 
If Soames is right then Kripke‘s account of the necessary a posteriori does not 
obviously apply to natural kind terms. Since the account of rigidity, which grounds the 
necessity of true identity sentences, was only given for proper names, and natural kind terms 
are disanalogous to proper names, Kripke‘s account of rigidity does not apply to them. 
Consider the identity sentence ‗Marie Curie is Maria Sklodowska‘. Since names are always 
rigid designators, which is to say they have the same denotation in all possible worlds,
20
 and 
the identity sentence is true, it will be true in all possible worlds and hence metaphysically 
necessary. But Kripke does not say that predicates are rigid designators. So if natural kind 
terms are predicates then given that Kripke thinks that theoretical identification sentences 
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 This is not completely accurate. It is possible to distinguish between types of rigid designator. So one might 
argue that rigid designators only designate in worlds where their denotation is present, and failed to designate in 
worlds where their denotation does not exists (cf. Besson 2010; LaPorte 2006; Salmon 2005). However, this 
distinction is not important for my discussion. 
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concerning natural kinds are also, when true, necessary and knowable only a posteriori, we 
urgently need some account of the rigidity of predicates: this is Soames‘ project in Beyond 
Rigidity. 
It is worth noting, however, that the move to treat natural kind terms as predicates is 
not uncontroversial. Nathan Salmon has argued that Kripke‘s account of rigidity for proper 
names applies directly to his examples of natural kind terms, because natural kind terms are 
simply general names. The crux of this issue, which I will address in the next chapter, is 
whether or not the most fundamental use of mass nouns and count nouns is predicative. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from what Kripke says that he recognises that many of our natural 
kind terms can function as predicates (Kripke 1980: 127), and this is sufficient for our 
purposes here. 
 
3.2 Revisiting Kripke 
There is one further argument, neglected by Soames, to demonstrate that Kripke‘s account of 
theoretical identification containing natural kind terms is not the straightforward analogue of 
his account of identity sentences containing proper names. Laporte, in his (2004: 36-37), 
makes brief reference to the similarity between Kripke‘s theoretical identifications and his 
account of the necessity of origin, which was first noticed by Salmon (2005): this was 
mentioned in chapter 1, but that connection is developed in this section, to illustrate the fact 
that not all of Kripke‘s claims concerning necessity are grounded in language.  
For Kripke, theoretical identifications are ‗identities between terms for substances, and 
also the properties of substances and of natural kinds‘ (Kripke 1980: 166). In the classic 
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discussion of gold, as a paradigm example of a theoretical identification, Kripke claims that 
‗it is part of the nature of gold as we have it to be an element with atomic number 79‘ (Kripke 
1980: 125), and that ‗science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find the 
nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind‘ (Kripke 1980: 138). 
Taken together these claims suggests a reading of Kripke where theoretical identities are the 
identifications of a natural kind with its essence – they are ‗statements representing scientific 
discoveries about what this stuff is‘ (Kripke 1980: 125), rather than statements of identity 
generated by distinct naming events. Theoretical identifications like the gold example 
‗resemble ―Cicero is a product of the egg and sperm that generated him‖ rather than ―Cicero = 
Tully‖ in respect that they aim to expose essence‘ (LaPorte 2004: 37). Standard identity 
sentences like ‗Cicero is Tully‘, in stark contrast, are silent on metaphysical issues about the 
essence of Cicero. It is this observation, I claim, that represents the most significant difficulty 
for the supposed analogy between identities between proper names and theoretical identities 
between natural kind terms: if theoretical identifications are the analogue of Kripke‘s claims 
about the essences of individuals, then although Soames might be right that they are 
semantically dissimilar to identity sentences featuring proper names, he may turn out to be 
wrong when he claims that theoretical identities are ‗linguistically guaranteed to be necessary 
when true‘ (2002: 279), since the necessity of origins claims in Kripke stem from the 
essentialism already presupposed. Hence theoretical identities may well come with 
significantly more metaphysical baggage than Soames imagines. 
The difficulty can be decisively illustrated with a brief analysis of the necessity of 
origin thesis. According to Kripke, there is a principle of origin for material objects such that 
‗if a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its 
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origin from any other matter‘ (Kripke 1980: n56).21 This principle when applied to people, as 
it is in Naming and Necessity, boils down to the claim that for any particular person P, P 
necessarily comes for their particular origin – where their origin, for the sake of argument, is 
the sperm and egg from which they originated – and nothing lacking that origin could be P. 
Consider, to illustrate, Sir Winston Churchill, and ask whether it is (counterfactually) 
possible that he was the son of Mr and Mrs Chamberlain. Given that Sir Winston Churchill 
really did come from his actual parents – Lord Randolph Churchill and Jennie Jerome – 
according to Kripke, he necessarily came from his actual parents. When we entertain a 
counterfactual scenario where ‗Churchill‘ is the son of Mr and Mrs Chamberlain we are, at 
best, considering a scenario in which some other person possessing many of the properties 
that Sir Winston Churchill actually possessed, is the son of Mr and Mrs Chamberlain. As 
Putnam would say, we are considering a situation where someone else satisfies the 
operational definition we have of Sir Winston Churchill. 
According to Kripke, whilst it is possible to consider situations in which Sir Winston 
Churchill was never actually born, or where he was born but did not become Prime Minister, 
or even where someone else with many of the properties of Sir Winston Churchill became 
Prime Minister, it is not coherent to consider him, the actual man, as being born of different 
parents. The point here is that people necessarily come from the origins that they do, but that 
their actual origins are not something we know about a priori (although the general principle 
that origin is necessary looks to be a priori).  
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 This principle is precisely the kind of principle that counts as nontrivially essentialist. However, more on this 
in chapters 7 and 8. 
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  Kripke‘s necessity of origin thesis has been given numerous different treatments (see 
Hughes 2004: 108 – 118, Mackie 2006, McGinn 1976: 127 - 135), but the basic view is that 
‗a human being‘s parentage is one of that human being‘s essential properties‘ (Mackie 2006: 
8). Some philosophers have distinguished between the necessity of origin and the sufficiency 
of origin (cf. Mackie 2006: 93 - 117), but for the purposes of this investigation I intend my 
use of the so-called ‗necessity of origin thesis‘ to be understood in the following way. In 
Kripke‘s discussion of the necessity of origin thesis (Kripke 1980: pp. 110 – 115) he presents 
two types of counterfactual scenario. On the one hand he considers cases where an individual, 
say Churchill, is born of his actual parents, but lacks all the properties that he has in this world 
except his origin. So imagine that Churchill never became Prime Minister, never smoked 
cigars, and never won the Nobel Prize for Literature. Despite having none of these properties 
we can still say that it was Churchill who didn‘t do these things, because our example gives us 
the man, Churchill, by giving us exactly his origin. In this case it seems that origin is 
sufficient to guarantee that we are talking about Churchill. 
The other type of case Kripke considers is where we have someone with all the 
properties we standardly associate with Churchill, but lacking Churchill‘s unique origin. In 
these cases, argues Kripke, it is impossible to imagine Churchill ‗being born of different 
parents. It would seem to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this 
object‘ (Kripke 1980: 113). In other words, it is a necessary condition of being Churchill that 
he have the particular origin he actually has. Any possible world where there is someone with 
all the properties we standardly associate with Churchill, but without his origin, does not 
count as a world where that person is Churchill: the lack of Churchill‘s origin guarantees that 
someone who is qualitatively identical to Churchill in all ways other than origin is not 
Churchill. 
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The two counterfactual scenarios Kripke sketches suggest that his intended notion of 
the ‗necessity of origin thesis‘ is in fact one that states both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for being a particular individual (Churchill, in my example). The ‗necessity‘ in the 
‗necessity of origin thesis‘ is, I take it, intended to indicate that the origin of an individual is 
metaphysically necessary, which is to say, holds in all possible worlds: the claim, in effect, is 
that being a particular individual consists in possessing the relevant essence, i.e. the set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and these conditions holding across possible worlds. In 
other words, the sentence ‗someone is Winston Churchill if and only if they come from the 
(particular) gamete of Jennie Jerome, and the (particular) gametes of Randolph Churchill‘ 
expresses the necessary and sufficient conditions for being Churchill, and further is, if true, 
metaphysically necessary.
22
 
The important parallel between theoretical identification sentences and claims about 
the necessary origin of an individual, which makes discussion of the former important here, is 
that both are examples of the necessary a posteriori: the category of truths which, according 
to Kripke, have a ‗special character‘ (Kripke 1980: 159) in that ‗[p]hilosophical analysis tells 
us that they cannot be contingently true, so any empirical knowledge of their truth is 
automatically empirical knowledge that they are necessary‘ (ibid.). Since ‗the origin of an 
object is essential to it‘ (Kripke 1980: 114 n57), and the origin of an object holds as a matter 
of metaphysical necessity, we should understand Kripke‘s general notion of essence as the 
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 This interpretation of Kripke, however, is not uncontroversial: at one point Kripke states explicitly that 
‗adequate necessary and sufficient conditions for identity which do not beg the question are very rare‘ (Kripke 
1980: 43) and that ‗I don‘t know of such conditions for identity of material objects over time, or for people‘ 
(ibid.).  
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metaphysically necessary set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity and 
existence of either kinds or individuals.
23
 
Contrast now the identity statement (a) ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘, with the 
essence claim (b) ‗Ehrich Weiss is a product of the sperm and egg that generated him‘. Both 
of these sentences, on Kripke‘s view, are examples of the necessary a posteriori. But there are 
two clear points of disanalogy: firstly, there is a clear semantic dissimilarity between the 
names ‗Ehrich Weiss‘ and ‗Harry Houdini‘ on the one hand, and the descriptive phrase ‗being 
a product of the sperm and egg that generated him‘ on the other; secondly, only the necessity 
of (a) is explicable via Kripke‘s semantic story. The necessity of (b) hinges on whether or not 
we accept the necessity of origin thesis, which is an independent metaphysical hypothesis. 
Hence nothing in Kripke‘s semantics motivates the claim that (b) is necessary.  
But since (b) looks to be more obviously analogous to a standard example of a 
theoretical identification sentence, some account of why sentences with that structure are 
necessary (and knowable a posteriori) is required. Consider Kripke‘s view of the natural kind 
gold, and its corresponding kind term: 
 
[A] material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is 
that with atomic number 79. Here the ‗if and only if‘ can be taken to be strict 
(necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find 
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 The intended contrast is a logical one: take the logical representation of necessary and sufficient conditions 
using a biconditional. The distinction between those that are metaphysically necessary and those that aren‘t is 
just that the former, but not the latter, include a modal operator. 
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the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. (Kripke 1980: 
138) 
 
The passage quoted above indicates that theoretical identity sentences like ‗Gold is the 
element with atomic number 79‘, taking the logical form of a biconditional, and represent 
scientific discoveries about the essences of kinds, much like claims about the origin of an 
individual represent discoveries about the essence of that individual. But the sort of discovery 
that makes a theoretical identity sentence a posteriori is as different from the proper names 
case as discoveries about the origin of an individual are. The a posteriority of standard 
identity sentences requires investigation into causal chains of reference, and, prima facie at 
least, involves no explicit metaphysical commitments. 
Investigating the essences of individuals and kinds, on the other hand, requires 
empirical investigation into the properties of objects, in conjunction with the metaphysical 
notions of individual-identity and substance-identity respectively (and we have yet to even 
consider whether such criteria are a priori, and part of metaphysics proper, or a posteriori, 
being discovered, presumably, by scientists). According to Soames: 
 
[S]cientific investigation may lead to the discovery of properties that are necessary 
and sufficient for membership in the kind. These properties are expressed in 
‗theoretical identity sentences‘ that are necessary but a posteriori. (Soames 2002: 244) 
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 Theoretical identification sentences, then, merely represent important scientific discoveries in 
a language, but the empirical investigations that yield them concern a different type of 
discovery. In the proper names case, although the a posteriority is the product of empirical 
investigation, the discovery is that one object has been named twice, and was hence the 
subject of two distinct name acquiring transactions. The truth of an identity sentence, then, is 
guaranteed by simply substitution. This, is surely not the sort of discovery science makes 
when they find out that samples of tungsten have atomic number 74! Rather, the discovery 
was that the kind of substance called ‗tungsten‘ had a certain physical property – the property 
of having 74 protons within the nucleus of a typical tungsten atom. Hence theoretical 
identities are much more similar to claims about the necessary origin of individuals, since 
both are concerned with the properties of particular objects (be they individuals or kinds).
24
 
Moreover, on the face of it at least, if descriptions like ‗the element with atomic number 74‘ 
are rigid designators, one might reasonably expect Kripke to concede that ‗the person who 
originated from Jennie Jerome‘s (particular) ovum and Randolph Churchill‘s (particular) 
sperm‘ is also a rigid designator. However, it is obvious that the latter is semantically nothing 
like the name ‗Winston Churchill‘, although it might successfully refer to Churchill. 
Furthermore, one might also expect some alternative account of why such an expression is 
rigid in the first place, which would, presumably, appeal to the thought expressed by the 
necessity of origin: that the property of coming from Jennie Jerome‘s (particular) ovum and 
Randolph Churchill‘s (particular) sperm is a property that Winston Churchill, and only 
Winston Churchill, has necessarily. This represents a clear and decisive point of disanalogy 
between natural kind terms and theoretical identities, and proper names and identity 
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 The observation that theoretical identities are much more similar to necessity of origin claims highlights the 
implicit nontrivial essentialist principles underpinning Kripke‘s enterprise. I will return to this issue in chapters 7 
and 8. 
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sentences. The necessity of the former, but not the latter, appear to rely upon a particular 
conception of the world where individuals and kinds have some of their properties 
necessarily. Again, however, it must be noted that this is an independent metaphysical 
position, and nothing to do with semantics per se! 
The foregoing analysis of Kripke‘s discussion of theoretical identification, then, 
makes a convincing case against the assumption that natural kind terms and theoretical 
identification sentences are straightforwardly analogous to proper names and identity 
sentences. Given the disanalogy, if the category of the necessary a posteriori is to apply to a 
wider class of cases, including the philosophically significant class of natural kind terms, then 
we require some alternative account of why Kripke‘s considerations concerning proper names 
and identity sentences apply to natural kind terms and theoretical identification sentences. It is 
with this in mind that we now turn to Soames‘ proposed extension of Kripke‘s semantics to 
natural kind terms. 
 
3.3 Soames’ positive account I 
Soames suggests two distinct initial strategies for extending Kripke‘s insights concerning 
proper names to natural kind terms.  The first, Strategy 1, is to define a notion of rigidity for 
predicates that is a natural extension of Kripke‘s notion for singular terms, and then determine 
whether this notion of rigidity will guarantee the necessity of true theoretical identification 
sentences. The second, Strategy 2, is to relate each natural kind predicate to a corresponding 
singular term, and then define predicate rigidity in terms of singular term rigidity. Hence, a 
predicate will be rigid ‗iff its associated singular term is rigid‘ (Soames 2002: 249). If the 
singular terms that correspond to the natural kind predicates are rigid then any true identity 
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sentence containing the singular terms will have a corresponding predicate analogue, and if 
the former is necessary then so is the latter. 
In the end we shall see that Soames dismisses both strategies for extending Kripke‘s 
account, concluding that we should ‗reserve the terminology of rigidity exclusively for 
singular terms‘ (Soames 2002: 263), and opting, instead, to argue for an analogy between 
proper names and natural kind terms via alternative semantic similarities. Nevertheless, I will 
sketch both of these ultimately rejected strategies since (i) they have received alternative 
treatments in the recent literature (see Gomez-Torrente 2006: 227-259 for a defence of 
essentialist predicates, and Ahmed 2009: 121-133 for a response), and (ii) they help to 
motivate Soames‘ final positive account.  
The aim of Soames‘ positive thesis is to account for the modal intuitions we 
apparently having concerning theoretical identifications, namely that they are necessary when 
true. In the case of proper names the necessity of identity sentences containing them is 
grounded by the notion of rigid designation, and as such Soames formulates the following 
desiderata, which any satisfactory account of the semantics of natural kinds must satisfy: 
 
(1) The rigidity of predicates must be a natural extension of the rigidity of singular terms, 
as defined by Kripke. 
(2) It must have the consequence that (nearly all) natural kind predicates are rigid while 
(nearly all) other predicates are nonrigid. 
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(3) It must play a role in explaining the necessity of true theoretical identification 
sentences that is analogous to the role of a rigid singular term in explaining the 
necessity of a true identity sentence. 
 
Soames‘ first candidate for a predicate that can satisfy these criteria is an essentialist 
predicate.  
 
3.3.1 Essentialist Predicates 
Soames defines an essentialist predicate (EP) as follows: 
 
(EP) =df a predicate that, for all possible worlds w and objects o, if P applies to o with 
respect to w, then P applies to o in all worlds in which o exists. 
 
The nub of the definition is that a predicate P is an essentialist predicate iff ‗the property it 
expresses is an essential property of anything that has it‘ (Soames 2002: 251), and any 
individual that is P could not have existed without being P. 
The notion of an essentialist predicate can be shown to satisfy (1) by first unpacking 
what Soames labels ‗Kripke‘s test, TRS, for [the rigidity of] singular terms‘ (ibid.) and 
applying it to proper names, and then, by extension, to natural kind predicates. TRS states, 
most simply, that a singular term ‗t‘ is a rigid designator just when it is true that the individual 
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that is t could not have existed without being t, and nothing other than that individual can be 
the referent of ‗t‘. Take a proper name, for instance ‗Winston Churchill‘. The name ‗Winston 
Churchill‘ rigidly designates a particular individual iff that individual, Churchill, could not 
have existed without being Churchill, and no person other than Churchill can be the referent 
of the proper name ‗Winston Churchill‘. 
The predicative version can now be straightforwardly articulated, in conjunction with 
some essentialist thesis about the properties of the individual or kind in question. To stick 
with the Churchill example, as we have already seen Kripke claims that individuals have their 
actual origin necessarily (the necessity of origin thesis). Thus we can say that given the facts 
about Churchill‘s actual origin, no other individual, in some other possible world, qualifies as 
being Churchill unless they have precisely the origin Churchill has in the actual world, and 
only Churchill has his particular unique origin.   
Now, take Churchill‘s origin, O, and consider the predicate ‗is the man with origin O‘. 
We already know that ‗Winston Churchill‘ rigidly designates the man with origin O, but now 
we can see that there is a corresponding predicate ‗is the man with origin O‘ that will refer in 
all and only worlds where there exists a person with the origin that Winston Churchill actually 
has. So, just as the name ‗Winston Churcill‘ refers to Churchill in all worlds where the man 
with origin O exists, so too does the predicate ‗is a man with origin O‘. The predicate satisfies 
the predicative version of TRS, which is as follows: let a predicate p be a rigid designator just 
when it is true that the individual that has the property expressed by p could not have existed 
without that property, and nothing other than that individual can have the property expressed 
by p. Where p is the predicate that expresses the property that is Churchill‘s essence, (EP) 
satisfies  (1), and is thus a natural extension of the rigidity of singular terms. 
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The extension of this thesis to natural kind predicates is fairly straightforward. In the 
case of natural kinds and theoretical identification sentences we have two essentialist 
predicates, for example ‗is gold‘ and ‗is the element with atomic number 79‘, where the 
theoretical identity takes the logical form of x[Ax ↔ Bx], where A is the predicate ‗is gold‘ 
and B the predicate ‗is the element with atomic number 79‘. According to the definition (EP), 
A and B are predicates that refer to essential properties of the objects that bear them, and are 
hence essentialist predicates. Further, we have discovered that both predicates apply to the 
same set of objects at this world, call it w. Suppose that for some object o, both A and B apply 
to o with respect to w, then by (EP) both A and B apply to o in every possible world in which 
o exists.  
To satisfy (2), the claim that natural kind predicates are rigid, whilst all other 
predicates are not, the essentialist predicate account must presuppose ‗a substantive 
metaphysical claim about kinds – namely, that if K is a natural kind, then it is a necessary 
property of K that anything that is an instance of K is essentially an instance of it‘ (Soames 
2002: 254). Without the presupposition there is a risk that all kind terms, and all the 
predicates corresponding to them, will turn out to be rigid. Take the predicate ‗is coffee‘. 
Everything to which the predicate ‗is coffee‘ applies to – the extension – has the property of 
being coffee, which is expressed by the predicate. Moreover, the predicate will apply, across 
all possible worlds, to just the set of things that have that property. 
But, this will hold for all predicates, since there will always be some property, P, 
expressed by the predicate, ‗is P‘, that holds trivially of just the set of things within the 
extension of that predicate. This problem has been labelled by Dan Lopez De Sa as ‗the 
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trivialization problem‘ (2007: 117).25 The benefit of the metaphysical claim, then, is that since 
it is only natural kinds that have the necessary property that anything that is an instance of 
that kind is essentially an instance of it, only natural kind predicates will be essentialist 
predicates. The alleged contrast is with non-natural kinds, for instance the wristwatch kind, 
where no particular instance of the wristwatch kind is necessarily an instance of that kind. For 
instance, if it irrevocably stops to function as a wristwatch, and is used rather as an ornament, 
then it is plausible to suppose that it is no longer an instance of the wristwatch kind. If that is 
right, then as a corollary, since the object in question is no longer an instance of the 
wristwatch kind, it cannot have been a necessary property of that object that it was.
26
 The 
cost, of course, it that such a theory of reference requires a highly controversial metaphysical 
assumption in order to work, and one might think (plausibly) that an account of the basic 
semantic function of a common set of terms within our language should be metaphysically 
neutral (cf. Salmon 2005). 
The satisfaction of (3), the final desideratum, requires the notion of an essentialist 
predicate to play a role in the explanation of the necessity of true theoretical identification 
sentences (that is analogous to that for singular terms). As we noted earlier, however, 
Kripke‘s theoretical identifications have a different logical form to standard examples of 
identity between proper names, such as ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘. Consider some of Kripke‘s 
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 Both Soames (2002) and Scwhartz (2002) notice problems with trivialisation, as does LaPorte (2004). 
However, the labelling of the problem is López De Sa‘s, so I have attributed it to him. For some further 
discussion of this problem see also Martí and Martinez-Fernandez in Beebee, H. and Sabbarton-Leary, N. (eds.) 
(2010). 
26
 It should be noted that the claim that for some object o, where o is a member of the natural kind NK in virtue 
of possessing E, where E is the essence of NK, it is a further and far more controversial claim to say that o bears 
E necessarily. Prima facie it looks to be false. For example, where o is a member of the kind Thorium 232, it is 
possible for o to undergo radioactive (alpha) decay, emitting an alpha particle, and transmuting into a member of 
the kind Radium 228. However, if o can go from being an instance of Thorium 232 to Radium 228, than o 
cannot have been a member of the Thorium 232 kind necessarily! 
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paradigm theoretical identifications, for instance ‗light is a stream of photons‘ (1980: 116), or  
‗a material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is that with 
the atomic number 79‘ (ibid.: 138). These theoretical identifications have the logical form of 
biconditionals: x (Ax ↔ Bx)27. Why should we treat these as identity sentences? 
Soames‘ argument is simple: the absence of the identity predicate does not disqualify 
sentences with a distinct logical form from being identity-sentences. Sentences such as ‗an A 
is a B‘ and ‗something is an A iff it is a B‘ are still, in some sense, identifying As with Bs, 
and thus still qualify as a species of identity sentence. Nevertheless, they do require some 
alternate explanation of why they are, when true, necessary. With this in mind Soames 
produces the following argument for the necessity of theoretical identifications with this 
distinctive logical form: 
 
(i) x (Ax ↔ Bx) is true. 
(ii) The predicates ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ are rigid designators – that is, for all possible worlds w and 
objects o, if the predicate applies to o in w, then it applies to o in all worlds in which o 
exists. 
(iii)x (Ax ↔ Bx) is necessary – that is, □x (Ax ↔ Bx) is true. 
However, Soames identifies two problems with the above formulation. The first is that 
the argument is invalid. What follows from (i) and (ii) is not (iii), but (iv): 
                                                          
27
 Soames also considers, to begin at least, representing theoretical identities as universally quantified 
conditionals i.e. x (Ax → Bx). However, since he eventually opts to use only biconditionals in his conclusion, I 
have omitted to former for simplicity. 
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(iv) x □ (Ax ↔ Bx) is true. 
 
But now, although the argument from (i) and (ii) to (iv) is valid, (iv) does not guarantee the 
necessity of theoretical identification sentences since the modal operator has a more limited 
scope. The scope of the necessity operator in (iv) fails to guarantee that there is not some 
possible world ‗w in which some object that doesn‘t exist in the actual world exists, and is an 
A in w, without being a B in w‘ (Soames 2002: 258). Consider the previous example, where A 
stands for ‗is gold‘, and B stands for ‗is the element with atomic number 79‘. Fleshing out the 
story we found that since both A and B apply to an object o in this world, w, A and B apply to 
o in all possible worlds in which o exists. But nothing in Soames‘ argument on behalf of the 
(EP) model rules out there being some other object o1 in some other possible world w1, such 
that it is an A in w1 without being a B in w1. So, even when (iv) is true, the claim that true 
theoretical identifications sentences involving rigid designators are necessary will turn out to 
be false. Let a) be a definition of the compound predicate ‗F‘, consisting of the disjunction of 
three essentialist (and thus rigid) predicates, and let b) be the definition of the predicate ‗...is a 
fundamental particle‘, to which the predicates in a) are related species terms:  
 
a) F (...is a photon or ...is a muon or ...is an electron). 
b) G (...is a fundamental particle) 
Consider, then, the following argument, given the definitions stipulated in a) and b): 
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c) x [Gx (x is a fundamental particle) ↔ Fx (x is a photon or x is a muon or x is an 
electron)]. 
Therefore, 
d) x □ [Gx (x is a fundamental particle) ↔ Fx (x is a photon or x is a muon or x is an 
electron)]. 
 
Assuming that c) is true, and there really are only three species of elementary particle, 
then from c) we can derive d) since each actually existing fundamental particle is essentially a 
fundamental particle, and essentially a photon, muon or an electron. The problem with the 
argument is that it doesn‘t preclude additional species of fundamental particles at other 
possible worlds. So, imagine some other possible worlds where there are additional 
fundamental particles, say positrons. In these worlds there will be individuals that are 
fundamental particles but not any of the three species that constitute fundamental particles in 
our world. Thus the truth of c) does not guarantee the necessity of d), since there are worlds in 
which d) can be false. If this is correct then the notion of an essentialist predicate does not 
satisfy desiderata (3), since theoretical identities do not turn out to be necessary. Hence (EP) 
does not capture the analogue of the notion of rigidity for singular terms. This effectively 
makes strategy 1 unsuccessful as an extension of Kripke‘s thesis. 
 
3.3.2 Correspondence rigidity 
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With strategy 1 unsuccessful Soames moves on to consider strategy 2: finding for each natural 
kind predicate a corresponding singular term which is rigid, and using the rigidity of that 
singular term to derive a corresponding rigidity for the related predicate. So, given a natural 
kind predicate P, we find the associated singular term st, and when it is both necessary and a 
priori that x (x is P iff x is an instance of st) then the rigidity of P can be defined in terms of 
the rigidity of st (Soames 2002: 259). So, if P is the natural kind predicate ‗is water‘ and st is 
the corresponding singular term
28
 ‗water‘, provided the latter is a rigid designator we can 
derive the rigidity of the predicate ‗is water‘ from the rigidity of the singular term ‗water‘ – 
the predicate ‗is water‘ only applies to instances of the kind water, and nothing else.  
The clear benefit of strategy 2 is the it allows the construction of theoretical identity 
sentences like ‗(the kind) water is (the kind) H2O‘ that are analogous to identity sentences 
containing proper names, for instance ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘. Once the necessity of 
the theoretical identity containing singular terms is established we reason as follows: if P is 
the predicate corresponding to the singular term ‗water‘ and Q is the predicate corresponding 
to the singular term ‗H2O‘, and singular terms are, as Kripke said, rigid designators, then it 
will follow from the truth of the identity sentence ‗water is H2O‘, the rigidity of those singular 
terms, and the rule for defining predicate rigidity in terms of the rigidity of some 
corresponding singular term, that necessarily for all x, x is P iff x is Q i.e. x (Px ↔ Qx). 
The key here is the truth of the identity of the singular terms denoting the kind. Where P and 
Q are predicates that refer to their extensions, and o is an object that is referred to by both P 
and Q, it still might be the case that P and Q are merely coextensive, rather than identical. The 
identity must be formulated in terms of the corresponding singular terms, such as ‗the kind 
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 Soames actually uses ‗the kind water‘ as his singular term, but we lose nothing by using ‗water‘ instead, since 
‗water‘, if it designates anything, plausibly designates the kind water. 
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water‘ and ‗the kind H2O‘. If an identity between two such terms is true, then since the 
corresponding predicates P and Q only refer to objects that are instances of the kind water and 
the kind H2O, theoretical identities involving predicates will turn out to be necessary.   
The main problem with the account (as Soames notes) is that it will not just be natural 
kind predicates for which we can locate corresponding singular terms. Consider the predicate 
‗is a philosopher‘ and the corresponding singular term ‗the kind philosopher‘. Since the 
predicate ‗is a philosopher‘ has a corresponding singular term ‗the kind philosopher‘, and 
given that singular terms are always rigid designators, it will follow that the predicate ‗is a 
philosopher‘ is also a rigid designator. Strategy 2, then, is also liable to Lopez De Sa‘s 
‗trivialization problem‘, and hence fails to satisfy desiderata (2): it does not maintain an 
asymmetry between natural kind terms (predicates or otherwise) and other general terms. 
Thus it is not a successful extension of Kripke‘s semantic thesis. 
Since both initial strategies are unsuccessful, Soames concludes that the notion of 
rigidity cannot carry the analogy between proper names and natural kind terms, and that there 
is no satisfactory notion of rigidity for natural kind predicates. This invites further analysis of 
the semantics of natural kind terms to reveal an alternative mechanism that satisfies 
desideratum (1) – (3), and which does justice to our apparent confidence in the necessity of 
true theoretical identification sentences. 
 
3.4 Soames’ positive account II 
Given the two unsuccessful strategies Soames proposes to ‗reserve the terminology of rigidity 
exclusively for singular terms‘, and ground the relation between singular terms and natural 
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kind predicates via some other semantic similarity (2002: 263). As Soames reads Kripke, the 
central thesis in Naming and Necessity is not that names and natural kind terms are both rigid 
designators, but that names and natural kind terms are both nondescriptive. The nub of 
Kripke‘s thesis on this reading is that since names are nondescriptive the denotation of a name 
(an individual) is not required to satisfy any descriptive conditions in order to qualify as the 
referent of that name. Thus nondescriptive terms get to be rigid precisely because they (a) 
have no descriptive content, and (b) are introduced with the intention that they are to refer to 
precisely this individual. Hence, the ‗doctrine that names are rigid designators may be viewed 
as a corollary of the more central thesis that they are nondescriptional, together with an 
account of how their reference is fixed in the actual world‘ (Soames 2002: 264). 
Soames‘ account of natural kind predicates maintains that the important similarity 
between names and natural kind terms is that they are both nondescriptive, and that both have 
broadly the same metasemantics – so a speaker, s, associates a predicate p with a kind K by 
ostending a sample of individuals, x, y and z, all of which are presumed to be instances of K; 
once K has been determined ‗it is understood that for any world w the extension of the 
predicate at w is to be the set of instances of K at w‘ (Soames 2002: 267). The thesis that both 
proper names and natural kind terms (predicates or otherwise) are nondescriptive is what we 
can call Extended Millianism: 
 
Extended Millianism (EM): the thesis that ‗the meaning (semantic content) of a simple 
natural kind predicate is the natural kind it designates‘ (Soames 2002: 278). 
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According to (EM) a speaker associates a natural kind predicate p with certain 
individuals with which she is acquainted, and which she presumes to be members of the same 
kind.
29
 The introduction of the predicate comes with the explicit intention that p apply to all 
and only things of the same kind as the individuals with which the speaker is acquainted.  
Alternatively, a speaker may employ a description to help affix the natural kind predicate to 
the individuals which she presumes to be members of the same kind, but in such cases 
although the description is taken to be indicative of the kind, it is not thought to be 
synonymous with the introduced predicate. Consider the predicate ‗is gold‘. The actual 
introduction of this predicate is lost to history, but imagine the Romans were right, and the 
god Mercury discovered gold. Mercury, as our typical language user, introduced the predicate 
‗is gold‘ with the intention that it apply to all and only stuff of the same kind as dthat stuff 
(the ostended samples), with which he was acquainted. 
The thesis (EM) stems, in part, from what Soames takes to be part of Kripke‘s 
‗unfinished semantic agenda‘ (Soames 2002: 3) from Naming and Necessity, namely to give 
an account of the semantic content of proper names and, by extension, simple natural kind 
terms. Kripke, as we have already seen in  chapter 1, endorsed a modified version of 
Millianism, the thesis that (logically proper) ‗names have denotation but not connotation‘ 
(Kripke 1980: 25). A Kripkean semantics is essentially Millianism, extended to natural kind 
terms (which Mill thought of as connoting expressions). Kripke construes Mill as ‗more or 
less right‘ (Kripke 1980: 127) about names, but wrong about general terms. Where Mill 
treated general terms as connotative, Kripke extends Mill‘s thesis about names to general 
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 The individuals, presumably, get to be members of the kind by being instances of it. So, for some individual x, 
x is a member of the gold-kind if (and only if) it instantiates the property of being gold. In effect, then, the 
implicit assumption here is that kinds are property like abstract objects. The assumption is made explicit later in 
Soames, and will be discussed here in due course.  
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terms, claiming that they, like names, have denotation but no connotation. Since neither 
proper names nor (simple) natural kind terms have connotation, but only denotation, the 
semantic content of either category of term is simply the referent of the relevant term. Both 
are what we might call purely referential expressions.
30
 
Soames, then, follows Kripke in endorsing a modified Millianism, extended from 
proper names to natural kind terms. It is important to note, though, that as Soames interprets 
Kripke, Kripke never really constructed a theory of the semantic content of either names or 
natural kind terms. On this point, Soames view is plausible; after all, Kripke states quite 
explicitly ‗You may suspect me of proposing a theory; but I hope not, because I‘m sure it‘s 
wrong too if it is a theory‘ (Kripke 1980: 64). But if that is right, it is far from obvious that 
Kripke really did have a solution to Frege‘s Puzzle (see Chapter 1, section 5), and hence not 
even obvious that Kripke justified that identities and theoretical identities express propositions 
that are actually knowable only a posteriori. After all, if the meaning of a term just is its 
referent, then since, for example, ‗Batman‘ and ‗Bruce Wayne‘ are co-referential, the identity 
sentence ‗Batman is Bruce Wayne‘ expresses the same proposition as ‗Batman is Batman‘, 
and so should be knowable a priori. Putting an answer to this worry to one side, this 
observation makes Soames‘ account quite unlike Kripke‘s insofar as it attempts to give an 
account of the semantic content of proper names (and natural kind terms), and argues for an 
analogy between proper names and natural kind terms on the basis of their nondescriptive 
semantic content. He then uses this similarity to ground our modal intuitions about theoretical 
identification sentences. In the following section I will sketch his account of the necessity of 
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 It is not completely obvious what Kripke thinks about the semantic content of names and natural kind terms. 
However, what he says about Mill at least suggests that buys Mill‘s view of content. 
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theoretical identification sentences, but first there are some problems and confusions to 
address, concerning (EM). 
Firstly, the confusion that stems from Soames‘ perplexing articulation of (EM). Prior 
to the introduction of (EM) as a semantic thesis, Soames is fairly consistent in claiming that 
natural kind predicates have, as their extensions, sets of instances of the kind with which the 
introducer of the predicate was acquainted. Natural kind predicates are the sorts of term that a 
speaker can use ‗to say something about members of a kind, even if he lacks the ability to 
accurately describe either the kind itself or its instances‘ (Soames 2002: 266). Moreover, 
when natural kind predicates are introduced into a language, they are stipulated to ‗apply to 
all and only instances of the unique natural kind‘ of which the samples employed to introduce 
the predicate are instances (ibid.: 267). Hence it sounds as though natural kind predicates 
designate their extensions. 
However, Soames also talks about natural kind predicates designating kinds (ibid.: 
272), and indeed defines (EM) in these terms. For Soames, natural kind predicates are 
semantically similar to proper names, like ‗Mercury‘, in that they are denoting (rather than 
connoting) expressions, and fundamentally nondescriptive. The predicate ‗is gold‘ 
nondescriptively applies to all and only the stuff which is of the same kind as the stuff with 
which Mercury is already acquainted – instances of the kind – and designates the kind itself.31 
But as Michael Devitt notes ‗it is not obvious that they [natural kind terms] designate at all‘ 
(2005: 139). Similarly, as Nathan Salmon notes, there ‗are very forceful reasons – due 
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 There is perhaps an obvious parallel here between Soames‘ account and Putnam‘s account of natural kind 
terms. Indeed Nathan Salmon (2003) raises this point as an objection to Soames, observing that Soames‘ account 
relies upon the same metaphysical essentialism that Putnam‘s does, and that this is objectionable since a 
semantics should be metaphysically neutral on these sorts of issues. 
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independently to Church, Gödel, and ultimately Frege – for taking predicates to designate 
their semantic extensions‘, rather than as designating the kinds themselves (Salmon 2003: 
480). Admittedly, the extension of a kind is not a good candidate for the reference of a 
predicate if we are trying to capture something like the notion of rigidity, whilst also 
endorsing (EM), since general terms, like ‗tungsten‘ or ‗bear‘, cannot rigidly designate their 
extensions, when the class of objects that is the extension of a predicate varies from world to 
world. Moreover, extension tends to vary within a world over time. Consider the extension of 
‗is a human‘, which is the class of humans. Since the population is constantly changing, if the 
meaning of a predicate is its extension, ‗is human‘ will mean something different every time 
the population changes – this surely cannot be right. 
How, then, should we understand Soames‘ thesis? It is clear from Soames‘ rejection of 
strategy 1, the essentialist predicate strategy, that he is aware of the problems associated with 
marrying rigidity to extension: whilst all actual samples of a kind may be within the extension 
of the corresponding kind predicate, there are additional possible samples that are not. Hence, 
the notion of a rigid predicate is undermined. Similarly, Soames dismissed strategy 2, the 
correspondence rigidity strategy, on the grounds that for the vast majority of predicates there 
is a corresponding singular term (e.g. ‗is a coffee mug‘ and ‗the kind coffee mug‘), which 
undermines the required asymmetry between kind terms and natural kind terms.
32
 
The upshot of the two failed strategies, recall, was to reserve the notion of rigidity for 
singular terms. Does that mean that natural kind predicates are not rigid designators? Well, 
since they are nondescriptive and introduced by ostension and stipulation – making them 
analogous to proper names – and, for Soames, rigidity is a corollary of being nondescriptive, 
                                                          
32
 Inviting the so-called ‗trivialisation problem‘, which I discuss in chapter 4, section 8. 
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presumably predicates are rigid (Soames 2002: 264). What Soames thesis appears to be, then, 
is that for any arbitrarily selected natural kind predicate p, introduced with the appropriate 
metasemantics (by ostending samples of some natural kind NK, or via reference fixing 
description), p applies to all instances of the kind NK – x, y and z say – but designates the 
kind NK; moreover, since p is nondescriptive, p rigidly designates NK. That this reading of 
Soames is correct is given additional support by his claim that ‗properties are the meanings of 
predicates‘ and his initial treatment of natural kinds as properties (2002: 278-9).33 So, if p is 
the predicate ‗is tungsten‘, p applies to all and only instances of the tungsten kind. Since 
objects qualify as members of the tungsten kind, NK, only in virtue of possessing the property 
being tungsten, and the content of  p is defined by (EM), the meaning of ‗is tungsten‘ will be 
the property being tungsten. 
But this raises a second, obvious problem. According to Millianism, the meaning of a 
nondescriptive proper names is just its referent. Soames has extended this thesis of semantic 
content to natural kind predicates. Hence, if two simple natural kind predicates are co-
referential then they have the same semantic content, since the meaning of a natural kind 
predicate just is the natural kind it designates. Take the theoretical identity sentence ‗for all x, 
x is a Woodchuck iff x is a Groundhog‘, which contains two simple natural kind predicates. 
Since the two natural kind predicates are co-referential, the proposition expressed by ‗for all 
x, x is a Woodchuck iff x is a Groundhog‘ is the same proposition as that expressed by ‗for all 
x, x is a Woodchuck iff x is a Woodchuck‘. In effect, the two theoretical identification 
                                                          
33
 Although Soames goes on to change his mind slightly, claiming that although the meanings of natural kind 
predicates are properties, the natural kinds themselves are not properties but intensions (functions from worlds to 
extensions). He then goes on to distinguish simple natural kind predicates from complex natural kind predicates, 
claiming that the former designate natural kinds (intensions) directly, whilst the latter designate natural kinds 
indirectly, since the meaning of a complex predicate is the property that determines the kind (2002: 279). I will 
discuss this distinction in significantly more detail in section 9 of this chapter. 
 105 
sentences are synonymous. However, since the latter is knowable a priori so too must the 
former be. Hence it is a consequence of endorsing (EM) that identity sentences and theoretical 
identity sentences containing two simple natural kind predicates turn out to be knowable a 
priori, rather than being knowable only a posteriori as Kripke argued.
34
 
Soames‘ effectively concedes the point that the proposition expressed by sentences 
containing two co-referential names or natural kind terms are knowable a priori, but 
maintains that this is consistent with the claim that in certain contexts an assertive utterance of 
such a sentence could well communicate a posteriori information (2002: 279). Consider the 
following two theoretical identity sentences: (a) ‗for all x, x is a Moose iff x is an Elk‘, and 
(b) ‗for all x, x is a Moose iff x is a Moose‘. Given (EM), the thesis that the meaning of a term 
just is its referent, the proposition expressed by (a) is the same as that expressed by (b), since 
‗is a Moose‘ refers to the same species as ‗is an Elk‘. Thus, it is a logical consequence of 
(EM) that just as the proposition expressed by (b) is knowable a priori, so too is the 
proposition expressed by (a), since (a) and (b) express the same proposition. However, 
observes Soames, ‗in different contexts [assertions made of one] would standardly convey, 
and even result in the assertion of, a posteriori propositions that would not be‘ (Soames 2002: 
279) asserted of the other.
 
 
The crux of the move is to concede that both names and natural kind terms are Millian, 
and that when such terms are co-referential they are synonyms, but to maintain that when 
speakers utter simple sentences containing such terms, they assert more than just Russellian 
                                                          
34
 It is worth noting that this consequence stems from endorsing Mill‘s account of the semantic content of 
denoting expressions. Thus if Kripke‘s original intention was to endorse this Millian account of semantic 
content, then identities like ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ are not obviously a posteriori. However, Kripke did not 
give an explicit account of the meaning of names and/or natural kind terms, so it is not obvious that the criticism 
applies to Kripke. 
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structured propositions, i.e. a proposition that has an individual (the referent) as its 
constituent. So, when a speaker utters a sentence about, say, an elk, she does not merely assert 
the singular proposition that has the referent of the natural kind predicate ‗is an elk‘ as a 
constituent, such that the substitution of ‗is a moose‘ for ‗is an elk‘ would have no impact on 
the content of her utterance. Rather she asserts, in addition to the singular proposition, various 
general or descriptive propositions that, as far as she is concerned, may be true of everything 
within the extension of ‗is a moose‘, but not true of things within the extension of ‗is an elk‘. 
For instance, our typical speaker might know that a bull moose sheds its antlers seasonally, 
but that if castrated it will shed its antlers, and then grow a single misshapen set that it keeps 
for the rest of its life (Geist 1998). However, they might not associate this information with 
things within the extension of ‗is an elk‘. 
Let us represent the descriptive information that our language user, Lu, associates with 
the predicate ‗is a moose‘ using the sentence letter D; according to the story told above, Lu 
associates D with ‗is a moose‘, but not with ‗is an elk‘, and hence when she asserts a sentence 
containing ‗is a moose‘ part of what she intends to convey (the content of her 
sentence/utterance) is D. The solution, then, is to concede that although (a) is a priori, 
assertions containing the natural kind predicates ‗is a moose‘ or ‗is an elk‘ will tend to convey 
a posteriori information such that standard language users will not think that (a) expresses the 
same proposition as (b). Whilst this does not save the Kripkean insight about the a 
posteriority of identity and theoretical identity sentences, it does offer some account of why 
we think that (a) is a posteriori, despite (a) expressing the same proposition as (b).
35
 
                                                          
35
 It should also be noted that a proponent of Millianism is committed to conceding that ‗Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ expresses the same proposition as ‗Hesperus is Hesperus‘, since the two names are co-referential, 
and hence both contribute the same referent to any proposition in which they figure. It was this problem with 
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However, as we shall see in section 3.6, Soames does not adopt this solution to the second 
class of theoretical identification sentences, namely those containing complex natural kind 
terms such as ‗H2O‘ or ‗the element with atomic number 79‘. 
 
3.5 Simple theoretical identification sentences 
My central line of objection to Soames‘ thesis is to his theory of types, and his assumption 
that such a notion of ‗type‘ is true. In this section I show that Soames‘ notion of ‗type‘ is 
actually false, which will effectively undermine his argument for the necessity of theoretical 
identities, since the notion of ‗type‘ is doing the heavy lifting in establishing that necessity. I 
will begin by showing how the argument is clearly invalid without Soames‘ notion of ‗type‘, 
and then use this to analyse precisely what Soames has in mind when he introduces the 
notion. The conclusion of this section will be that Soames fails to establish the necessity of 
theoretical identities linguistically. 
Theoretical identities, according to Soames‘ analysis, come in two semantic varieties. 
The first, which I call the simple-simple type, involve a pair of simple natural kind predicates, 
for instance ‗x is a Woodchuck iff x is a Groundhog‘. The second, what I call the simple-
complex type, involves a simple natural kind predicate and a complex natural kind predicate, 
for example ‗x is tungsten iff x is the element with atomic number 74‘. Here I focus only on 
the former, the simple-simple type, but Soames‘ notion of type plays the same role in 
arguments for the necessity of simple-complex theoretical identities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Millianism that generated Frege‘s Puzzle, and encouraged the development of descriptivist theories of meaning 
and reference. 
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A simple-simple theoretical identity sentence consists of two simple natural kind 
predicates. A simple natural kind predicate, typically, consists of a single count noun, for 
instance ‗Apatosaurus‘, modified with the copula ‗is‘, to form the predicate ‗is an 
Apatosaurus‘. Using LaPorte‘s (2004: 36) example to illustrate: let A stand for the predicate 
‗is an Apatosaurus‘ and let B stand for the predicate ‗is a Brontosaurus‘. Assume that A was 
introduced via ostension with the explicit intention that it apply to all and only instances of 
the unique natural kind of which this is an instance, where ‗this‘ picks out a sample within the 
environment. Let B be introduced more loosely, by ostension or reference-fixing description, 
but let B designate a kind of the same type as A (so, if A designates a species kind than so too 
does B). Now, suppose that after some empirical investigation we discover that everything 
within the extension of A is also within the extension of B. How, given co-extension, do we 
firstly conclude that ‗all As are Bs‘,  and secondly move from this discovery to the modal 
version of the claim i.e. that necessarily all As are Bs? 
Soames employs the following argument, call it the Necessity Argument, to extend 
Kripke‘s insights into proper names and identity sentences to natural kind predicates and 
theoretical identity sentences: 
 
...we reason as follows: (i) From the assumption that the ostensive natural kind predicate 
A has successfully been introduced it follows that there is a unique natural kind KA (of a 
certain type T) of which nearly all members of the sample associated with A are instances, 
and A applies (at a world) to all and only instances of KA (at the world). (ii) From the 
assumption that the natural kind predicate B has successfully been introduced, it follows 
that there is a natural kind KB which is such that B applies (at a world) to all and only 
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members of KB (at the world). (iii) By hypothesis, the two predicates designate kinds of 
the same type T; thus both KA and KB are species, or both are substances, or both are kinds 
of some other category. (iv) If the theoretical identity sentence [All As are Bs] is true, then 
(since nearly all objects in the A-samples are As) nearly all of the objects in the A-sample 
are Bs, and hence they are instances of kind KB as well as kind KA. (v) Since the A-sample 
determines a single kind (of the given type T – species, substance, etc.), of which nearly 
all members of the sample are instances, it follows that kind KA = KB. (vi) But this mean 
that in addition to [All As are Bs], [All and only As are Bs] must also be true. (vii) 
Moreover, both must be necessary, since from steps (i), (ii), and (v) it follows that for all 
worlds w the extension of A at w = the set of instances of KA at w = the set of instances of 
KB at w = the extension of B at w. (viii) In short, if A and B are natural kind predicates of 
the sorts indicated, then a theoretical identity sentence [All and only As are Bs] involving 
those predicates is necessary, if the corresponding sentence [All As are Bs] is true. 
(Soames 2002: 268)   
 
If we ignore premise (v) of the preceding argument, then we can see that the argument 
is obviously invalid. Without premise (v) there is an inference from ‗All As are Bs‘ to ‗All and 
only As are Bs‘ – i.e. from x[Ax → Bx] to x[Ax ↔ Bx] – that is erroneous. Since the 
argument is supposedly valid with premise (v), let me first represent the argument more 
formally without (v), in a bid to cash out precisely what (v) amounts to. The argument is as 
follows: 
 
(a) Let P and Q be natural kind predicates that have been successfully introduced. 
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(b) If P and Q have been successfully introduced, then there is a unique kind KP 
corresponding to P, and a unique kind KQ corresponding to Q. 
(c) Let P and Q be natural kind predicates designating kinds of the same type T (i.e. 
species predicates, or substance predicates). 
(d) Let x [Px → Qx] be true (on the basis of empirical investigation). 
Given (a) and (b),  
(e) The extension of P at a world w is the set of individuals that are members of KP, and 
the extension of Q at w is the set of individuals that are members of KQ. 
From (e) and the truth of (d) it follows that, 
(f) since (nearly) all P-samples are Ps, and (nearly) all P-samples are Qs, that (nearly) all 
P-samples are instances of KP and KQ. 
Thus, from (b), (c) and (f) it follows that, 
(g) KP = KQ. 
And therefore, 
(h) x (Px ↔ Qx). 
 
The invalidity of the argument is now clear. The derivation of (g) and consequently (h) 
from (a)-(d) just does not follow. The biconditional at (h) is effectively being derived from a 
single conditional, rather than from the conjunction of two conditionals: x [Px ↔ Qx] only 
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follows from the conjunction of x [Px → Qx] and x [Qx → Px]. Since the inference to (h) 
is straightforwardly invalid, Soames‘ argument devoid of its notion of ‗type‘ fails. 
The problem stems from Soames‘ claim that ‗finding out that everything in the 
extension of [P] is in the extension of [Q] is tantamount to finding out that the kind associated 
with [P] is identical with the kind associated with [Q]‘ (2002: 269). This is not the case. It 
fails to follow from the fact that everything within the extension of P is within the extension 
of Q that everything within the extension of Q is within the extension of P. For instance, if P 
is the predicate ‗is nickel‘ and Q the predicate ‗is metal‘, then whilst everything within the 
extension of ‗is nickel‘ is indeed within the extension of ‗is metal‘ not everything within the 
extension of ‗is metal‘ is within the extension of ‗is nickel‘.  
Moreover, even when we have two predicates that are actually co-extensional, an 
inference to identity would still not be warranted. If P is the predicate ‗is a renate‘ and Q the 
predicate ‗is a cordate‘ then despite everything within the extension of P being within the 
extension of Q, and everything within the extension of Q being within the extension of P, this 
is insufficient to ground an inference to the identity of the renate-kind and the cordate-kind 
(since there will be close possible worlds where there are creatures with hearts but no 
kidneys). 
What the forgoing analysis reveals, then, is just what work Soames notion of ‗type‘ is 
doing. In the original argument we are offered, as a paradigm case, a situation where we 
discover that one predicate, P, has total extensional overlap with another, Q, but not that the 
latter, Q, has total extensional overlap with the other, P. As I have demonstrated, a version of 
the argument without (v) invalidates the inference to identity, hence (v) is vital for deriving 
the necessity of true theoretical identities. But what manner of premise is (v)? Premise (v) 
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states that ‗individuals in the sample associated with the ostensive predicate [P] are members 
of a single natural kind of a given type‘ (Soames 2002: 269). From this, and the observation 
that the two predicates, P and Q, designate kinds of the same type, it allegedly follows that the 
kinds are identical. Premise (v), as Soames concedes, is a ‗very substantial non-linguistic 
claim‘ (2002: 269) about kinds that accompanies the introduction (or metasemantics) of a 
natural kind predicate. With the analysis in place I now propose to distil Soames‘ notion of 
‗type‘, and show why it is false. 
 
3.6 Kinds of a type T? 
Soames claims, explicitly, that: 
 
If the theoretical identity sentence [All As are Bs] is true, then (since nearly all objects 
in the A-sample are As) nearly all of the objects in the A-sample are Bs, and hence 
they are instances of kind KB as well as kind KA. (v) Since the A-sample determines a 
single kind (of the given type T – species, substance, etc.), of which nearly all 
members of the sample are instances, it follows that kind KA = KB. (Soames 2002: 
268) 
 
According to the quoted passage, if we have the true conditional P → Q, and there is a kind 
KP and a kind KQ to which the predicates correspond, then all P-samples are instances of KQ 
as well as KP. So far, so good. The nub of the inference to identity is that since the P-samples 
determine a single kind of a type T of which all correctly identified members of the sample 
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are instances, it follows that the kinds KP and KQ are identical. But how does being a kind of a 
type T do so much work?  
Soames says little of what being a kind of a particular type consists in, saying only 
that where two kinds, say KP and KQ, are of the same type, then both are, for example, 
substance kinds (for substances) or species kinds (for species). Presumably what Soames has 
in mind is something like the following: where A is the predicate ‗is an Apatosaurus‘ and B is 
the predicate ‗is a Brontosaurus‘, and KA is the kind designated by the former, whilst KB is 
designated by the latter, since both kinds are of the same type – species kinds – the discovery 
that if something is within the extension of A then it is also within the extension of B is 
sufficient to infer the identity of KA and KB. But this, as it stands, does little to plug the 
invalidity of the argument form without (v).  
Consider a variation on an earlier example: let P be the natural kind predicate ‗is 
gold‘, let KP be the natural kind gold, and assume that P has been successfully introduced 
(which means that it does pick out individuals that are members of a natural kind) by 
ostending samples within the speaker‘s environment. Let Q be the natural kind predicate ‗is 
metal‘, let KQ be the natural kind metal, and assume also that Q has been successfully 
introduced. We have discovered that ‗all Ps are Qs‘ is true, since all instances of gold are also 
instances of metal, and as such can say that all the samples with which a speaker is acquainted 
that are instances of KP are also instances of KQ (all objects within the P-sample are also 
within the Q-sample). Both KP and KQ are kinds of the same type insofar as both are 
substance kinds. Hence, according to Soames‘ model, we can infer that KP = KQ, and derive 
the further conclusion that necessarily something is P iff that something is Q. But this is 
obviously false. All samples of gold are samples of metal, but not all samples of metal are 
samples of gold. The mere fact the everything within the extension of P is within the 
 114 
extension of Q does not warrant an inference to the identity of the kinds associated with the 
predicates. Even with a stipulation that the kinds be of the same type, where by ‗type‘ we 
mean substance or species (the kinds gold and metal are, after all, both substance kinds), the 
argument is still invalid.  
We can identify just what work the theory of types must do by considering precisely 
why the counterexample works. The answer, in this case, is fairly obvious: the 
counterexamples works by appealing to kinds at different levels of generality. Any case where 
there is a natural kind KP, and KP is an instance of a higher-order kind KQ, it will follow 
automatically that any instance of KP will also be an instances of KQ. Of course, what will not 
automatically follow is that any instance of KQ will also be an instance of KP. 
Soames‘ notion of ‗type‘ must therefore restrict the class of inferences to necessary 
theoretical identities, specifically excluding cases where one kind is a member of another 
(higher-order) kind. What, if anything, makes this restriction plausible? Well, Soames‘ appeal 
to so-called substantial non-linguistic claims must include something like the idea that natural 
kinds come in a hierarchy, and that kinds of the same type are not kinds across different levels 
within the hierarchy, but only on a given level.
36
 Hence, the gold-kind is not a kind of the 
same type as the metal-kind, since the former is a member of the latter, despite both kinds 
clearly being substance kinds. 
Moreover, it appears as though this thought is supposed to be implicit in the 
introduction of the relevant natural kind predicates in the first place. According to the 
necessity argument, note, when a speaker introduces a natural kind predicate they do so with 
                                                          
36
 The thesis that natural kinds form a unified hierarchy is something I shall criticise on empirical/metaphysical 
grounds in Chapter 7. In this section, for the sake of argument, I simply accept it. 
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some notion of what type of kind they are denoting. But that just looks implausible! How are 
typical language users supposed to be able to judge at what level the kind they are picking out 
occurs upon? Moreover, even if they were able to do so, this renders at least part of Soames‘ 
account implausible, since he purports to be presenting a theory concerning the basic 
semantics of natural kind terms. 
Consider, for instance, the following (somewhat artificial) example: a technical 
language user Lu discovers a fundamental particle, and introduces the natural kind predicate 
‗is a muon‘ successfully. Now imagine, further, that there are also protons in the environment, 
and Lu introduces the natural kind predicate ‗is a proton‘ accordingly. Since the introduction 
of kind terms requires, as one of its non-linguistic claims, a stipulation about the level of 
generality at which the kind occurs, we are effectively being asked to suppose that Lu 
implicitly recognises that ‗is a muon‘ applies to things that are less general than ‗is a proton‘, 
since the latter is only a subatomic particle, whilst the former is a more fundamental 
elementary particle. But this is highly implausible. When Lu introduces ‗is a muon‘, how 
could she know at what level of generality the muon-kind occurs? Indeed, even if she does, 
that Lu is required to know at what level of generality the muon-kind occurs within a 
hierarchy only serves to illustrate just how absurd Soames‘ assumption is. Soames‘ theory of 
natural kind predicate semantics purports to be an account of a basic part of our language, but 
turns out to rely fundamentally upon a rich and complex knowledge of science. This makes it 
highly implausible as an account of our basic semantics. 
 
3.7 The Special Auxiliary Assumption 
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Even if, despite what has been said, we decide to accept Soames‘ restriction, it is still not 
strong enough to rule out counterexamples. The earlier renate/cordate example, recall, still 
poses a problem. Let P be the predicate ‗is a renate‘ and Q the predicate ‗is a cordate‘. We 
have discovered that the conditional x[Px → Qx] is true, since if anything is a renate then it 
is a cordate. Further, since there is no more to the extension of P than Q – there is no more to 
the class of renates than those that are also cordates – it follows that x[Qx → Px], and hence 
that x[Px ↔ Qx]. However, it would still be a mistake to equate this with identity, since the 
property of having a heart is surely distinct from that of having a kidney. Thus, we can 
imagine worlds where although x[Px → Qx] is true – where, if a creature has a kidney it has 
a heart – it might well be the case that there are creatures that possess hearts but no kidneys 
i.e. where x[Qx → Px] (or vice versa) is false, and hence  x[Px ↔ Qx] – the conclusion 
of Soames‘ necessity argument – is also false.  
This counterexample is interesting since it highlights a case not ruled out by Soames‘ 
initial restriction on types. In this case, since KP and KQ appear to be kinds of, roughly, the 
same type (kinds defined by the possession of particular organs), the inference is not blocked 
by appeal to the notion of ‗type‘ discussed earlier.37 Soames, presumably with something like 
the preceding (timeworn) example in mind, observes that his original argument did ‗not 
assume that an individual cannot be a member of two kinds of a given type‘ (2002: 269-270). 
As such, he introduces a special auxiliary assumption: 
 
                                                          
37
 Since Soames does not provide any criteria for what qualifies as a natural kind, the example is prima facie 
acceptable. 
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Special auxiliary assumption (SAA): An individual cannot be a member of two 
different kinds of the same type T (e.g. two species, two substances). (Soames 2002: 
270) 
 
What (SAA) is intended to do is show that for some object, o, if that object is a 
member of one kind, the gold-kind say, then it cannot also be a member of another kind of the 
same type, for instance the nickel-kind. The restriction has some initial plausibility, and its 
utility is obvious. The renate/cordate counterexample, for instance, is apparently ruled out by 
(SAA): since I am clearly a member of both the renate-kind and the cordate-kind, but no 
individual can be a member of two kinds (presumably natural kinds) of the same type, either 
the renate-kind and the cordate-kind are not kinds of the same type, or they simply are not 
kinds at all. 
Given (SAA), says Soames (2002: 270), we can construct the following argument for 
the necessity of theoretical identities: 
 
(I) x (Px & Qx) is true. 
(II)   P and Q are natural kind predicates of the same type T (e.g., both species predicates, 
both substance predicates, etc.). Moreover, P ‗designates‘ the unique natural kind (of 
type T) instantiated by nearly all members of its associated samples. Where KP and 
KQ are the kinds associated with (‗designated by‘) P and Q, respectively, the 
extensions of P and Q at a world w are the sets of individuals that are members of KP 
and KQ, respectively. 
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(SAA) An individual cannot be a member of two different kinds of type T (e.g. two   
species, two substances, etc.). 
Therefore, 
(III) x (Px ↔ Qx) is necessarily true. 
 
Premise (I) is obviously, as Soames admits, empirically slimmer than the initial x (Px → 
Qx), since it claims that you only require one sample, x, to which both predicates, P and Q, 
truly apply, to infer the necessity of x (Px ↔ Qx). Whether or not we think that (III) can 
actually be ‗validly drawn‘ (2002: 270) as Soames claims, the argument reveals just how 
many metaphysical assumption Soames is making about natural kinds: firstly, he assumes that 
natural kinds at different levels of generality are not kinds of the same type, secondly he 
assumes that natural kinds occur in an ordered hierarchy, and thirdly that no individual can be 
a member of two different kinds of the same type. 
It is only when all of these assumptions are combined with Soames semantic story that 
finding out that anything ‗in the extension of [P] is in the extension of [Q] is tantamount to 
finding out that the kind associated with [P] is identical with the kind associated with [Q]‘ 
(Soames 2002: 269). In other words, in order to derive the identity of the kinds from the 
semantics of the corresponding predicates Soames assumes enough metaphysics to guarantee 
that it follows from either the conditional x (Px → Qx) or merely the conjunction x (Px & 
Qx) that the kinds associated with P and Q are identical. Indeed, the addition of (SAA) to the 
latter argument seems only to highlight a suppressed premise in the original argument form – 
in order to rule out non-identical but co-extensive predicates from being employed to show 
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the invalidity of the argument, it must be the case that no individual can be a member of two 
kinds of the same type. But this notion of type is patently false. 
In the first instance it looks perfectly reasonable to treat both the predicate ‗is metal‘ 
and the predicate ‗is gold‘ as kind predicates of the same type, namely the substance-kind 
type. So, let P be the predicate ‗is gold‘, let Q be the predicate ‗is metal‘ and let R be the 
predicate ‗is a substance‘. For some object, x, if x is gold then x is metal. More formally, this 
means that it is true that x (Px → Qx). Similarly, if x is metal then x is a substance, and thus 
x (Qx → Rx). Given transitivity, it is also true that x (Px → Rx). Hence, it is reasonable to 
treat both P and Q as predicates of the same kind in at least one important sense – again, they 
are both substance predicates. If that is right then one way to view Soames‘ inflated notion of 
‗type‘ is as an ad hoc attempt to rule out false inferences to necessary theoretical identities 
from mere conditionals and conjunctions, given his Necessity Argument. Since a more natural 
notion of ‗type‘ recognises P and Q as kinds of the same type, but does not construe the 
discovery that either everything within the extension of P is also within the extension of Q, or 
that one object is both a P and a Q, as tantamount to a discovery of identity, which is surely 
too strong, the derivation of necessary theoretical identities, or so it seems to me, is predicated 
on both a notion of ‗type‘ that is false, and a highly suspicious use of the material conditional 
(or conjunction). Standard notions of ‗type‘ do not have the restrictions that Soames places on 
his notion. Moreover, even co-extensive predicates are not normally considered to be 
indicative of kind identity.  
Similarly, (SAA) also appears to be false. Consider the following example from 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (1998: 33 – 50): take the category parasite, of which fleas and 
tapeworms are both members, and the category insect of which fleas and flies are both 
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members. Since the categories cross-cut, neither parasite nor insect is obviously a subset of 
the other, and hence we do not breach the first condition placed upon the notion of a ‗type‘. 
The point is more obvious if we represent the example formally as follows: let F be is a flea, 
let G be is a tapeworm, let H be is a fly, let I be is an insect and J is a parasite. Now , both the 
following conditionals are true: 
(a) x ((Fx v Gx) → Jx) 
(b) x ((Fx v Hx) → Ix) 
Since both fleas and flies are insects, and fleas and tapeworms are parasites, but tapeworms 
are not insects and flies are not parasites, the categories insect and parasite cannot be 
subsumed, one within the other, since they imperfectly overlap. That one category cannot be 
subsumed within the other means that the two categories cannot be ordered into a hierarchy.
38
 
If the categories insect and parasite cannot be ordered into a hierarchy, reasoning about their 
members cannot be subject to the hierarchy restriction introduced via Soames‘ notion of 
‗type‘. 
Hence fleas, as members of both the insect and parasite category, operate as a 
counterexample to (SAA), the claim that something cannot be a member of two kinds of the 
same type. Since a flea is both an insect and a parasite, and the categories cannot be ordered 
into a hierarchy, it turns out to be false that something cannot be a member of two kinds of the 
same type. The Necessity Argument, then, is unsuccessful. 
 
                                                          
38
 Khalidi, note, uses this as an objection to the so-called ‗hierarchy‘ thesis, that all natural kinds are ordered into 
a single hierarchy. 
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3.8 False theoretical identities 
Although (SAA) looks to be false it is worth noting that if you construe it as true (as Soames 
does), then in conjunction with a further, uncontroversial assumption of taxonomic naming, 
many of Soames‘ paradigm examples, by his own lights, turn out to be straightforwardly 
false, and hence not illustrative of his overall thesis (that there are necessarily true theoretical 
identities). 
According to (SAA), no individual i (or object o) can be a member of more than one 
kind of the same type. So, for instance, if an individual, Billy, is a member of the species Bear 
then Billy can be a member of no other species – he cannot be a member of the species Tiger, 
say – since membership of one species precludes membership of another. Now, the purpose of 
introducing natural kind terms, broadly speaking, is to classify individuals into kinds. Let us 
assume that in some cases, when a natural kind term is introduced, it is accompanied by the 
intention that it (the natural kind term) denotes a new kind – that is, one which was previously 
unnamed.
39
  
Typically, once a kind has acquired a name (at least within a modern system of 
classification), unless there turns out to be some radical error about the existence of the kind, 
as in cases like ‗phlogiston‘, then it has that name for good. If, for some reason or other, a 
kind term is replaced then presumably the new kind term is introduced with that intention, 
and is accompanied by some further rationale. For instance, if the names of chemical kinds 
are required to communicate information about the structure and composition of that kind, but 
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 The role of intention here is not such a large departure from Soames general project. Even on Soames 
metasemantic story, speakers are required to have some sort of intention when they ostend samples that they take 
to be indicative of some natural kind, namely that their proposed natural kind predicate refers to the kind of 
which those ostended are instances.  
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the kind already possess a pre-scientific name, the latter might replace with the former. Take 
the classic example of water, where the term ‗water‘ is taken to denote the kind with the 
chemical composition H2O. Using the specific rules for generating names for chemical kinds, 
H2O comes out as ‗dihydrogen oxide‘. Since the name ‗dihydrogen oxide‘ communicates 
information about the structure and composition of the kind, inorganic chemists might opt to 
use it instead of water, given the additional information it contains. However, I shall discuss 
these sorts of cases further in Chapter 5. For now, I wish merely to propose that in some cases 
the naming of natural kinds comes with the intention that the natural kind being named is a 
newly discovered kind, and has not been named before. 
If we accept that such is possible, and combine this with Soames‘ model for 
generating necessary theoretical identities that contains (SAA) then there is an alternative 
interpretation of paradigm simple-simple theoretical identities (which were used to motivate 
the simple-complex theoretical identities). Take LaPorte‘s ‗Apatosaurus is Brontosaurus‘ 
example: as LaPorte tells it, particular fossils, a, b, and c say, were found, and a genus term 
(nothing hangs on these being genus, rather than species, terms) ‗Apatosaurus‘ was 
introduced to pick out the genus of the type of which the (ostensively identified) fossilised 
remains were an example. Later, in a different location, a similar but much smaller skeleton 
was found, call it d, and mistakenly a new genus term ‗Brontosaurus‘ was introduced to 
denote the genus of which this fossilised skeleton was an example. When d was found d, 
unbeknownst to the person who found it (in both cases this was O.C. Marsh, according to 
LaPorte),  was already a member of the Apatosaurus genus. Marsh‘s mistake was to think that 
he had discovered a member (or the remains of a member) of a previously undiscovered 
genus, and thus to introduce a new genus-name. While the discovery of d was obviously 
considered reasonable evidence of a hitherto undiscovered genus, and led to the introduction 
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of a new genus term ‗Brontosaurus‘, d was, in actual fact, already a member of the 
Apatosaurus-genus of which a, b and c were members.  
If we accept (SAA) then d cannot be a member of any other genus, and a fortiori 
cannot be a member of the Brontosaurus-genus, since d is already a member of the 
Apatosaurus-genus. If we add this to the second credible assumption that when some natural 
kind terms are introduced they are intended to denote new kinds (and where they do not 
denote a new kind the speaker would not intend their usage to be accepted), and  note that d 
was the paradigm sample ostended by O. C. Marsh to introduce the new term (for a new 
kind), we can reasonably conclude that, in actual fact, ‗Brontosaurus‘ was never successfully 
introduced. If d cannot be a member of any other genus other than the Apatosaurus genus then 
it is implausible to suggest that d could be successfully employed as the prime (and only!) 
exemplar of some new genus. Moreover, a common sense account of Marsh‘s rationale in 
introducing the genus term ‗Brontosaurus‘ is that he erroneously thought he had discovered a 
new genus. Had Marsh know that he was not naming something new with his term 
‗Brontosaurus‘ then presumably he would not have attempted to introduce a new natural kind 
term. 
The standard treatment, found in both LaPorte and Soames, of this sort of scenario is 
to formulate a theoretical identity sentence, ‗Brontosaurus = Apatosaurus‘, or the predicate 
analogue, treat it as straightforwardly true, and claim that it is also necessary. For LaPorte, the 
necessity follows from the fact ‗[that] ―Brontosaurus = Apatosaurus‖ is true, [that] it must be 
necessarily true, assuming that ―Brontosaurus‖ and ―Apatosaurus‖ are rigid designators, as 
they seem to be‘ (2004: 38); similarly, Soames claims that theoretical identity sentences of 
this form (his example is ‗all and only woodchucks are groundhogs‘) are ‗linguistically 
determined to be necessary if true‘ (2002: 278). 
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The argument for the necessity of ‗Brontosaurus is Apatosaurus‘, on Soames‘ account, 
should run something like this: ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ was introduced in much the same way as 
‗is an Apatosaurus‘, via ostensive definition to a sample with which a speaker (O.C. Marsh) 
was acquainted. Furthermore ‗is a Brontosaurus‘, just like ‗is an Apatosaurus‘, successfully 
designated a unique natural kind of a given type. However, it turns out that the kind 
designated by ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ was the Apatosaurus-kind. Hence everything within the 
extension of ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ is also within the extension of ‗is an Apatosaurus‘ (or, more 
minimally, the sample d used to introduce ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ is within the extension of ‗is an 
Apatosaurus‘ as well). Via the necessity argument, it follows that necessarily, for all x, x is an 
Apatosaurus if and only if x is a Brontosaurus. 
But this is not the only available treatment of this (type of) example. The alternative, 
derived from the argument above, is that theoretical identification sentences like ‗Apatosaurus 
is Brontosaurus‘ are straightforwardly false, since at least one of the natural kind terms (or 
predicates) is, in fact, not a term for a unique natural kind, but was introduced by mistake. The 
argument for such a conclusion runs as follows: assume that some taxonomic names are 
introduced with an implicit presupposition that they are denoting a new kind. Let natural kind 
terms be introduced via a broadly Kripkean metasemantic story about name acquiring 
transactions (ostension, etc.), and let us also endorse Soames‘ special auxiliary assumption 
(SAA), that nothing can be a member of two kinds of the same type. Now, since d is a member 
of the Apatosaurus kind it could not have been a Brontosaurus, given (SAA). Since d could not 
have been a Brontosaurus, then despite the role d played in the introduction of the term 
‗Brontosaurus‘ (it was the paradigm sample), ‗Brontosaurus‘ does not qualify as a natural 
kind term since it was not successfully introduced: thus (a) the natural kind term 
‗Brontosaurus‘ is an empty kind term since it did not pick out a unique kind – the so-called 
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Brontosaurus kind would not be the only kind of its type since ‗Apatosaurus‘ had already 
been used to pick out that kind – and (b) given the semantic presupposition that new kind 
terms are introduced to denote new kinds, and there was no new Brontosaurus kind, only an 
existing Apatosaurus kind, ‗Brontosaurus‘ does not qualify as a bona fide natural kind term. 
If picking out a unique kind is one of the conditions on successful naming for at least 
some natural kinds, and we read ‗unique‘ as meaning the only one of its kind, then trying to 
pick out a new kind using something that is a member of an existing kind appears almost self 
stultifying. The genus term ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ failed to pick out a unique kind (the kind 
represented by d, and not by a, b or c), since it picked out an existing kind, the Apatosaurus 
genus (which includes a, b, c and d among its members). The predicate ‗is a Brontosaurus‘, 
then, is an empty kind term, since it fails to denote anything. Consequently, given the theory 
of semantic content indicative of (EM) – that the semantic content of a natural kind predicate 
is just its referent – it turns out that ‗is a Brontosaurus‘ is empty, much like ‗is a Pegasus‘ or 
‗is a Griffin‘. This, in turn, invites various problems concerning the substitution of empty 
names, although these are beyond the remit of this thesis.
40
 
The point is that there is a fairly natural treatment of typical theoretical identity 
sentences that uses Soames‘ model for the derivation of necessary theoretical identities, in 
conjunction with reasonable assumptions about the introduction of taxonomic names, where 
such identities are just false. If that is correct then an important class of Soames‘ paradigm 
cases of necessarily true theoretical identification sentences drop out of the picture, leaving us 
without a satisfactory account of necessary a posteriori truths concerning natural kind terms. 
                                                          
40
 Briefly, if we construe ‗Apatosaurus is Brontosaurus‘ as true, and ‗Brontosaurus‘ has no semantic content 
(being, as it is, an empty name) then ‗Apatosaurus is Pegasus‘ is also true, since both ‗Pegasus‘ and 
‗Brontosaurus‘ have the same meaning (which is to say, no meaning). 
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3.9 Complex natural kind terms and essentialism 
We have, so far, only discussed the simple-simple type of theoretical identity i.e. those 
consisting of two simple natural kind predicates (or their singular term counterparts). The 
extension of  the Kripkean insight concerning (metaphysical) necessity and a posteriority was 
the most likely in such cases given their obvious resemblance to standard identity sentences: 
‗Apatosaurus is Brontosaurus‘ clearly resembles ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘ insofar as 
there are two name-like terms flanking the identity predicate. However, as we have seen, 
Soames‘ account of the necessity of theoretical identities has not, so far, been successful – or 
at least, if it is successful then it is predicated on a highly counterintuitive notion of ‗type‘ and 
a decidedly odd use of the material conditional. 
But, as I noted at the beginning of chapter 3, section 5, there are two types of 
theoretical identity: simple-simple and simple-complex. Now, then, we turn to the simple-
complex theoretical identity sentences, and consider Soames‘ separate argument for their 
necessity. This second brand of theoretical identity is, I claim, the most interesting; however, 
it is also the most controversial since it is, or so I shall conclude, predicated on metaphysical 
essentialism. 
The simple-complex theoretical identity sentence consists, semantically, of a simple 
natural kind predicate, for instance ‗is gold‘ or ‗is water‘, and a second complex natural kind 
predicate, for example ‗is the element with atomic number 79‘ or ‗is H2O‘. This second 
species of theoretical identity has, as I observed in Chapter 1 (and as we shall see further in 
Chapter 4), much more in common with Kripke‘s claims about the necessity of origin for 
individuals in that both ‗aim to expose essence‘ (LaPorte 2002: 37). Hence simple-simple 
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theoretical identities and simple-complex theoretical identities are both semantically 
dissimilar and metaphysically dissimilar: they are semantically dissimilar since the latter (but 
not the former) contain semantically complex phrases that appear to be descriptions; they are 
metaphysically dissimilar insofar as the latter (but not the former) appear to be describing 
essences, and thus come with significant metaphysical commitments.
41
 
As Soames carves up the semantic geography, a simple-complex theoretical identity 
consists of a simple natural kind predicate P, for example ‗is water‘, and a complex natural 
kind predicate Q, the chemical formula (modified with the copula ‗is‘) ‗is H2O‘, which 
Soames claims is synonymous with the description ‗substance molecules of which contain 
two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom‘ (2002: 274). This description, as Soames 
observes, is the product of scientific theory, and belongs to ‗a class of formulas specifying 
different possible molecular structures that are understood as determining possible physically 
constitutive kinds‘ (ibid.). The empirically discovery that water is H2O, then, is the discovery 
of the basic physical constitution of the water-kind. The question now is what implications the 
complexity of Q has on its semantics. More specifically, since the semantically complex 
phrases that specify the alleged essences of natural kinds, for instance the molecular structures 
of chemical compounds, are being treated as descriptions, are they Millian (i.e. nondescriptive 
marks, with a semantic content that just is the referent)? If Q does fall under the purview of 
(EM) – the thesis that the meaning of a kind term is just the kind it designates – then ‗x is 
water iff x is H2O‘ (or, ‗water is H2O‘) will express the same proposition as ‗x is water iff x is 
water‘, since ‗water‘ is Millian, and both terms designate the same kind. But, if the latter 
proposition is knowable a priori then so too is the former, and the Kripkean insight 
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 Although as we have seen, Soames‘ simple-simple theoretical identities have significant metaphysical 
baggage. 
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concerning a posteriority is lost. If Q does not fall under the purview of (EM) since it has a 
meaning other than the kind to which it refers (it has a connotation in addition to its 
denotation) then we might be sceptical as to just how Kripkean Soames‘ semantics really is. 
Moreover, we should wonder why some descriptions (the essentialist ones) apparently 
maintain the necessity (and a posteriority) of theoretical identities whilst others (the non-
essentialist ones) do not. 
The first question, concerning whether or not descriptive predicates like ‗is H2O‘ are 
Millian, turns on the question of what natural kinds are, and is motivated by concerns over the 
a posteriority of theoretical identities. If natural kinds are property-like entities, and the 
predicate ‗is H2O‘ describes the essence of that kind, then since ‗is water‘ and ‗is H2O‘ 
designate the same kind, and the meaning of such a kind term is just the kind it designates, 
their respective meanings must be identical. More simply, if natural kind predicates designate 
properties, and the ‗property of being water is the property of being a substance molecules of 
which contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom‘ (Soames 2002: 276) then the 
natural kind predicates ‗is water‘ and ‗is H2O‘ mean the same thing, since both mean ‗the 
property of being a substance, molecules of which contain two hydrogen and one oxygen 
atoms‘. The upshot is that we lose Kripke‘s ‗conventional wisdom about the a posterioricity‘ 
(Soames forthcoming: 19) of necessarily true theoretical identity sentences. 
Soames‘ solution is to concede that ‗the kind (...) water is identical with the kind (...) 
substance molecules of which contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom‘ (2002: 
277), but to claim that ‗the two predicates do not express the same properties‘ (ibid.). Simple 
natural kind predicates, such as ‗is gold‘, ‗is water‘ or ‗is a muon‘, are like proper names 
insofar as they are nondescriptional, directly referential and have their reference fixed by 
stipulation (modulo certain empirical presuppositions). So, just as ‗the referent of a name at a 
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world is not semantically determined by the satisfaction of any descriptive condition at the 
world‘ (Soames 2002: 265), neither is the referent of a simple natural kind predicate. 
Complex natural kind predicates, for instance ‗is the element with atomic number 79‘, 
‗H2O‘ or ‗is an unstable subatomic particle with a negative charge, a mass of 105.7MeV/c
2
  
and spin ½‘, are semantically quite different. Let Q be a typical complex natural kind 
predicate. According to Soames, Q can be analysed as the complex <I, D>,  where I is the 
copula meaning roughly ‗the relation of being an instance of‘, and D is the descriptive 
semantic content of Q. In the case of ‗is H2O‘ then, the descriptive content, D, is ‗substance, 
molecules of which contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom‘. The descriptive 
content of Q, D, denotes the property F. In the water example that property is, again roughly, 
the property of being a substance, molecules of which contain two hydrogen and one oxygen 
atom. Since D always designates this property, in all possible worlds, Q turns out to be rigid. 
More important, however, is Soames‘ claim that the property F, described by D and indirectly 
denoted by Q, is the property that determines the kind KQ in every possible world, but is not 
itself identical with it. Thus not only is the predicate Q – which is a typical complex natural 
kind predicate – not a Millian predicate, since its reference to the natural kind is mediated by 
description, the natural kind  KQ is not the property of being a substance, molecules of which 
contain two hydrogen and one oxygen atom. 
Since complex natural kind predicates ‗have meanings that are not identical with the 
objects they designate, but rather are properties in virtue of which the descriptions designate 
what they do‘ (Soames 2002: 279), the proposition expressed by ‗for all x, x is P iff x is Q‘ is 
not identical to that expressed by ‗for all x, x is P iff x is P‘, and thus it fails to follow that the 
former is a priori just because the latter is. Typical simple natural kind predicates, like ‗is 
water‘ designate natural kinds directly, although we have yet to say precisely what they 
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(natural kinds) are, whilst complex natural kind predicates, like ‗is H2O‘, are ‗analogous to 
singular definite descriptions‘ (Soames 2002: 279) whose reference is fixed by discovery 
(rather than stipulation), and whose use is satisfied via an object‘s meeting of certain 
descriptive conditions i.e. Q only applies to things that satisfy the description D, the only 
things that satisfy the description D are those things that possess the property F, and F 
determines the kind KQ. Now Soames must show that the kind denoted directly by P, call it 
KP is identical to that which is determined by F, which we have called KQ. But what sort of 
thing does P denote? 
According to Soames natural kind predicates denote natural kinds, where ‗we identify 
them [natural kinds] with intensions – that is functions from [possible] worlds to extensions‘ 
(2002: 277). The thesis, then, is broadly as follows. Take, for example, the nickel-kind. The 
nickel-kind, KN, is to be identified with an intension IN (a function from worlds to extensions), 
and the simple natural kind predicate ‗is nickel‘, or P, is directly referential, nondescriptional 
and denotes IN across all possible worlds. The complex natural kind predicate ‗is the element 
with atomic number 28‘, abbreviated to ‗is Ni28‘ and represented formally as Q, is a definite 
description (the descriptive content of which we have called D) that refers to anything with 
the property of being an element with atomic number 28. This property, call it F (which is 
described by D) is what determines the intension IN. 
The interesting (and controversial) element of Soames‘ thesis is the determining 
relation that holds between the property F and the natural kind, which is an intension, IN. An 
intension, as I have said, is a function from worlds to extensions. Roughly understood it is a 
function that assigns, at some possible world, a value, either positive or negative, to objects 
which either (i) are instances of a natural kind, or (ii) are truly referred to by the relevant 
natural kind predicate. For instance, the natural kind predicate ‗is nickel‘ refers to the function 
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IN that assigns, at any possible world, a value of 1 (positive) to all samples of nickel, and a 
value of 0 (negative) to all other objects. The complex natural kind predicate ‗is the element 
with atomic number 28‘, more importantly, describes the property being an element with 
atomic number 28, or F, and it is this property which determines the intension IN that we have 
identified with the nickel-kind. The vital question now is why is it F that determines IN, rather 
than some other property, not just in the actual world, but in all possible worlds? 
Soames, in his (2002) at least, gives no explanation, but it is easy enough to 
reconstruct one. Firstly, we need a reason to think that F is the property that determines the 
nickel kind, rather than some other property, G say. Since Soames has already been explicit 
about the source of complex natural kind descriptions – that they are the product of scientific 
theory – it is to science that he would presumably turn for some sort of justification as to why 
F, but not G, determines the nickel-kind. Presumably then Soames would say something like 
‗since science classifies substances like nickel in terms of their atomic number, indeed they 
define elements on that basis, we philosophers should construe that property as determining 
the nickel-kind‘. Indeed, in later work (2008) this is roughly what he does say. But note that 
for Soames, and arguably not for the scientist, the upshot of the empirical discovery that 
nickel is the element with atomic number 28 is that necessarily nickel is the element with 
atomic number 78. But the claim that science is in the business of discovering necessary 
truths is controversial to say the least (see, for instance, Dupré 1986, Mellor 1977, Putnam 
1983; see Leplin 1988 for a response).  
In order for it to be the case that necessarily nickel is the element with atomic number 
28 it must be the case that the property being the element with atomic number 28 is essential 
to nickel. Put in terms of intensions, it must be the case that the property being the element 
 132 
with atomic number 28 is the only property that determines the intension IN which is the 
nickel-kind. But why think that? 
For Soames the key is in the metasemantics of simple natural kind predicates, 
specifically the empirical presuppositions that accompany their (ostensive) introduction. 
When simple natural kind predicates are introduced they are introduced with the intention that 
they apply to anything that possesses the same properties that explain the salient 
characteristics of paradigmatic instances of the kind. The empirical discovery of what this 
property (or set of properties) is, is tantamount, says Soames, to learning ‗empirically that 
instances of the kinds have these characteristics at every possible world-state in which the 
kind exists‘ (forthcoming: 8). It seems, then, that built into the initial enterprise is an 
assumption that certain ‗properties are essential to the kinds‘ (ibid. 7). Moreover, the 
assumption seems to be that when simple natural kind terms are successfully introduced they 
latch on to these essences, by being nondescriptive (which means that we don‘t need to know 
what the essence is when the term is introduced), and that the stability of essences across 
possible worlds stabilises the reference of the natural kind term. Hence, when science 
eventually discovers what underlying property it is that explains the salient features of the 
kind, and describes that property, this complex natural kind term also manages to denote the 
unique kind, and can be formulated into a theoretical identity sentence. As Soames says, it is 
‗a feature of any genuine substance S that whatever its molecular structure turns out to be, all 
possible instances of S share that structure (and all possible instances of that structure are 
instances of S)‘ (2002: 273). 
Thus it is from the conjunction of a belief about substances (that they have essences), 
the truth of a theoretical identity sentence – such as ‗nickel is the element with atomic number 
28‘ – and the metasemantics of simple natural kind terms like ‗nickel‘, that we derive the 
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necessity of the relevant theoretical identity. Such theoretical identities are both 
(metaphysically) necessary and a posteriori, and the ‗necessary aposteriority of these 
examples is thereby grounded in essentialist claims about kinds which can be known only 
empirically‘ (Soames forthcoming: 5). 
The problem, perhaps obviously, with this account is that it is predicated upon the 
truth of essentialism – an independent metaphysical thesis which receives no independent 
justification in Soames‘ theory. On that basis, not only does the proposed extension of 
Kripke‘s insight rest upon an unjustified, highly controversial assumption (of metaphysical 
essentialism), but it is incompatible with anti-essentialism. Moreover, like Kripke‘s original 
account, it simply assumes that reference is unproblematic, and this, I think, is less obvious 
when we are talking about natural kind terms (more on this in chapter 5). As we shall see in 
the next chapter, however, an account of our basic semantics (the causal theory of reference) 
should not be incompatible with any particular metaphysical thesis. Further, as we shall see in 
chapter 5, if some versions of Millianism are committed to essentialism and countenance at 
least some rigid descriptions, then there is an obvious version of descriptivism that is equally 
as tenable. Underlying both such theses, however, will be some version of a posteriori 
essentialism, and the notion of an explanatory essence that accounts for the salient features of 
natural kinds. It is to this that I turn in chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
As a final thought, it is worth noting that Soames‘ account appears not to satisfy one 
of its own key desiderata. In  section 3 of this chapter, I identified Soames‘ three key 
desiderata for an extension of Kripke‘s insight into proper names to natural kind predicates. 
Condition (2), recall, was that it must be a consequence of the account that there is an 
asymmetry between natural kind predicates and all other predicates insofar as only the former 
are rigid. However, it cannot be the case that what determines whether something is a natural 
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kind predicate is whether or not it is rigid, since this would make (2) completely trivial. For 
instance, it seems straightforwardly false to suppose that determining whether or not the 
general term ‗philosopher‘ picks out a natural kind hinges upon whether ‗is a philosopher‘ is a 
rigid predicate. Hence, given that Soames assumes that there is an asymmetry between natural 
kind predicates and all other predicates, he must be assuming that somehow the rigid 
predicates will pick out that natural kinds. But then it seems he should say much more about 
what the natural kinds are. Presumably what Soames has in mind is that the natural kinds are 
just those kinds marked out in our best scientific classification. However, not only is this an 
unargued assumption, but it seems totally implausible to suppose that rigid predicates, 
miraculously, are just those predicates that latch onto the best scientific classification. The 
kind term ‗phlogiston‘, at some point, was part of the best scientific classification, but failed 
to latch onto a legitimate joint in nature. Hence there is no reason to think that everyday 
naming practices latch onto nature‘s joints, as revealed by scientific investigation. To put it 
another way, there are no a priori reasons to think that general terms (be they predicates or 
otherwise) that are rigid designators should correspond exactly to those employed by modern 
science (physics, chemistry and biology, say). Given these problems I now turn to an 
alternative attempt to extend the Kripkean thesis from proper names to natural kind terms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
  
In this chapter I will present Nathan Salmon‘s alternative version of the Causal Theory of 
Direct Reference, (CDR) for short, and argue that although it avoids some of the problems 
that beset Soames‘ version, it is unsuccessful insofar as it ignores the function of natural kind 
terms within classification and taxonomy. I begin, in section 1, by articulating the debate 
between Salmon and Soames over the status of rigidity in the project of extending Kripke‘s 
conclusions from names to natural kind terms. In section 2 I present Salmon‘s version of 
(CDR), and in section 3 discuss the Kripkean objections to descriptivist natural kind terms, 
along with Salmon‘s important caveats. In section 4, following Salmon, I distinguish between 
the two distinct routes to necessary a posteriori truth in Kripke. In sections 5 I identify the 
essentialism implicit in Kripke, and in section 6 present Salmon‘s distinction between Kripke 
and Putnam in terms of their respective essentialist commitments. In section 7 I present 
Salmon‘s account of the semantics of theoretical terms, such as ‗H2O‘. In sections 8 and 9 I 
criticise Salmon‘s positive proposal. I claim that his account of the semantics of natural kind 
terms is implausible on two fronts: firstly, concerning the function of natural kind terms 
within science, and secondly, given the so-called ‗trivialisation problem‘ (Lopez De Sa 2007). 
In section 10 I pause to briefly take stock of how the debate has progressed, before moving 
on, in chapter 5, to defend a novel version of descriptivism. I will also, here, present Salmon‘s 
famous objections to the Kripke-Putnam (i.e. early-Putnam) programme to derive 
metaphysical conclusions from semantic premises, offer some qualifications to Salmon‘s 
objections, and illustrate how they also apply to Soames‘ more recent account. I will 
conclude, however, that the most plausible version of (CDR) for natural kind terms contains a 
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prima facie essentialist premise. This will set up the defence of a novel version of 
descriptivism in chapter 5, using the implicit essentialism of (CDR). 
It is worth noting from the outset of this chapter that the discussion concerning natural 
kind terms is no longer being framed in terms of predicates. For Salmon, the fundamental use 
of natural kind terms is as names for natural kinds. I shall indicate a naming use of a natural 
kind term throughout this chapter by capitalising the first letter, as one would do with a proper 
name.  
 
4.1 Salmon vs. Soames 
Nathan Salmon‘s explication of (CDR) differs sharply from Soames‘, as presented in the 
previous chapter. Indeed, Salmon objects to Soames‘ entire project, claiming that ‗Soames 
creates the misimpression that N&N [Naming and Necessity] stands somehow incomplete and 
so falls short of meeting its own objectives‘ (2003: 447). 
Among the various points of disagreement between Salmon and Soames there are two 
that are pertinent to my project concerning the metaphysical necessity and a posteriori 
knowability of theoretical identities: firstly, the issue of whether general terms (primarily 
mass and count nouns) are fundamentally predicative or not; and secondly, the alleged 
‗demotion of the status of rigidity‘ (Soames 2002: 264) as the fundamental semantic property, 
which is responsible for maintaining the analogy between proper names and natural kind 
terms. Soames‘ view, recall, is that the predicative use of mass and count nouns is 
fundamental, rather than the denoting use (so ‗is a bear‘ is more fundamental than ‗Bear‘). 
Further, he argued for the demotion of rigidity, claiming that the analogy between proper 
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names and natural kind terms (and the extension of Kripke‘s insights from the former 
category to the latter category) is grounded in an alternative semantic similarity, namely their 
mutual nondescriptiveness. 
Salmon, in contrast, claims that Soames has failed to ‗distinguish sharply between a 
general term [like] ―tiger‖ and its corresponding predicate, ―is a tiger‖‘(2005: 386), and as 
such has falsely demoted, and failed to appreciate the philosophical significance of, rigidity. 
Salmon‘s basic claim is that it is the rigidity of count and mass nouns that makes them 
parallel to proper names, and that it is this parallel that allows us to extend Kripke‘s insights 
concerning proper names to natural kind terms. In this chapter I will be particularly interested 
in Salmon‘s analysis of this parallel, and in his distinctive treatment of so-called theoretical 
identification sentences. 
 
4.2 Salmon’s (CDR) 
Salmon claims that there is an ‗imposing analogy‘ (2005: 43) between proper names and 
common nouns, in that both sorts of terms are designators: proper names designate 
individuals, common nouns designate kinds. The account runs as follows: Consider, first, two 
distinct uses of a general term, for instance ‗Billy is a bear‘ and ‗Billy is a member of the 
species Bear‘. The difference between the two sentences is that whilst the former contains but 
one denoting phrase, the latter contains two. In the former sentence, we take it that an object 
is the referent of the proper name ‗Billy‘, and that we predicate of that object, Billy, that he ‗is 
a bear‘; hence, while we are ontologically committed to Billy when we assert that ‗Billy is a 
bear‘, the occurrence of ‗bear‘ in that sentence carries no explicit ontological commitment, 
being, as it is, merely a property that we are attributing to Billy. 
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In the latter sentence, however, both the proper name ‗Billy‘ and the general term 
‗Bear‘ are most naturally read as denoting expressions. Here we say of Billy that he is a 
member of a particular species, which we have designated ‗Bear‘, and take the general term 
‗Bear‘ to ‗denote a certain kind of animal, a certain abstract entity or universal‘ (Salmon 
2005: 43). Since the second sentence contains two denoting expressions we garner (when we 
assert it) two obvious ontological commitments, one to Billy, and one to the species Bear. 
Salmon, following Kripke, claims that single world general terms like ‗Bear‘ are 
‗nondescriptional label[s]‘ (2005: 45) that designate natural kinds – in other words, they are 
names for natural kinds.
42
 But, if we treat general terms, such as ‗Bear‘, as nondescriptional 
labels (making them analogous to proper names), we need to explain why it is that they can be 
truly applied to a range of individuals. For instance, imagine Billy the bear has a family, 
Betty, Belinda and Ben, all of whom are members of the species Bear. If ‗Bear‘ is a 
nondescriptional label then it cannot be the case that the word ‗Bear‘ gets to apply to these 
individuals in virtue of them satisfying some description, which is encoded within, and is the 
content of, the term ‗Bear‘. Thus it must be that the individuals themselves that fall within the 
extension of the term have something in common, which explains why the term ‗Bear‘ does 
(truly) apply to any and all bears. 
There is also an important, but well known, difference between general terms and 
proper names, when we distinguish between the extension (the object(s) to which a term 
                                                          
42
 I will, to begin with, simply restrict the focus of the discussion to general terms that designate natural kinds, 
since this is the topic of my overall investigation. However, as we shall see, Salmon‘s account generalises across 
a range on non-natural kind cases, including, for instance, general terms for artefact kinds. This will be 
particularly important when we come to the metaphysics sections of this thesis, where articulations of natural 
kind essentialism typically appeal to Kripkean insights. If rigidity applies to all general terms, rather than just 
natural kind terms, then there is no special Kripkean insight into natural kind terms. Hence it cannot be 
employed to motivate metaphysical essentialism. 
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applies) and the denotation (the object to which a term refers) of a term. The distinction is 
best illustrated by example. Take the proper names ‗Bruce Wayne‘ and ‗Batman‘. Since 
Bruce Wayne is Batman, the two names are co-referential. When two proper names are co-
referential they have the same extension – that is, they apply to the same person. Moreover, 
when two proper names have the same extension, this is sufficient to infer a corresponding 
identity sentence, in this case ‗Bruce Wayne is Batman‘. 
However, when two general terms have the same extension this is insufficient for 
theoretical identity. For the sake of argument, treat natural kinds as abstract universals. 
Following Salmon, we can say that a natural kind term like ‗Bear‘ denotes or designates the 
natural kind or species Bear, i.e. the Bear-universal. The natural kind Bear also has what 
Salmon calls a metaphysical extension, which is ‗the class of instances of an abstract 
universal‘ (2005: 46). Since the natural kind term ‗Bear‘ designates the kind Bear, and the 
metaphysical extension of the Bear-kind is the class of instances of bears, the semantic 
extension of the term ‗Bear‘ is also the class of instances of bears. Strictly speaking, then, no 
particular bear is the denotation of the term ‗Bear‘, although it is, of course, clearly possible to 
refer to an individual bear using that term.
43
 Hence we can produce the following definitions 
(Salmon 2005: 46): 
 
 Metaphysical extension =df the class of instances of an abstract universal. 
                                                          
43
 Perhaps obviously, the extension of a Millian thesis about proper names (the claim that the meaning of a term 
is its referent) extended to natural kind terms does require some care. For instance, it must not be the case that 
the actual extension of a general term is the referent, since extensions are fairly dynamic sorts of things. So, if 
the referent of ‗human‘ was the actual extension of the kind human, then since the population of humans is 
constantly changing, so too would the meaning of the general term ‗human‘, and this is surely wrong. 
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Semantic extension =df the class of individuals to which a term (truly) applies. 
 
But there are obvious cases of co-extensional general terms that are insufficient for an 
inference to identity. Adapting an example from Salmon (2005: 45-8), consider the term 
‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘. This general term 
denotes the (non-natural) kind Member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago’s 
NFL team, and, like the term ‗Bear‘, applies to individual animals on the basis of their being 
members of the species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team. The extension of the 
phrase ‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘, in this world, 
is the class of bears. Hence, the kind terms ‗Bear‘ and ‗Member of a species that serves as a 
mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ have the same semantic extension (i.e. both terms apply to 
the same class of individuals). But there is an obvious difference between the denotations of 
the respective kind terms. While the term ‗Bear‘ must apply to the Bear-kind in all possible 
worlds, it is pure coincidence (and thus contingent) that the term ‗Member of a species that 
serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ also applies to the Bear-kind. For instance, we 
can clearly imagine a scenario where Chicago‘s NFL team had an alternate mascot, a buffalo 
say, and as such the extension of the general term ‗Member of a species that serves as a 
mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ is the class of buffalos, rather than the class of bears. In such 
a world, call it w1, the extensions of the two general terms would be quite different since the 
extension of ‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ in w1 
would be the class of buffalos, rather than the class of bears as it is at the actual world. 
What this example illustrates is that theoretical identities require more than just co-
extensionality, else ‗A Bear is the member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s 
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NFL team‘ would be necessarily true. Thus, following Salmon (2005: 46), we can draw the 
following, additional semantic and metaphysical distinction, and note that theoretical 
identities require co-intensionality. 
 
Metaphysical intension =df the function that assigns, for any abstract universal K and 
any possible world w, the class of instances (m-extension) of K at w. 
Semantic intension =df the function that assigns, for any (general) term T and any 
possible world w, the class of instances (s-extension) of T at w. 
 
With the addition of these pieces of terminology there is an obvious distinction between 
‗Bear‘ and ‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘. The 
general term ‗Bear‘ designates the Bear-kind, or more accurately the species (or family) 
Ursidae, and hence the semantic intension of ‗Bear‘ coincides with the metaphysical intension 
of the Bear-kind, and does so in all possible worlds. The metaphysical intension of the non-
natural kind Member of a Species that Serves as a Mascot for Chicago’s NFL Team, on the 
other hand, clearly has a different metaphysical intension to the Bear-kind, since only the 
former could have assigned a class of instances consisting of all and only buffalos. 
As a brief aside, the forgoing discussion also reveals how, for Salmon, the notion of 
rigidity applies to general terms. On Salmon‘s view the rigidity of a general term is not 
simply a product of that term‘s nondescriptionality, since general terms can be rigid 
regardless of ‗whether the general term is nondescriptional, relationally descriptional, or 
thoroughly descriptional‘ (Salmon 2005: 70). For Salmon, provided a general terms is a 
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designator it follows trivially that it is also a rigid designator. There are, however, two 
conditions on general term designation: for some general term T to count as the designator of 
a kind K, (i) the semantic extension of T must coincide with the metaphysical extension of K, 
and (ii) the semantic intension of T must also coincide with the metaphysical intension of K. 
The second condition places ‗severe restriction[s] on the sorts of entities that can be 
designated by a general term‘ (ibid.) since it restricts the reference of general terms to 
universals. The Kripkean notion of rigidity, recall, is sameness of reference across possible 
worlds i.e. if a rigidly designates x, then a designates x in all possible worlds. Now, since on 
Salmon‘s view general terms only qualify as designators when the semantic intension of T 
coincides with the metaphysical intension of K, the semantic intension of T only coincides 
with the metaphysical intension of K when T designates K (where K is a universal and T a 
general term), and when T designates K, given that K is an abstract object, T automatically 
does so in all possible worlds (perhaps with the qualification, where K exists), it turns out that 
‗the distinction between designation and rigid designation disappears‘ (Salmon 2005: 71-2). 
For instance, the general term ‗Bear‘ designates the species Bear, which is a universal, 
instances of which are actual bears. In contrast, general terms like ‗the colour of the sea‘ are 
thought to be non-rigid designators, since (a) there is no colour of the sea kind, and (b) the 
colour of the sea varies from possible world to possible world (in some worlds in is green, in 
others blue, and so on). However, as I shall argue later, following work by López De Sa 
(2007), the distinction between rigid and non-rigid general terms turns out to be spurious, 
given the abundance of available properties to correspond to the appropriate general term. 
This, I will show later (in Chapter 7), has consequences for parallel views in metaphysics 
concerning natural kind essentialism. However, in this chapter I will focus on the 
consequences it has for distinguishing theoretical identities from predications. For instance, 
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typical language users predicate certain properties of objects regularly: ‗my shirt is blue‘, ‗this 
saucepan is hot‘ or ‗my stomach is aching‘. However, if general terms like ‗shirt‘, ‗blue‘, 
‗saucepan‘, ‗hot‘, ‗stomach‘ and ‗aching‘ all designate properties, which are treated as 
abstract universals, then the distinction between sentences that predicate properties of objects, 
and those that identify two kinds, seems to disappear. I will return to this issue in detail in 
section 8. For now, however, I propose the following principle for restricting what sentences 
count as theoretical identities, which I take to be an implication of Salmon‘s thesis. The 
principle – call it the Theoretical Identity Principle – is intended to express the restriction 
required to make an inference from co-extension to identity, namely, that the semantic 
intensions of the kind terms must also coincide (by designating kinds with the same 
metaphysical intension). 
 
Theoretical Identity Principle =df for any two general terms T1 and T2, the theoretical 
identity T1 = T2 can only be true when the (metaphysical) intension of the kind K1, 
denoted by T1, coincides with the (metaphysical) intension of K2, denoted by T2 (i.e. 
when K1 = K2). 
 
4.3 Objections to descriptivism about natural kind terms 
In chapter 1 I outlined the extension of Kripke‘s objections to a descriptivist semantics to 
cases of natural kind terms. These arguments, recall, formed a putative reductio ad absurdum 
of the descriptivist position by highlighting the absurd metaphysical, epistemological and 
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semantic consequences of maintaining a descriptivist semantics, which were clearly 
inconsistent with our (intuitive) everyday practices. 
The conclusion of these arguments was a return to a version of naive Millianism, the 
thesis that proper names have denotation by no connotation, extended to natural kind terms. 
However, Salmon notes (2005: 61-5) that these (now classic) objections only ever warranted a 
weaker conclusion in the case of general terms. Consider, for instance, Salmon‘s (2005: 59 – 
68) discussion of the species term ‗Tiger‘. A descriptivist, says Salmon, might ‗associate with 
the term [‗Tiger‘ the description] being a four-legged animal, being cat-like in appearance, 
having a tawny yellow coat with black traversing stripes ...‘(2005: 59). From this we can 
formulate (1): 
 
(1) Something is a tiger iff it is a four-legged, meat eating, cat-like animal with a tawny 
yellow coat and black traversing stripes. 
 
Let (1), for the sake of argument, be taken to give the meaning of the word ‗Tiger‘. 
Since (1) is analytic (for the descriptivist), necessarily (this is the modal argument) anything 
that satisfies the description ‗four-legged, meat eating, cat-like animal with a tawny yellow 
coat and black traversing stripes‘ is a tiger. But, we can imagine a world where there is a 
species of feline that satisfies this description, but which could not interbreed with a tiger. 
Thus we appear to have two distinct species of feline
44
. Hence, it is (metaphysically) possible 
                                                          
44
 The example is predicated on the assumption that being able to interbreed is a necessary condition of being a 
member of the same species. However, this isn‘t always true. Consider, for instance, the offspring of a zebra 
stallion and a horse mare, a zorse. The zorse, as is typical of most hybrids, is sterile. Hence a male and female 
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that non-tigers satisfy the description said to define the word ‗Tiger‘, and (1) cannot be 
necessary, and a fortiori cannot be analytic. 
Now consider (1) in an alternate counterfactual scenario (the epistemological 
argument), where, as a result of some mass hallucination, we mistakenly attribute to tigers the 
properties described in (1). For instance, imagine that individual tigers have only ever been 
observed in dense jungle, and so the stripes we think they have are actually just shadows, and 
their tawny yellow colour is just a trick of the light (perhaps they are actually green). If this is 
possible then the word ‗Tiger‘ cannot include, as part of its meaning, ‗tawny yellow‘ and 
‗traversing stripes‘ since tigers are actually green and not striped. Hence (1) cannot be 
knowable a priori, and a fortiori cannot be analytic. 
Finally, imagine a species of animal qualitatively identical to tigers, but inhabiting a 
planet far, far away (the semantical argument). Since we are not acquainted with these 
creatures, but they exactly resemble our tigers, do we refer to instances them when we use the 
word ‗Tiger‘, as defined by (1)? According to the semantical argument we do not. The general 
term ‗Tiger‘ is ‗a label that applies only to animals of a certain familiar kind. It does not apply 
to everything whatsoever that might happen to have the general features that we associate 
with tigers‘ (Salmon 2005: 61). Hence the existence of a qualitatively identical species with 
which we are not acquainted has no bearing on our use of the word ‗Tiger‘. 
What Salmon notes, however, is that the upshot of the Kripkean arguments is not that 
descriptivism is false (as is perhaps the case for proper names), and that general terms are 
(semantically) nondescriptional tout court. Rather, the conclusion is that the general terms 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
zorse would be unable to breed. However, this would not rule out either of them as being members of the species 
zorse.  
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considered so far (‗Water‘, ‗Gold‘, ‗Tiger‘ etc.) cannot be descriptional in terms of the 
properties considered so far (ibid.).  
Salmon thus considers, on behalf of the descriptivist, the thesis that the term ‗Tiger‘ 
refers to all and only those things that have the property of being a tiger (rather than the 
property of being tawny, yellow, striped four-legged felines). The proposal, then, is that the 
description ‗is a tiger‘ is that which fixes the extension, and is the meaning, of the term 
‗Tiger‘. The obvious attraction of the proposal is that it is obviously ‗analytic that all and only 
tigers have this property [the property of being a Tiger]... and that the term ―tiger‖ applies to 
all and only those things that have this property‘ (Salmon 2005: 61). Prima facie, then, the 
proposal appears to avoid Kripke‘s three objections. 
Salmon‘s objection to the descriptivist rejoinder stems from his analysis of what the 
property of being a tiger amounts to. For Salmon, the ‗property denoted by ―being a tiger‖... 
involves direct reference to the species Tiger and is necessarily equivalent, in some sense, to 
the intrinsically relational property of being an animal of this very kind, said with direct 
reference to the species Tiger‘ (2005: 63). In other words, the property of being a tiger 
consists of the conjunction of the species Tiger (well, Felis Tigris actually) and a ‗kind-
membership relation‘ (ibid.). Salmon‘s objection is that even if it is conceded that ‗Tiger‘ is 
synonymous with the description ‗is a tiger‘, the latter still involves direct reference to the 
species Tiger (note the use of ‗this‘ in ‗this very kind‘, which is intended to be ostensive). 
Hence such a concession does not affect the overall conclusions of (CDR). 
Salmon uses Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment to demonstrate that the 
property of being φ, where φ is any natural kind, is an intrinsically relational property, and as 
such of no use to the descriptivist. Salmon treats the Twin Earth thought experiment as a type 
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of semantical argument (2005: 68) – which is to say, an argument that the general properties 
associated with a natural kind do not constitute a logically sufficient condition for the use of 
the corresponding natural kind term. Consider two speakers s1 and s2, and imagine that s1 is 
an inhabitant of Earth, and s2 is an inhabitant of Twin Earth, and both s1 and s2 have identical 
mental biographies. Imagine, further, that s1 and s2 find themselves in qualitatively identical 
circumstances, being pursued by a large, furry, four legged animal with claws, and a rather 
antisocial disposition, say. Now, both speakers have the thought ‗there is a Bear chasing me!‘. 
For s1 ‗Bear‘ functions as it standardly does on Earth, for any typical language user. For s2 
‗Bear‘ denotes a species k which cannot (and could not) interbreed with the species that s1 
denotes using the term ‗Bear‘. Now, since s1 and s2 have identical mental biographies, the 
conceptual content of their respective there is a Bear chasing me-thoughts must be identical. 
But since the species denoted by s1‘s use of the term ‗Bear‘, Ursidae, is not the same as the 
species denoted by s2‘s use of the term ‗Bear‘, the conceptual content cannot fix the reference 
of a general term. 
For the descriptivist (as noted in chapter 1) there must be some description that both is 
the conceptual content of a word, and plays the unique denotation-determining role. Salmon 
takes the Twin Earth thought experiment to demonstrate that no single description can play 
both of these roles, and hence that descriptivism is untenable. The crux, then, is that the 
descriptions a speaker might come to associate with a kind, and treat as the conceptual content 
of the corresponding kind term, can ‗always underdetermine the denotation or extension‘ 
(Salmon 2005: 68) of a natural kind. The constant denotation of the kind term in the Twin 
Earth experiment is a product of the direct reference to the kind in question, and since 
‗properties that involve direct reference to external things of a certain kind... cannot be part of 
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a psychological state‘ (ibid.) the thought experiment shows that the property of being φ 
‗cannot be a general property involving no direct reference‘ (ibid.: 69). 
What the descriptivist requires, then, is that the property of being a tiger is a ‗general 
property that does not involve direct reference to the species Tiger‘ (Salmon 2005: 65). If they 
can show this to be the case, then ‗the direct reference theory [is] neatly refuted, by the simple 
observation that ―tiger‖ may be said to express the property of being a tiger‘ (ibid.). Thus 
descriptivism cannot analyse the property of being a tiger as the conjunction of the species 
Tiger and the kind-membership relation, since this is ‗only a small step away from the claim 
that ―tiger‖ is altogether nondescriptional‘ (ibid.: 64). Rather, it must show that there is some 
general property that defines what it is to be a tiger, but does not, itself, involve direct 
reference to the species Tiger. I will not pursue this line of argument on behalf of the 
descriptivist here, but reserve a proposed rejoinder for chapter 5, where I will argue that such 
a strategy is readily available for the descriptivist. Now I turn to Salmon‘s analysis of the 
derivation of a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds.  
 
4.4 Theoretical identity and a posteriori necessity 
Ignoring, for the time being, any problems that might afflict Salmon‘s own account of the 
rigidity of general terms and theoretical identity, and the point raised in Chapter 3 that it is a 
commitment of a Millian view of general terms that theoretical identities containing co-
referring terms are knowable a priori, not a posteriori, I now return to Salmon‘s analysis of 
Kripke and Putnam, and their alleged derivation of a posteriori necessities. Once this is 
complete, I turn to my own criticisms of Salmon‘s account. 
 149 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, the necessity of certain identity sentences is, 
according to Kripke, entailed by the conjunction of their truth and the philosophical semantics 
of (CDR), in particular the notion of rigid designation. Identity sentences such as ‗Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ or ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘ contain two proper names, which are always 
rigid designators, flanking the identity predicate (or that natural language version of it) and 
are guaranteed to be necessary when true. They also allow us to derive additional 
(metaphysically) necessary truths, for example it follows from the necessity of ‗Ehrich Weiss 
is Harry Houdini‘ that, necessarily, if Ehrich Weiss is human, then Harry Houdini is a human. 
Despite the apparent necessity of these truths Kripke argued, convincing almost the entire 
philosophical community, that such truths were knowable only a posteriori, and hence a new 
category of necessary truth was introduced into the philosophical literature – the so called 
necessary a posteriori. 
However, there are two clearly distinct categories of necessary a posteriori truth 
within Kripke. The first kind, sketched above (and in Chapter 1), involve singular reference to 
an individual, and result from the substitution of co-referential terms within an identity 
sentence. Their necessity, as stated above, is the uncontroversial result of (CDR), an empirical 
(entirely uncontroversial) claim that the identity sentence is true, and some logic. As such, 
there is no special ‗metaphysical theory involving modality‘ (Salmon 2005: 80) invoked to 
guarantee their necessity.  
The second category is more controversial. A theoretical identification sentence like 
‗Water is H2O‘ also, according to Kripke, falls within the purview of the necessary a 
posteriori. However, such a sentence is clearly disanalogous to ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ in 
that the term on the right hand side of the identity appears (a) to ‗be descriptional‘ (Salmon 
2005: 82), and (b) bears a clear resemblance to other examples of the necessary a posteriori 
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that ‗involve singular reference to an individual but which do not result from substitution‘ 
(ibid.). The most notable example from this latter category, which has nothing to do with 
semantics per se, is Kripke‘s necessity of origin thesis. As others have noted, theoretical 
identifications appear to ‗resemble ―Cicero is a product of the egg and sperm that generated 
him‖ rather than ―Cicero = Tully‖ in respect that they aim to expose essence‘ (LaPorte 2004: 
37), and are thus not the product of the substitution of co-referential terms. 
The necessity of origin thesis, as is well known, is an essentialist thesis concerning the 
origin of an individual. Kripke claims, about the origin of an object or person, that ‗anything 
coming from a different origin would not be this object‘ (Kripke 1980: 113), and that ‗the 
origin of an object is essential to it‘ (ibid.: 114, n57). Precisely how we should treat this 
thesis, as noted in chapter 3, section 2, is a matter of some controversy (cf. Hughes 2004: 111-
7; Mackie 2006), however all we need note here, as Salmon does, is that Kripke employs a 
‗nontrivial general principle of essentialism‘ (Salmon 2005: 195) in his derivation of 
necessary a posteriori truths concerning the origins of individuals.
45
 
Salmon‘s distinction between trivial and nontrivial essentialism (2005: 82-7) is 
roughly as follows. Consider the identity sentence ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘, and the 
claim, following (CDR), that both ‗Ehrich Weiss‘ and ‗Harry Houdini‘ are rigid designators. 
We know from Kripke that the truth of the identity sentence guarantees its necessity given the 
rigidity of the two names flanking the identity predicate. But we can also say that the identity 
sentence ‗Ehrich Weiss is identical to Harry Houdini‘ is necessary iff that man, Ehrich, could 
not have failed to have the property of being identical to Harry Houdini. In effect, Ehrich 
Weiss has the property of being Harry Houdini essentially, since it is impossible for Ehrich to 
                                                          
45
 I will discuss the distinction between trivial and nontrivial essentialism in greater detail in chapter 7, section 1. 
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exist and lack that property. But the property of being Harry Houdini is a property which we 
can apply to Harry Houdini a priori, since it is analytic that Harry Houdini has that property. 
Similarly with the property of being Ehrich Weiss and the man Ehrich Weiss. Once we 
discover a posteriori that Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini, we discover that the property of 
being Ehrich Weiss and the property of being Harry Houdini are properties that both Ehrich 
and Harry have necessarily. But these properties, as it goes, are pretty uninteresting 
properties. The property Ehrich Weiss has necessarily of being Ehrich Weiss is, to all intents 
and purposes, just the property of being self-identical. Hence the derivation that Ehrich Weiss 
has the property of being Harry Houdini necessarily is, at best, a trivial form of essentialism, 
and as such metaphysically uncontroversial. 
Nontrivial essentialist conclusions, on the other hand, are metaphysically 
controversial. Take the case of individuals: following Kripke‘s model we might say that since 
Winston Churchill has his (actual) origin necessarily (say, being the son of Randolph 
Churchill and Jennie Jerome), he could not have existed and yet failed to have precisely the 
origin that he actually has, although he might not have done the things we commonly 
associate him with (being Prime Minister, for instance). But such a conclusion goes beyond 
the claim that Winston Churchill has the property of being Winston Churchill necessarily. It 
states, rather, that there is some particular origin that Churchill has, and that Churchill could 
not have existed whilst lacking that very origin. Such a conclusion is ‗Aristotelian 
essentialism par excellence‘ (Salmon 2005: 86), and thus has significantly more metaphysical 
bite.
46
  
                                                          
46
 I say more about the distinction between trivial and nontrivial essentialism is chapter 7, section 1. The basic 
distinction is just that nontrivial essential properties require some additional theory of essentialism, such that the 
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The distinction between trivial and nontrivial essentialism is important here as 
theoretical identity sentences, such as ‗Water is H2O‘, have more in common with nontrivial 
essentialist claims concerning the necessity of origin, than typical identity sentences. For 
example, if ‗water‘ picks out a kind, and ‗H2O‘ describes that kind‘s chemical composition 
(as it does for Kripke, Putnam and Soames), being shorthand for ‗being composed of two 
parts hydrogen and one part oxygen‘, then the claim that ‗necessarily water is H2O‘ is a claim 
about water‘s composition. Thus the claim that necessarily water is H2O is, in effect, a claim 
that it is impossible for water to exist and not be so composed. This suggests that ‗the 
chemical composition of a compound is an essential feature of that compound‘ (Salmon 2005: 
82), in much the same way as Kripke claims that origin is an essential feature of an individual. 
But this is a far more controversial conclusion than the more general semantic 
conclusion that true identities, theoretical or otherwise, between two co-referring names, are 
guaranteed to be necessary when true. The only properties that you can infer about Ehrich 
Weiss, that he bears necessarily, once you discover the Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini are 
properties like being Harry Houdini. There is no obvious entailment from the fact that Ehrich 
Weiss is Harry Houdini that Ehrich necessarily has the parents he actually has. However, if 
there is such an entailment, then these essentialist ‗facts‘, about the origins of individuals and 
the composition of substances, were allegedly uncovered via a ‗relatively simply theory about 
the reference of single words‘ (Salmon 2005: 87). The key question, then, is whether this 
second category of necessary a posteriori truth (theoretical identities and claims about the 
origins of individuals) are derivable from (CDR) in conjunction with some uncontroversial 
empirical observations. Salmon‘s answer, as we shall see, is that they are not. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
origin of an individual is an essential property of that individual, whilst trivial essential properties do not. 
However, more on this in chapter 7. 
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4.5 Kripke’s essentialist premise 
The majority of Salmon‘s discussion of the derivation of necessary a posteriori truths focuses 
on Putnam, and Donnellan‘s (1983) elucidation of Putnam. His criticism, in a nutshell, is that 
the only essentialist conclusions that follow from (CDR) are those that stem from nontrivial 
essentialist premises. Here, however, I wish to focus on how this criticism might apply to 
Kripke, especially in light of chapter 2, where I distinguished early-Putnam from later-
Putnam, and sketched Putnam‘s rejection of the metaphysical reading of his conclusions (viz., 
the necessary a posteriori). Thus, the following explication of Salmon‘s account of, and 
objection to, Putnam‘s mechanism for generating a posteriori necessities for natural kinds and 
individuals should be read as applying only to early-Putnam. The purpose of this exposition, 
however, is to use it, in conjunction with an analysis of Kripke‘s necessity of origin thesis, to 
illustrate the clear similarities between necessity of origin claims and theoretical identities, 
and to show that Kripke endorsed the self same mechanism that Salmon attributes to early-
Putnam (and Donnellan). 
Salmon presents the following argument, labelled the OK-mechanism
47
 (‗O‘ for 
ostension, ‗K‘ for kind), as Putnam‘s (and Donnellan‘s) attempt to derive the necessary, 
nontrivial essentialist conclusion, such as ‗necessarily, gold is the element with atomic 
number 79‘, from (CDR), uncontroversial empirical observations, and no nontrivial 
essentialist premises. The mechanism (see Salmon 2005: 166), using water as an example, is: 
                                                          
47
 The OK-mechanism is a restricted version of a more general mechanism, the K-mechanism. However, since 
my target here is Kripke, and Kripke‘s thesis critically includes ostension rather than Putnam‘s operational 
definition, I will only present the OK version. 
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(T1) It is necessarily the case that: something is a sample of water if and only if it is a 
sample of dthat (the same substance as this is a sample of). 
(T2) This (liquid sample) has the chemical structure H2O. 
(T3) Being a sample of the same substance as something consists in having the same 
chemical structure. 
Therefore, 
(T4) It is necessarily the case that: every sample of water has the chemical structure H2O. 
 
The OK-mechanism, then, consists of an ostensive definition, (T1), a description of the 
hidden nature of the paradigm sample, referred to via the ostensive definition, (T2), a claim 
about what being the same kind (as the kind in question) consist in, (T3), and the conclusion 
asserting the necessity of the generated truth, (T4). Since (T1) is clearly a consequence of 
(CDR), and (T2) is an uncontroversial empirical observation, the focus of the investigation is 
(T3).  
Salmon settles on the following formalisation of (T3), in a bid to determine precisely 
what ‗consists in‘ means: ‗if x exists in w1 and y exists w2, and if x is a sample in w1 of the 
same substance that y is a sample of in w2, then whatever chemical structure x has in w1, y has 
that same chemical structure in w2, and vice-versa‘ (Salmon 2005: 179-180). On this 
interpretation the ‗consists in‘ relation in (T3) is effectively being cashed out as a cross-world 
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sameness (of chemical structure, in this instance) relation, which fits with the analysis of 
Putnam given in Chapter 2. 
However, it is worth noting, briefly, that Salmon treats this sameness relation as 
merely a necessary condition. Thus he says that ‗the third premise schema of the OK-
mechanism must assert, at a minimum, a necessary condition of the cross-world same-K 
relation‘ (2005: 181). However, this fails to capture what Kripke and (early) Putnam intended. 
Whilst I agree with Salmon that (T3) at a minimum must assert a necessary condition, it 
seems to me that the original force of the argument is that it be a necessary and sufficient 
condition. Indeed, the most natural interpretation of ‗consists in‘ seems, obviously, to be a 
necessary and sufficient condition. Moreover, there is decisive exegetical evidence illustrating 
that both Kripke and Putnam were interested in necessary and sufficient conditions – that is, 
essences rather than essential properties. 
The exegetical evidence in Putnam (1973) quite clearly demonstrates his intention that 
the notion of ‗consists in‘ captures a necessary and sufficient condition. When he defines what 
sameness of substance (or liquid, in the original article) consists in, he states quite clearly that 
the ‗necessary and sufficient condition for being [x] is bearing the relation sameL to the stuff‘ 
(Putnam 1973: 702) identified as the paradigm sample. Similarly, Kripke‘s statement that: 
 
a material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is that 
with atomic number 79. Here, the ―if and only if‖ can be taken to be strict 
(necessary)... the coextensiveness of the predicates is necessary, but not a priori‘ 
(Kripke 1980: 138)   
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also clearly indicates a stronger reading of what ‗consists in‘ amounts to: namely, as a 
necessary-and-sufficient condition, rather than merely a necessary condition. Salmon‘s 
interpretation of (T3), then, seems clearly implausible given the exegetical evidence. 
However, since Salmon‘s criticisms apply to Kripke and early-Putnam given the weaker 
reading of (T3), they apply a fortiori to a stronger reading of (T3), hence my observation has 
no impact for the overall argument. Still, it is worth noting that both Kripke and early-Putnam 
claim that H2O is the essence of water, rather than merely an essential property of water. 
Similarly, Soames recognises the use of the biconditional in Kripke, and analyses theoretical 
identities as having the logical form x [Fx ↔ Gx]. Salmon is just wrong to treat ‗consists in‘ 
are merely a necessary condition. 
 
4.6 Essentialism, a priori or a posteriori? 
According to Salmon,  there is one particular difference between Kripke‘s derivation of 
necessary a posteriori truths concerning natural kinds, and the Putnam-Donnellan derivation, 
which it is worth noting. The second half of Salmon‘s Reference and Essence is dedicated to 
showing that nontrivial essentialist conclusions cannot be derived merely from semantic 
premises.
48
 The key premise identified by Salmon as that which enables nontrivial 
essentialism to be derived, is (T3). 
Salmon‘s criticism is that (T4) critically relies upon (T3), and (T3) is a ‗nontrivial 
general principle of essentialism‘ (Salmon 2005: 184). Hence, the derivation of necessary a 
                                                          
48
 Although I have said a little concerning the distinction between nontrivial and trivial essentialism, I am well 
aware that I have left much to be said. However, I will deal explicitly with what essentialism, and claims to the 
effect that H2O is the real essence of water, amount to in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
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posteriori truths concerning natural kinds (and, by analogy, the necessity of origin thesis) are 
not merely the product of philosophical semantics. To claim that essentialism can be derived 
just from linguistic premises is just to beg the question of essentialism; in other words, the 
only essentialism you get out from the philosophy of language is that which you put in, since 
the necessity of ‗water is H2O‘, at least as it is presented in Kripke and Putnam, ‗depends 
crucially on a premise, which is a contestable essentialist principle that does not in any way 
seem to come from the philosophy of language‘ (Salmon 2005: 186). 
Salmon observes that Putnam and Donnellan appear to claim that (T3) is a scientific 
principle, and mistakenly take the derivation of necessary truths like ‗water is H2O‘ to be the 
product of philosophical semantics and uncontroversial empirical observations/discoveries. 
But (T3) is ‗a principle whose truth is established in good part by conceptual analysis and the 
reflective methods of the metaphysician‘ (Salmon 2005: 185), rather than scientific theorising. 
In a sense, the claim that philosophical semantics in conjunction with (T3) entails nontrivial 
essentialism is trivially true since (T3) itself is a statement of nontrivial essentialism, and as 
such when combined with any semantic theory (including a descriptivist semantics, as we 
shall see in chapter 5) it will generate essentialist truths. 
Kripke, by contrast, does not appear to treat (T3) as a scientific truth. Rather, again as 
Salmon notes (2005: 195), he appears to treat it as a conceptual truth, knowable a priori. Thus 
we know a priori that if a chemical kind K has a molecular structure/constitution C that it is 
necessary that K have C. If K is the kind water, and we discover (empirically) that water has 
the molecular constitution H2O, then it follows from our a priori essentialist principle (T3), 
that necessarily water is H2O. This is why the discovery that water is H2O is automatically the 
discovery that necessarily water is H2O. The difference between Kripke on the one hand, and 
Putnam and Donnellan on the other, at least as Salmon sees it, is that Kripke ‗explicitly 
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recognizes the essentialist import of the major premise in his modal arguments generating 
necessary a posteriori truths‘ (Salmon 2005: 196), and avows the ambition to prove 
essentialism from a theory of reference (Kripke 1980: 1, n1). 
The point that Salmon is really intending to make is that Putnam, but not Kripke, 
claimed to have derived necessary truths knowable only a posteriori entirely from 
philosophical semantics. However, the distinction between Putnam and Kripke on this basis 
seems obviously spurious. As Salmon quite rightly notes, (T3) must be established by 
conceptual analysis. However, Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment is one of modern 
philosophy‘s paradigms of conceptual analysis. Moreover, inasmuch as Kripke offers a priori 
arguments for (T3), they are (independently developed) variations on the Twin Earth thought 
experiment. Furthermore, Kripke claims explicitly that ‗science discovers the nature[s], and 
thus the essence[s]‘  of natural kinds (Kripke 1980: 138). Whilst Putnam is surely right that 
neither Kripke nor Putnam manage to derive essentialism from (CDR), since both employ 
(T3), it seems that both offer some arguments for (T3) in the form of conceptual analysis.
49
 
Hence, if there is a distinction between the projects of Kripke and Putnam, it is not on this 
basis.
50
 
The important point for this thesis is that there are two apparent routes to necessary a 
posteriori truth: the first being the product of the substitution of co-referential names and 
(CDR), such as ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘, the second being the product of nontrivial 
                                                          
49
 In some sense, then, it is not clear why Salmon labels (T3) as an essentialist assumption, since it is rather the 
conclusion of independent a priori argument.  
50
 In chapter 2, section 5, I observed that Putnam was concerned with the threat of Kuhnian incommensurability, 
whilst in chapter 1 it was obvious that Kripke‘s concerns were with descriptivism. This, or so it seems to me, is 
where the two projects differed. Not, as Salmon would have it, in that Kripke‘s essentialism is a priori whilst 
Putnam‘s is a posteriori.  
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essentialist premises like (T3), and including truths like ‗necessarily, water is H2O‘. In the 
literature the two categories are not always properly distinguished, but the distinction suggests 
a possible (novel) descriptivist rejoinder, utilising an essentialist premise like (T3), and 
arguing that only descriptions of the essential properties of kinds can guarantee determinate 
reference. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
4.7 Salmon’s account of theoretical terms 
Before moving on to a defence of descriptivism, it is worth presenting, and ultimately 
rejecting, Salmon‘s alternative account of necessary a posteriori theoretical identity 
sentences. Salmon, as I have indicated, recognises a division between two types of necessary 
a posteriori truth in Kripke: (i) those like ‗Erich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘ and ‗Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘, and (ii) those like ‗water is H2O‘ and ‗Winston Churchill is the son of Randolph 
Churchill and Jennie Jerome‘. As we have seen (ii) is the product of a not uncontroversial 
nontrivial essentialist premise, whilst (i) is metaphysically neutral. 
Salmon‘s alternative account (cf. Salmon 1987/8: 193-217) attempts to maintain 
Kripkean insights into proper names and apply them straightforwardly to natural kind terms 
by treating natural kind terms tout court as names for abstract universals. The basic move is to 
restrict the sorts of things that general terms can designate. For Salmon, where T is a general 
term, T cannot be taken to designate its actual extension, since a Millian theory of meaning 
says that the meaning of a term is its referent, and the actual extension of a general term is 
liable to change over time. For instance, were the general term ‗Human‘ to designate the 
extension of the human-kind, then since new humans are born every day, and other humans 
die, the fluctuating extension of the human-kind would entail a fluctuating meaning of the 
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general term ‗Human‘. Hence, Salmon claims that general terms should be thought of as 
designators for abstract universals. So, where T is the mass noun ‗Water‘, we should construe 
T as a designator of the water-kind, which is an abstract universal. It follows from this that 
where T successfully designates a kind, T rigidly designates that kind, in precisely the way 
that all successfully introduced names are, in virtue of being designators, rigid designators. 
The problem cases for Kripke were descriptions like ‗H2O‘, – where ‗H2O‘ is read as 
being synonymous with ‗the substance consisting of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen 
atom‘ (as it is by Soames) – ‗the element with atomic number 79‘, or statements about the 
origin of an individual. In the case of natural kind terms, Salmon opts to treat ‗H2O‘ and ‗the 
element with atomic number 79‘ in much the same way as he does ‗Water‘ or ‗Gold‘, which 
is to say as substance names designating abstract universals. On such a view a term like ‗H2O‘ 
is ‗a general-term version of a proper name whose reference is fixed through a scientific 
convention concerning chemical-compound terms‘ (Salmon 2003: 488). Consequently, the 
apparent necessity of a true theoretical identity sentence, for instance ‗Water is H2O‘, really is 
a product of philosophical semantics since both general-terms are the analogues of logically 
proper names, and the two general terms are co-referential. 
The main argument for this claim, if indeed it can be called such, actually occurs in 
Salmon (1987/8), in footnote 5, where he contrasts the occurrence of the ‗2‘ in the phrase ‗2 
meters‘ with its occurrence in the proper name ‗R2-D2‘, and notes that only in the former case 
does ‗2‘ seem to be replaceable by a variable in an existential generalisation. In a later paper 
he invites us to ‗note the oddity of (x) (y) [x = the most abundant element & y = the 
smallest prime integer & water = xyO]‘ (2003: 488, n25). When we break down a general term  
such as ‗H2O‘ into what we take to be its component parts, and substitute them as in the above 
logical formula, we generate highly odd results where ‗H2O‘ is synonymous with the 
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conjunction of ‗the most abundant element‘, ‗the prime integer‘ and ‗oxygen‘. Terms like 
‗H2O‘, then, are just technical names, and analogous to any other proper name. 
It is difficult to know what to make of this ‗argument‘. In the first instance, the ‗2‘ in 
‗H2O‘ clearly has more in common with the ‗2‘ in the phrase ‗2 meters‘ than it does ‗R2-D2‘, 
since it really does mean two: there are two hydrogen atoms, and one oxygen atom. The point 
is even more obvious when we consider phrases like ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ 
where, again, the number ‗79‘ is doing precisely the work one would expect, rather than the 
slightly odd work that numbers are doing in the name ‗R2-D2‘. Hence I am not entirely sure 
that I even understand what Salmon is trying to say. The argument for treating all referring 
general terms as the analogue of proper names, then, seems to rely upon two concerns about 
treating them as descriptions: (i) that to treat only some descriptions as rigid seems to require 
the controversial metaphysical thesis of essentialism, and (ii) the apparent oddity of breaking 
down terms like H2O into their constituent parts. However, (ii) seems plainly false, since 
empirical formulae like ‗H2O‘ only make sense when we realise that they literally tell us 
something about the ratios of the constituent atoms of a molecule, and whilst (i) maybe prima 
facie plausible, when I have established, in Chapter 5, that the combination of essentialism 
with descriptivism makes for a defensible thesis, in Chapter 8 I will give a deflationary 
account of essences that will also highlight that (i) is false. 
Given that Soames‘ alternative (discussed in Chapter 3) is to treat general terms like 
‗H2O‘ as synonymous with descriptions, in this case ‗the chemical compound consisting of 
two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen‘, the choice seems to be whether to admit that some 
descriptions can be rigid, but restrict the class of rigid descriptions via the claim that the kind 
in question ‗has an essential property‘ (Salmon 2003: 488). But this means that such a theory 
of reference comes with substantive metaphysical baggage. Alternatively, we can endorse 
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Salmon‘s proposal that all referring general terms are like proper names. But this comes with 
the immediate consequence that such an account looks plainly false for theoretical terms like 
‗H2O‘ and ‗the element with atomic number 79‘. Furthermore, the view appears to be 
motivated by a rather dubious and apparently flimsy argument. However, there are further 
negative consequences entailed by Salmon‘s thesis that I have yet to mention. 
 
4.8 The trivialisation problem  
One important objection to Salmon‘s proposal is aimed at his claim that general terms only 
designate abstract universals, and the consequence of this claim that every general term 
designator is a rigid designator. The objection, simply, is that it trivialises the notion of 
rigidity (cf. Schwartz 2002, Salmon 2002). Following Dan López De Sa, let us call this 
problem – the problem that it follows trivially from any general term being a designator that it 
is a rigid designator – the ‗trivialization problem‘ (López De Sa 2007: 117). The effect of the 
trivialisation problem is that there is no semantic distinction to be drawn between natural kind 
terms like ‗Water‘, ‗Gold‘ and ‗Tiger‘ on the one hand, and general terms like ‗Member of a 
species that serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘, since, prima facie at least, each can 
be taken to designate a property, and it follows trivially from being a designator that it is 
rigid. 
Salmon has responded to concerns over trivialisation, at least as they are articulated by 
Soames (2002: 250), in the following fashion. While it is true that many general terms do turn 
out to be rigid, including terms like ‗Bachelor‘ which we might not think of as standard 
examples, there are still plenty of general terms that fail to be rigid, and hence rigidity is not 
trivial. Consider, for instance, the sentence ‗A Bear is a member of the species that serves as a 
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mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘. According to Salmon (2005a: 124), this sort of sentence is 
most naturally read as a kind of identity sentence. This identity sentence is ‗true if and only if 
the terms flanking the ―is‖ are co-designative‘ (Salmon 2005a: 124). However, the term on 
the left, ‗Bear‘, is not co-designative with ‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for 
Chicago‘s NFL team‘, since the intension of the latter, but not the former, is such that it might 
have assigned, at a world like w1, a class of instances consisting of all buffalos, rather than all 
bears. Hence the metaphysical intension of the kind Member of a species that serves as a 
Mascot for Chicago’s NFL team is not the same as the Bear kind, and hence the 
corresponding general terms are not co-designative. Rather, as stated earlier, they are 
contingently co-extensional, and as we have already established this is insufficient for the 
truth of a theoretical identity. However, what the example also shows, in addition to the 
falsity of the alleged identity, is that the definite description ‗Member of a species that serves 
as a Mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ is not rigid, since it applies to bears in the actual world, 
but buffalos at nearby possible worlds, such as w1. Thus there are still ‗non-rigid general 
terms everywhere‘ (Salmon 2005a: 132). 
But Salmon‘s response is unsuccessful. Consider the following example: let the 
general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts‘ pick out the kind 
Object that weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts, and let the extension of that general 
term be any object that is an instance of something with the weight of three bags of peanuts. 
Given Salmon‘s response above, the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of three 
packets of peanuts‘ looks to be a non-rigid designator. The point is easily illustrated: if a 
packet of peanuts in the actual world, w@, weighs 27g, then the combined weight of three 
packets of peanuts would be 81g. Hence the kind referred to be the general term ‗Object that 
weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts‘ has, as its extension, anything weighing 81g. 
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However, go to a nearby possible world, w1, where the weight of a packet of peanuts is 30g, 
and the combined weight of three packets is 90g. In w1 the general term ‗Object that weighs 
the weight of three packets of peanuts‘ will apply to anything weighing 90g, rather than 81g. 
In other words, the general term has a different extension at w1 than it has at w@, and cannot 
therefore be a rigid designator. 
However, all that this shows is that the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of 
three packets of peanuts‘ does not rigidly designate either 81g or 90g. It does not show that it 
is not a rigid designator at all. For Salmon, being a rigid designator follows trivially from 
being a designator. Hence, provided there is ‗an appropriate property (whose extension 
necessarily tracks the extension of the general term)‘ (Lopez de Sa 2007: 118) to designate, 
then it won‘t be that the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of three packets of 
peanuts‘ flexibly designates objects with different weights in different possible worlds. Rather, 
the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts‘ will designate 
anything with the property of being an object that weighs the weight of three packets of 
peanuts in all possible worlds, regardless of how heavy those objects contingently happen to 
be. 
Let me put the point more formally: let f be the function that assigns a value of 1 to all 
objects that bear the property of being an object that weighs the weight of three packets of 
peanuts, and 0 to all other objects. Let the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of 
three packets of peanuts‘, abbreviated to T, designate the function f. Let w@ be the actual 
world, where the weight of three packets of peanuts is 81g, and let w1 be a nearby possible 
world where the weight of three packets of peanuts is 90g. Now consider what it is that the 
class of objects that weigh 81g, call that O, in w@, have in common with that class of objects 
that weigh 90g, call that O*, in w1? The answer, perhaps obviously, is that both classes of 
 165 
object, O and O*, are the product of the function f that assigns 1 to all objects that have the 
property of being an object that weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts. It does not 
matter that the class of objects O weigh 81g, while the class of objects O* weigh 90g. What is 
important is that both O and O* have the property of being an object that weighs the weight of 
three packets of peanuts. Hence the general term ‗Object that weighs the weight of three 
packets of peanuts‘ does rigidly designate, it is just that it rigidly designates anything with the 
property of being an object that weighs the weight of three packets of peanuts. Hence, this 
still appears to trivialise the notion of rigidity. 
According to López De Sa, it must be conceded that the trivialisation problem only 
arises if we have ‗a very ―liberal‖ view about the entities general terms are said to designate‘ 
(2007: 119). However, it seems to me that he need not be quite so concessive. Salmon, by his 
own admission, claims that examples like ‗A Bear is the Member of a species that serves as a 
mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ are most naturally read as identity sentences. Since there is 
no substantive difference between Salmon‘s own example, and the one I have employed to 
articulate the trivialisation problem, the concession is unnecessary. Salmon‘s view of general 
terms designation entails the trivialisation problem, since he cannot distinguish between rigid 
and non-rigid general terms.
51, 52
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 There have been some more recent responses in the literature, which I have not had time to discuss here. For 
instance, Martí and Martinèz-Fernandez (2010) argue that we can distinguish between rigid and non-rigid 
readings of general terms. However, since my overarching aim in this thesis is to show that there is no interesting 
connection between the semantics and metaphysics of natural kinds (and natural kind terms), I have not included 
that discussion here. In any event, my main objection to Salmon‘s account, in chapter 4 section 9, is that his 
interpretation of the semantics of theoretical terms is implausible in light of actual practices. 
52
 Similarly, it is worth noting that Soames might also be liable to the trivialisation problem. At the end of 
chapter 3, I observed that Soames does not really give a story about why there is an asymmetry between natural 
kind predicates and other predicates. Moreover, any story he does give appears to rely upon some significant 
metaphysical assumptions about natural kinds. Hence, either Soames owes us a story about natural kinds such 
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4.9 The semantics of science 
The second (rarely discussed, to the best of my knowledge) problem with Salmon‘s account is 
that it simply fails to cohere with our actual practices. While it is certainly true that general 
terms like ‗H2O‘ are introduced by scientists, and are (in part) the product of scientific 
theorising, that they are not synonymous with certain descriptions is far from obvious, and 
indeed I will claim that in many cases they are. However, it should be conceded that Salmon 
is quite correct that if we treat ‗H2O‘ as the general-term analogue of a proper name, then 
‗Water is H2O‘ is necessary. Nevertheless, this still leaves work to be done carving out a 
distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators. Furthermore, if Salmon is endorsing 
Millianism, and the meaning of a term just is its referent, then ‗Water is H2O‘ should be a 
priori if ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘ is (which, recall, is what Soames conceded in 
Chapter 3). However, there are compelling reasons not to treat ‗H2O‘ as the analogue of a 
logically proper name.  
Since general terms such as ‗H2O‘ are the product of scientific theorising, we should 
look to how scientists actually use such terms, in order to get a better sense of their semantics. 
The first thing to note is that chemists standardly distinguish between types of chemical 
formula, which is what ‗H2O‘ undoubtedly is. An empirical formula merely expresses the 
proportion of distinct elements within a compound. The empirical formula of butane, for 
example, is C2H5, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that butane molecules actually 
have two carbon atoms and five hydrogen atoms. The molecular formula of butane, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that they ground the asymmetry between natural kind predicates and other predicates, or he too is victim of the 
trivialisation problem. However, I do not have the space to address that issue here. 
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contrast, is C4H10 and this does tell us precisely how many atoms of distinct elements 
constitute a molecule of butane. Finally, structural formulas tell us not just the number of 
atoms within a molecule, but also give us their respective arrangements: for instance, propane 
has the molecular formula C3H8, and the structural formula CH3CH2CH3. The problem is that 
as a layperson it will not always be immediately obvious which sort of formula one is faced 
with, and thus unclear precisely what role that formula is playing. This ambiguity between 
general terms that are syntactically very similar adds an additional layer of complexity to 
general terms such as these, that has not been acknowledged in the literature. 
The distinction between types of formula also offers some insight into the function of 
what we might label broadly as chemical formulae within scientific discourse: they encode 
different types of information about the molecules to which they apply. The structural formula 
for propane tells us that there is a chain of three carbon atoms, with the hydrogen atoms 
arranged around these central carbon atoms, three on the left-hand carbon atom, two on the 
central carbon atom, and three on the right-hand carbon atom. It is clear from these simple 
observations that structural formulae do not merely denote, as Salmon would have us think, 
but connote as they are used by the scientist. As such it is hard to parse Salmon‘s claim that 
‗H2O‘ and its ilk are the general-term analogue of logically proper names, since the role of 
chemical formulae within chemistry is clearly intended to describe as well as denote.  
In light of the role that chemical formulae play within the semantics of chemistry we 
should, I conclude, reject Salmon‘s account of the semantics of at least some general-terms, 
particularly those from chemistry. Salmon‘s account, at best, applies to a very limited class of 
cases, paradigmatically represented by the ‗Apatosaurus is Brontosaurus‘ case. However, 
none of Kripke‘s original cases conform to this paradigm. Indeed, phrases like ‗the element 
with atomic number 79‘ have more in common with phrases like ‗Member of a species that 
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serves as a mascot for Chicago‘s NFL team‘ than they do with single world natural kind terms 
(e.g. ‗Gold‘, ‗Tungsten‘, ‗Muon‘), but on Salmon‘s view whilst ‗the element with atomic 
number 79‘ should be rigid, the phrase ‗Member of a species that serves as a mascot for 
Chicago‘s NFL team‘ should not be. The trivialisation problem demonstrates that this is not 
the case, and hence Salmon‘s defence of Kripke fails to carve out a special semantic category 
of general terms – the natural kind terms – that are semantically special. 
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TAKING STOCK: THE STORY SO FAR 
 
Given that paradigm Kripkean theoretical identities contain, on the right hand side, 
descriptions, I have concluded that Salmon‘s attempt to treat such terms as the general term 
analogue of proper names is highly implausible. In this respect, then, Soames‘ thesis, that 
recognises precisely this point, is preferable to Salmon‘s. Furthermore, Salmon‘s view, as we 
have seen, fails to effectively insulate a special class of general terms (the natural kind terms) 
that are rigid, whilst leaving all other general terms as non-rigid.
53
 Soames‘ view seems to 
achieve this end, but only at the cost some prima facie serious metaphysical baggage. 
According to my earlier criticism, the only way to make a description like ‗substance 
molecules of which contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom‘ figure in a necessarily 
true theoretical identity, whilst maintaining that descriptions like ‗potable substance that falls 
from the sky and flows in the lakes and rivers‘ do not, is to say that only the former latches 
onto the essence of the kind. Hence some version of metaphysical essentialism is required to 
ground the necessity of paradigmatic theoretical identities.  
In some sense, this seems like just the right thing to say. Kripke unabashedly talks 
about the essence of the kind, and according to Salmon‘s analysis offers some a priori 
arguments for essentialism. Indeed, one can view arguments like the Twin Earth thought 
experiment less as semantical arguments (arguments that aim to show that reference is 
underdetermined by description) and more as straightforward conceptual analysis, revealing 
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 Although, it should be noted, that the debate over trivialisation is ongoing, and some philosophers, for instance 
Martí and Martinèz-Fernandez (2010) are confident of a solution. 
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to us precisely what the conditions are on being such-and-such a kind. The implicit 
essentialism, then, should perhaps be no surprise.  
On that basis, elements of Soames‘ view appear to be cohere better with what Kripke 
intended, compared to Salmon‘s view. However, Soames‘ positive thesis, recall, also required 
a decidedly odd view of predicate reference (natural kind predicates designate natural kinds), 
a false notion of ‗type‘, and assumed that no object could be a member of two natural kinds of 
the same type – the special auxiliary assumption – which is also false. Hence it is not 
particularly satisfactory either. 
In addition, there is also the concession made by Soames that if you are a Millian 
about semantic content, and you think that the contribution that a name or natural kind term 
makes to a proposition is just its referent, then co-referring terms can be substituted salva 
veritate, since they make identical contributions to the proposition. The upshot of this for 
proper names was that identities like ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘ were knowable a 
priori, not a posteriori as Kripke would have us believe. Since Salmon, like Soames, is also a 
Millian about proper names, he too thinks that identity sentences containing proper names, for 
instance ‗Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus‘, are in actual fact necessary and a priori (cf. 
Salmon 1986: 2). This has the further implication for Salmon that given his treatment of 
natural kind terms as names, then where ‗H2O‘ is a name that refers to the same kind as 
‗Water‘, the theoretical identity sentence ‗Water is H2O‘ will be as a priori and as necessary 
as ‗all bachelors are unmarried men‘! 
Soames‘ own view was to endorse Millianism for simple natural kind terms, but to 
deny that terms like ‗H2O‘, that is complex natural kind terms, were directly referential (i.e. 
they are not Millian). Instead, Soames claims that the content of such an expression is the 
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property that determines the kind; hence, reference to the kind is mediated reference in the 
case of complex natural kind terms (which are descriptions) like ‗H2O‘, but direct in the case 
of simple natural kind terms like ‗Water‘. Theoretical identities like ‗Water is H2O‘ (the 
simple-complex type) are thus a posteriori because the two terms mean different things. But, 
as I said above, the distinction between kind-determining properties and non-kind-
determining properties seems to rely upon metaphysical essentialism. Moreover, the move to 
save a posteriority in one special case (simple-complex theoretical identities), while 
conceding it in all other cases (identities and simple-simple theoretical identities are a priori) 
appears somewhat ad hoc.   
It would seem, then, that the most plausible account, which recognises terms like 
‗H2O‘ as descriptions, is accompanied by the metaphysical thesis of essentialism. But since 
this is an independent metaphysical position, it can be separated from the causal theory of 
direct reference, and combined with other semantic theories. In the next chapter I will 
demonstrate that when essentialism is combined with descriptivism, descriptivism is not 
susceptible to Kripke‘s original objections. Hence with no additional metaphysics (and 
indeed, compared to Soames‘ thesis, with a good deal less), a simple version of descriptivism 
can be made tenable.   
Finally, it is worth stressing that (EM) is committed to the thesis that theoretical 
identities are actually knowable a priori, and that although Kripke backed off from giving a 
theory of semantic content (as I noted in Chapter 3), it is plausible to suppose that his 
endorsement of Mill extended to an endorsement of Mill‘s view of content. However, since 
this is controversial, I simply note the following: either Kripke is a Millian, and both identities 
and theoretical identities come out a priori, or Kripke is not a Millian, and the thesis in 
Naming and Necessity fails to show that propositions like that expressed by ‗Hesperus is 
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Phosphorus‘ or ‗Water is H2O‘ are knowable only a posteriori. Hence Kripke is either 
mistaken about many necessary a posteriori truths (since they are actually a priori), or the 
lacunae that Soames identifies in Naming and Necessity (Kripke‘s lack of a theory of 
semantic content) is more of a gaping, cavernous pit that, somehow, the majority of 
proponents of a posteriori necessities have ignored. Either way, the prospects for the 
necessary a posteriori are at best incomplete, and at worst looking bleak. 
Now, having identified the essentialism running through the plausible accounts of 
theoretical identity and (CDR), I turn (in chapter 5) to a presentation of an alternative account 
of the semantics of natural kind terms that employs essentialism (as Kripke‘s, (early) 
Putnam‘s and Soames‘ accounts all do), but which answers some of the key questions 
concerning the meaning of natural kind terms. With this in place, the remainder of the thesis 
addresses questions concerning the metaphysics of essence. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
In chapter 1 I identified three types of objection to descriptivism. Following Salmon I labelled 
these objections (i) the modal argument, (ii) the epistemological argument, and (iii) the 
semantical argument. In chapter 4 I established that these arguments do not refute 
descriptivism about natural kind terms, as they perhaps do about proper names, since for all 
that has been said it might just be that we have thus far considered the wrong descriptions. As 
Salmon has intimated, what the descriptivist needs is some general property that is indicative 
of the kind, but which does not itself involve direct reference to the kind. In this chapter I will 
present a version of descriptivism – Descriptivist Essentialism – that avoids all of these 
objections as they apply to natural kind terms. The key to avoiding Kripke‘s objections will 
be to combine descriptivism with metaphysical essentialism: after all, Kripke‘s arguments 
against the descriptivist are so successful because they target descriptions of accidental or 
contingent properties of natural kinds e.g. ‗liquid that falls from the sky, and flows in the 
lakes and rivers‘ for ‗water‘. But it is not an essential feature of descriptivism that only 
descriptions of the accidental properties of natural kinds can give the meanings of natural kind 
terms. The point of the chapter, however, is not to endorse essentialism, but to illustrate that if 
all the plausible versions of (CDR) employ an essentialist premise, as I claimed in the 
previous chapter, then since essentialism comes apart from (CDR), descriptivism too can be 
made plausible using this same premise. 
The plan of this chapter will be as follows: in section 2 I define a broad notion of 
descriptivism and remind us of Kripke‘s classic objections to descriptivism. In section 3 I 
briefly recap Kripke‘s positive thesis concerning natural kind terms and rigidity, and remind 
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the reader of Putnam‘s Twin Earth thought experiment, which neatly captures the intuition 
underlying Kripke‘s semantics. In section 4 I offer a new analysis of Kripke‘s thesis 
concerning the rigidity of natural kind terms that plays close attention to the distinction 
between de jure and de facto rigidity, which has been neglected in the literature. I argue that 
theoretical identifications are necessary because they contain de facto rigid designators, and 
that, given what de facto rigidity amounts to, it is Kripke‘s metaphysical essentialism that 
grounds the necessity of theoretical identifications. As such I combine Kripke‘s metaphysics 
with a descriptivist semantics and steer it around both the modal and semantical objections. In 
section 5 I deal with the epistemological objection by (i) endorsing a division of linguistic 
labour, (ii) offering a new story of how the reference of natural kind terms is fixed, and (iii) 
borrowing a strategy recently developed by Soames to defend Extended Millianism (EM). In 
section 6 I discuss the application of the thesis to the majority of natural kind terms and in 
section 7 I sum up the main achievements of the chapter.   
 
5.1 Kripke vs. Description Theory 
Let me define a broadly descriptivist theory as one which states that certain terms within a 
language, most notably names and natural kind terms, have a sense, associated with the name 
or natural kind term by speakers. Let me narrow my concern to natural kinds terms, remaining 
agnostic about names, and say that the sense of a natural kind term is a description associated 
with that term (again, by speakers) such that it supplies ‗a set of conditions, or properties, and 
the denotation, if any, is what uniquely satisfies those conditions‘ (Salmon 2005: 9). 
Contrast this with (CDR) where we ‗baptise‘ objects via ostension (or, sometimes, 
description) and the reference of the name is passed on causally, from speaker to speaker, 
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throughout the linguistic community. Names refer directly because their reference is not 
mediated by description, and, as a corollary of being nondescriptional (cf. Soames 2002: 264), 
they are also rigid designators: ‗in every possible world [the name] designates the same 
object‘ (Kripke 1980: 48). Now, as ‗names are always rigid designators‘ (Kripke 1980: 58), 
and ‗[t]he old term ―common name‖ is thus quite appropriate for… mass terms, such as 
―gold‖, ―water‖ and the like‘ (Kripke 1980: 127), natural kind terms, as a species of name, are 
also nondescriptional, and therefore always rigid designators (provided, following Salmon, 
that they designate at all). 
The three standard arguments that (allegedly) show us why we should both reject the 
descriptivist theory, and endorse Kripke‘s alternative (as it is not subject to the same 
criticisms), are as follows: take ‗gold‘ as our paradigm natural kind term, and imagine that 
‗the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra Nevada‘ is the description said 
by the descriptivist to give the meaning of ‗gold‘ and to determine the denotation of that 
natural kind term. If ‗gold‘ is descriptive in this way then a descriptivist language user would 
assert (1): 
 
(1) If gold exists, then gold is the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in 
the Sierra Nevada. 
 
As the natural kind term ‗gold‘ is synonymous, within the proposed descriptivist‘s dialect, 
with the description ‗the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra Nevada‘, 
(1) is synonymous with (2): 
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(2) If the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra Nevada 
exists, then the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra 
Nevada is the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra 
Nevada. 
The nub of the modal argument is that (2) expresses a proposition which is true 
necessarily. Since (2) is synonymous with (1), (1) also expresses a proposition that is 
necessary. The objection is that we can imagine metaphysically possible situations where (1) 
is false: imagines a possible world, w1, where the only metal found in the Sierra Nevada was 
fool‘s gold, which satisfies the description but which, nevertheless, is not gold (which was 
found elsewhere). At w1 (1) is false, while (2) is true. Thus (1) cannot express the same 
proposition as (2), since the truth value of (2) is distinct from that of (1) when assessed at 
different metaphysical possibilities. Since descriptivism is committed to saying that (1) is 
necessary, and the example shows that (1) is contingent (i.e. not necessary), descriptivism is 
committed to a contradiction: that (1) both is, and is not, necessary.  
The epistemological argument notes that (2) is analytic, and hence its truth is 
knowable a priori. However, since (1) and (2) are synonymous, we should also be able to 
know (1) a priori. Were that true, then for the descriptivist, imagining gold not to have the 
property of being a yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal and found in the Sierra Nevada 
should be as difficult as imagining a bachelor who is not an unmarried man. But this is 
implausible, since the possibility that gold lacks any of these properties ‗is not automatically 
precluded by reflection on the concepts involved‘ (Salmon 2005: 28). Hence (1) must be 
knowable only a posteriori. Since descriptivism is committed to saying that (1) is knowable a 
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priori (mutatis mutandis for similar sentences involving other natural kind terms and their 
descriptive meanings) it, again, appears to entail a contradiction. 
The semantical argument is ‗concerned with the nonmodal question of denotation 
simpliciter‘ (Salmon 2005: 30). So, if we (again) consider (1), descriptivism says that 
whatsoever satisfies the description ‗the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the 
Sierra Nevada‘ is the denotation of the natural kind term ‗gold‘. However, if, due to error, 
ignorance or fraud, the thing that actually satisfies the description is something else – so 
fool‘s gold, but not gold, was found in the Sierra Nevada – to what do we refer with our 
natural kind term e.g. ‗gold‘? According to descriptivism we are committed to referring to the 
fool‘s gold with the term ‗gold‘, because the denotation of our natural kind term is whatever 
satisfies the relevant description. The fact that fool‘s gold happens to have these qualities, 
however, strikes Kripke as irrelevant to the reference of the natural kind term ‗gold‘. That 
there is, or could be, fool‘s gold with gold-like properties should have no bearing on the 
denotation of gold, and the fact that it does according to descriptivism shows that 
descriptivism is false. 
 
5.2 Rigidity and Descriptionality 
Kripke‘s positive thesis, recall, avoids the objections said to beset the descriptivist by 
claiming that (a) natural kind terms are nondescriptional (they refer directly), and that (b) 
when we consider counterfactual scenarios we can stipulate that we are talking about just this 
kind, since natural kind terms, like ‗gold‘, are rigid designators. So, although the denotation 
of ‗gold‘ may have been fixed with the aid of a description such as that found in (1) above, 
the term ‗gold‘ itself is nondescriptional and directly referential: its meaning just is the 
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referent. The consequence of Kripke‘s reference fixing story is that it does not matter whether 
gold is the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra Nevada or not. The 
properties that a kind of substance happens to possess have no bearing on the reference of the 
corresponding natural kind term. The nondescriptionality of the natural kind term ‗gold‘ 
allows us to rigidly refer to gold, and to denote samples in any possible world in which gold 
exists regardless of whether it has the properties we commonly associate with that kind.
54
 
As Putnam noted, when a sample is ostensively defined, that definition comes with an 
‗empirical presupposition: that the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness 
relation … to most of the stuff I and other speakers in my linguistic community have… called 
―water‖ ‘(Putnam 1975: 225). Thus, while introducing a natural kind term like ‗gold‘ requires 
only a passing acquaintance with a sample, it does require an empirical presupposition that 
anything else which is essentially similar to this sample can also be truly denoted using the 
term ‗gold‘. With natural kind terms behaving in this fashion we can (i) avoid the negative 
consequences of Kripke‘s three arguments, and (ii) do justice to the modal intuition we 
(apparently) have in Twin Earth-style cases. 
 One way to recast the nub of the problem with descriptivism is using the notion of 
rigid designation. The problem with descriptivism is that descriptivists are committed to the 
rigidity of the descriptions which they take to be the meanings of natural kind terms. Thus the 
denotation of a natural kind term across metaphysical possibilities is whatever satisfies the 
description that is the meaning of, and so is synonymous with, some particular natural kind 
term. According to Kripke (and Putnam) this raises the problem that the satisfier of the 
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 That is not to say that only terms that are nondescriptional can be rigid. The claim is rather that it is a 
consequence of being nondescriptional that terms such as proper names are rigid designators. 
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description might not be the natural kind we are attempting to denote (the conclusion of the 
modal argument); that the denotation of a natural kind term at the actual world might turn 
out, for whatever reason, to be something other than that which was intended (the conclusion 
of the semantical argument); and finally, since the natural kind term is synonymous with its 
associated description the truth of identity statements such as (1) are a priori when they 
should be a posteriori (the conclusion of the epistemological argument). 
Taken together, Kripke‘s arguments form a reductio ad absurdum of the descriptivist 
position, at least when descriptivism uses the sorts of description found in (1). Kripke offers 
us, instead, the following model theoretical identification sentence: 
 
(3) If gold exists, then gold is the element with atomic number 79. 
 
As we have already seen, according to Kripke, a sentence like (3) is a species of identity 
statement ‗involving two rigid designators‘ (Kripke 1980: 140) which, given the necessity of 
identity, is a paradigmatic example ‗of the necessary a posteriori‘ (ibid.).  Schematically, if 
‗x‘ and ‗y‘ are rigid designators (as ‗gold‘ and ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ are 
supposed to be) then they refer to the same things in all possible worlds; if the identity 
sentence ‗x = y‘ is true in this world, because ‗x‘ and ‗y‘ have the same referent, then given 
that ‗x‘ and ‗y‘ refer to the same kind in all possible worlds, the truth of the identity statement 
guarantees its necessity. 
I have argued, contra Salmon (2005), that theoretical identities, such as ‗gold is the 
element with atomic number 79‘, represent discoveries made by empirical science during its 
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investigation into the properties of gold, contain a descriptive term, and form a second 
category of necessary a posteriori truth. The key passage in Kripke, recall, was: 
 
[A] material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is 
that with atomic number 79. Here the ‗if and only if‘ can be taken to be strict 
(necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find 
the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. (Kripke 1980: 
138) 
 
However, Kripke does claim that phrases like ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ are rigid 
designators. But since the complex phrase ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is clearly a 
description of the substance gold, rather than a natural kind term, and so not obviously 
analogous to ‗gold‘ or ‗silver‘, then if ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is to be rigid 
despite being a description we need some account of why some, but not all, descriptions are 
rigid. After all, if Kripke‘s objection to the descriptivist is, in part, a charge that their 
contingent descriptions are falsely treated as necessary, but it turns out that, by Kripke‘s own 
admission, there are some descriptions that are rigid (and thus necessary), then there is no 
reason why the descriptivist cannot use those descriptions to give the meanings of natural 
kind terms, thereby deflecting two  of Kripke‘s three objections (the modal and semantical 
arguments). In the following section I will present what I take to be Kripke‘s (severally 
neglected) account of rigid descriptions, and demonstrate how this gets us a new 
interpretation of Kripke on the necessary a posteriori.  
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5.3 De Facto Rigidity, Essentialism and Descriptivism. 
Given that (3) contains a description, it is useful to recognise Donnellan‘s (original 1966) 
distinction between two types of use of definite descriptions: (i) attributive, and (ii) 
referential. When a description is used referentially it is ‗merely one tool for doing a certain 
job – calling attention to a person or thing‘ (Donnellan 1966: 285), whereas when it is used 
attributively it ‗states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so‘ (ibid.). When 
we consider (3) in light of Kripke‘s claim that science has discovered the essence of gold then 
it is clear that ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is being used attributively rather than 
referentially.
55
 The description ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is not being used merely 
as a mark to pick out a certain kind of object, rather it is being used as a qualitative criterion 
for kind membership: anything with atomic number 79 is gold, anything without atomic 
number 79 is not gold. As Kripke says, having atomic number 79 is the essence of gold. 
There is a clear semantic analogy between (1) and (3), since both contain a (general) 
name and an attributive description. But (3), unlike (1), contains two rigid designators, is 
necessarily true (rather than just true), avoids the epistemological argument, and does not give 
the meaning of ‗gold‘. But Kripke does not explain why a description such as that in (3) can 
be rigid given that the description in (1) apparently cannot. Nevertheless, we can construct an 
account based on other things that Kripke says. The availability of such an account is crucial 
to the argument in favour of descriptivism. If some descriptions can, on Kripke‘s view, be 
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view and Scott Soames‘ view with precisely this distinction: Salmon (1982: 52 – 54) thinks ‗the element with 
atomic number 79‘ is only used referentially (being completely analogous to a proper name) whereas Soames 
(2002: 278 – 279) thinks that ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is descriptive, and seems to intend this to be 
attributive. 
 182 
rigid designators and avoid the modal and semantical objections, then any version of 
descriptivism that uses them will, a fortiori, also avoid these objections.  
The fundamental difference between (3) and (1) is that (3) describes an essential 
property, whereas (1) describes an accidental property. Thus, if the descriptivist claimed that 
(3), rather than (1), gave the meaning of ‗gold‘ they could avoid the modal argument: (3), if 
true, states the essence of the kind gold, and the essence of a kind is a property possessed by 
that kind in all possible worlds where that kind exists. Of course, this would still leave the 
descriptivist facing the epistemological and semantical arguments, which Kripke‘s thesis 
avoids by presenting a semantic story according to which (a) the truth of (3) is not something 
we come to know a priori – it takes scientific investigation; and (b) no description gives the 
meaning of ‗gold‘: the meaning of a natural kind term just is the referent. However, if (3) is 
making an essence claim, and descriptions of the essences of natural kinds turn out to be rigid, 
then the descriptivist can easily avoid the semantical argument: there is a description that is 
uniquely satisfied by all and only samples of a particular natural kind, in this case gold, and 
consequently the natural kind term gets to refer to all and only those things that satisfy the 
description of its essence, in this case ‗the element with 79 protons within its nucleus‘. Hence, 
it is just implausible to suppose that a description of the essence of a kind could 
underdetermine reference to it. Moreover, it seems to me that Kripke provided just such an 
account of the rigidity of some kinds of description.  
In the preface to the 1980 edition of Naming and Necessity, Kripke presents a 
distinction between two types of rigidity: de jure rigidity and de facto rigidity. According to 
Kripke a designator is rigid de jure when ‗the reference of a designator is stipulated to be a 
single object‘ (Kripke 1980: 21 n21). Names like ‗Hesperus‘ and natural kind terms like 
‗gold‘ are, for Kripke, rigid de jure. Designators that are de facto rigid, by contrast, are 
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descriptions that are rigid just when they happen ‗to use a predicate ―F‖ that in each possible 
world is true of one and the same unique object‘ (ibid.) – or, presumably, kind. This 
distinction has received only minimal treatment in the literature, but is central to Kripke‘s 
account of theoretical identity.
56
 Furthermore it also further highlights the role that Kripke‘s 
essentialism is playing in his account of natural kind terms. 
Kripke‘s endorsement of essentialism has been well established in previous chapters. 
It is also provocatively illustrated by Kripke‘s claim that ‗science attempts, by investigation 
basic structural traits, to find the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of 
the kind‘ (Kripke 1980: 138), and his further claim that there can be ‗cases of essence and 
[cases] of identity between two rigid designators‘ (Kripke 1980: 141). It is here that the 
distinction between de jure and de facto rigidity comes into play. 
Kripke illustrates his notion of de facto rigidity with the following example. Consider 
the number 2, and the description ‗the smallest prime number‘. According to Kripke the 
description ‗the smallest prime number‘ rigidly designates the number 2 because being the 
smallest prime number is a property the number 2 has in all possible worlds i.e. a necessary 
property. Similarly LaPorte (2004: 46) argues that the description ‗the positive square root of 
1600‘ is a rigid designator that designates the number 40 since the number 40 necessarily has 
the property of being the positive square root of 1600. The obvious contrast between these 
two examples and (3) is that both of the examples above are knowable a priori, and arguably 
analytic. Given their apparent analyticity it is hardly surprising that the descriptions ‗the 
smallest prime number‘ and ‗the positive square root of 60‘ are rigid designators.  But as 
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asymmetry between natural kind terms and other general terms. However, here I use it for a completely different 
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Kripke so famously argued, the epistemological contrast between ‗2 is the smallest prime 
number‘ and ‗if gold exists, then gold is the element with atomic number 79‘ has no bearing 
on the metaphysical necessity of the identity/essence statement. Kripke grants that although 
‗the contrast with mathematical cases could not be greater‘ (Kripke 1980: 141) 
epistemologically, when we are considering cases such as (3), ‗to apply these 
[logical/epistemic] notions to genuine de re modalities is, from the present standpoint, 
perverse‘ (Kripke 1980: 142). The key similarity between the cases is that they are both 
metaphysically necessary, and ‗any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori, could not 
have turned out otherwise‘ (Kripke 1980: 142). 
The similarity between sentences like (3) and examples like ‗2 is the smallest prime 
number‘ is that both are necessary. Moreover, since theoretical identities are essence claims, 
and typically contain descriptions of the essential properties of kinds, for instance ‗the 
element with atomic number 74‘ describes tungsten‘s essence, and given that Kripke claims 
they are rigid designators, there is a natural extension of the notion of de facto rigidity to the 
descriptions within theoretical identifications: after all, the descriptions in theoretical 
identities describe properties that the kind has in all possible worlds, and de facto rigid 
designators are rigid precisely because they refer to properties possessed by their bearers in all 
possible worlds. 
The upshot is that the necessity of theoretical identifications is grounded in two types 
of rigidity. On the left-hand side of theoretical identity sentences there is a de jure rigid 
designator, that is a natural kind term like ‗gold‘ that rigidly refers to the gold-kind by 
stipulation (proper names are rigid is just this way). On the right-hand side of many 
theoretical identities there is a de facto rigid designator, the rigidity of which is grounded in 
two non-semantic claims: (a) that gold is the element with atomic number 79, and (b) that 
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having atomic number 79 is the essence of gold. Clearly claim (b), as Salmon has noted on 
numerous occasions (see chapter 4), is a statement of an ‗irreducibly metaphysical, and 
philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism‘ (Salmon 2005: 217). But if theoretical 
identity sentences like (3) are necessary because they contain a de facto rigid designator, and 
de facto rigidity is grounded in describing a property that is a necessary property of the kind, 
then, again, it is Kripke‘s metaphysics which is doing the heavy lifting in his discussion of 
natural kinds: it is the essential (or metaphysically necessary) status of certain properties that 
allows descriptions to be rigid designators, and it is precisely this type of rigid designator we 
find in a theoretical identity sentence which is supposedly, when true, necessary. 
It is worth noting here that this strategy for identifying Kripke‘s essentialist 
commitments is quite different to Salmon‘s. Whilst Salmon identifies an essentialist premise 
in the Kripke-Putnam derivation of necessary a posteriori truths (see chapter 4), identifying it 
as a thesis about substances and consubstantiality, here the strategy is quite different. Here I 
have simply observed that typically one of the terms within a theoretical identity sentence (at 
least the simple-complex type) is an attributive description, and that Kripke claims that such 
terms are rigid (although he does not identify them as descriptions). The only account 
available from Kripke as to why descriptions of essential properties are rigid designators was 
the notion of de facto rigidity, which we found to amount to the claim that where an object 
has a certain property necessarily, an attributive description of that property will refer to the 
bearer of that property in all possible worlds. 
Again, the parallel between theoretical identities and the necessity of origin is worth 
drawing. Let O be the origin of Winston Churchill, where O means roughly coming from the 
sperm of Randolph Churchill and the ovum of Jennie Jerome, and consider the necessity of 
origin claim ‗Winston Churchill is the man with origin O‘. The name ‗Winston Churchill‘ is a 
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de jure rigid designator, introduced by ostension, and stipulated to apply to just the individual 
ostended at the original baptismal event. The description ‗man with origin O‘, however, 
describes the origin of Winston Churchill, rather than naming him. However, necessity of 
origin claims are supposed to be necessary when true. According to Kripke, individuals 
necessarily have the origins they actually have; in other words, Winston Churchill exists in all 
and only worlds where someone with the origin O exists. Hence, the description ‗the man 
with origin O‘ will precisely mirror the rigidity of the name ‗Winston Churchill‘ except that 
the description is generated by the empirical investigation of Churchill‘s actual origin, plus 
the a priori thesis that the origin of an individual is necessary. Thus the description ‗the man 
with origin O‘ looks to be a de facto rigid designator, paralleling my previous treatment of 
theoretical identities. 
 
5.4 Descriptivist Essentialism  
The forgoing analysis, particularly the account of rigid descriptions and the commitment to 
essentialism, invites the following sketch of a version of descriptivism that combines 
essentialism with descriptivism (rather than the causal theory of direct reference): call it 
Descriptivist Essentialism. This view, I will argue, can avoid all three of Kripke‘s objections 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter, and presented in detail in chapter 1: the modal and 
semantical objections can both be avoided by an application of metaphysical essentialism, and 
the epistemological argument can be avoided by presenting a new story about how the 
reference of natural kind terms is fixed, and employing a strategy developed by Soames for 
his Extended Millianism. 
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Let me very roughly define metaphysical essentialism as the view that what makes a 
particular object a member of a natural kind is that it possesses the relevant underlying 
nontrivial essence (contrast the trivial property of water, being water with the property being 
composed of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom, which requires a theory about the 
essences of substances, and  thus is nontrivial).
57
 The essences of natural kinds are properties 
which are both necessary and sufficient for being instances of those particular natural kinds; 
they are ‗properties which nothing can lack and still be of the kind‘ (Mellor 1977: 299). 
Furthermore, ‗things of a kind have [their] essential properties in all possible worlds‘ (ibid.), 
which is to say that the essential properties of natural kinds hold as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity.
58
 
Metaphysical essentialism is not a consequence of any semantic thesis (cf. Salmon 
2005), but an independent metaphysical position. As such there is nothing prima facie 
inconsistent about the combination of descriptivism and essentialism. The descriptivist 
essentialist view states that the only descriptions that give the meanings of natural kind terms 
are those that describe the essences of those kinds. In relation to our earlier examples we 
should say that (3) gives the meaning of ‗gold‘, whereas (1) does not. With the meaning of 
‗gold‘ fixed by (3), and the essence of gold being the element with atomic number 79, the 
descriptivist essentialist can quickly avoid the modal and semantical arguments. 
Since descriptions of the essences of natural kinds are rigid de facto, anything 
satisfying that description can be referred to via the associated natural kind term, both in this 
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 I will define and then discuss the distinction between trivial and nontrivial essentialism in chapter 7. 
58
 For all I have said here, it still might be that essentialism is nontrivial without also being a substantive 
metaphysical thesis. In chapter 7 I will analyse precisely what a substantive version of essentialism is, and 
distinguish between substantive and non-substantive versions of essentialism, before endorsing a non-substantive 
version in chapter 8. 
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world and in all possible worlds.
59
 On Kripke‘s view (3) is (if true) necessary. The truth of (3) 
depends upon some relevant scientific discovery, and the necessity is a product of the name 
‗gold‘  and the phrase ‗the element with atomic number 79‘  both being rigid designators. If 
‗the element with atomic number 79‘ is rigid de facto then its rigidity is a consequence of the 
property being the element with atomic number 79 being the essence of gold. Kripke‘s 
criticism of the descriptivist was that if they take a description to be the meaning of a natural 
kind term, as in (1), they are committed the necessity of (1), given that (1) expresses the same 
proposition as (2). The objection was that in (1) the description associated with the natural 
kind term is at best contingently true of it. Thus there are possible scenarios in which (1) is 
false, and so the description ‗the yellow, heavy, malleable, ductile metal found in the Sierra 
Nevada‘ cannot be the meaning of ‗gold‘. But (3) is, by Kripke‘s own lights, necessary when 
true. That necessity, I have argued, is grounded in the assumption that kinds have essences. A 
descriptivist essentialist endorses (3), but denies (1), as an account of the meaning of ‗gold‘: 
the only descriptions that give the meanings of natural kind terms are the essentialist ones.
60
 
As the members of natural kinds have their essential properties as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity there will be no scenario in which (3) could be false. Thus the descriptivist‘s 
commitment to the necessity of sentences that give the meanings of natural kind terms, like 
(3), is no longer a vice. So the modal argument does not threaten descriptivist essentialism. 
The semantical argument also fails to affect the descriptivist essentialist. The 
semantical argument was concerned with denotation simpliciter, and asked us to consider a 
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 In a recent paper Jasper Reid (2002) has argued that stability of reference is one of the key motivations for 
being a natural kind essentialist, although he is, at the time, endorsing a Kripkean picture of reference, rather 
than the descriptivist version being defended here. 
60
 It is worth flagging that this sort of proposal is inconsistent with the sorts of suggestion made by Papineau 
(1996), who claims that theoretical definitions are imprecise.  
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situation where something else satisfies the description we associate with the natural kind 
term. Kripke‘s argument was that it is irrelevant to the reference of a natural kind term 
whether (or not) it happens to have some property associated with it. But given descriptivist 
essentialism the scenario we are considering is one where the description ‗the element with 
atomic number 79‘ denotes something else. If the semantical argument applies to any 
description then Kripke should say that it is irrelevant to the reference of the natural kind term 
‗gold‘ what happens to have the property of being the element with atomic number 79. But 
since that property is essential, the objection looks implausible. Anything satisfying the 
description ‗the element with atomic number 79‘ just is gold, both on Kripke‘s view and on 
the descriptivist essentialist‘s view. Anything with the property being the element with atomic 
number 79 possesses the essence of gold, and thus is gold. The semantical argument, then, 
does not threaten descriptivist essentialism, as essential properties are relevant to the 
denotation of natural kind terms. 
 
5.5 Locating Meaning 
This leaves the epistemological argument. If the descriptivist essentialist rejects (1) in favour 
of (3) as giving the meaning of ‗gold‘, and uses their essentialism to navigate around the 
modal and semantical arguments, they must still deal with the counterintuitive charge that the 
truth of (3) is something a speaker can know a priori. Recent commentators (e.g. Mackie 
2006) have argued that ‗essentialism about natural kinds will be inconsistent with any 
description theory‘ (Mackie 2006: 176), citing the modal and epistemological arguments as 
the cause of that inconsistency. On the descriptivist essentialist view presented here it is only 
descriptions of the essences of natural kinds that can give the meaning of natural kind terms. 
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So, ex hypothesi, the description that gives the meaning of the natural kind term cannot come 
apart from the essence of the natural kind. But the epistemological argument can still be 
generated. To illustrate, if the descriptivist essentialist accepts (3), then they will undoubtedly 
accept (4): 
 
(4) If the element with atomic number 79 exists, then the element with atomic 
number 79 is the element with atomic number 79. 
 
As in the initial substitution made to illustrate Kripke‘s three arguments against the 
descriptivist (see section 5.1 this chapter, and Chapter 1), if the meaning of ‗gold‘ is ‗the 
element with atomic number 79‘ then (3) is synonymous with (4). Since (4) is analytic and 
thus knowable a priori, so too is (3). The remaining challenge for the descriptivist essentialist 
is to accept that sentences like (3) are, in some sense, knowable a priori without this seeming 
implausible. However, it should again be noted that Soames‘ Extended Millianism implies 
that identities and some theoretical identities are a priori, and seemingly Salmon is also 
committed to something like this view. Similarly, although Kripke‘s stops short of giving a 
theory of meaning, if he endorses Extended Millianism then he too is committed to the a 
priority of identities and some theoretical identities. The first element of the descriptivist 
essentialist‘s strategy for providing just such an account is to adopt Putnam‘s account of the 
‗division of linguistic labour‘ (DLL), properly understood (Putnam 1975: 227). 
The basic hypothesis of (DLL) is that within our linguistic community there are certain 
speakers who are experts in, say, chemistry. These experts form a sub-community that are 
able to recognise instances of some particular (chemical) kind, where the majority of us are 
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unable to do so. The ‗necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, 
ways of recognizing if something is in the extension (‗criteria‘), etc. – are all present in the 
linguistic community‘ (Putnam 1975: 228), but need not be known by every member of that 
community. This general division of labour engenders a further division of linguistic labour, 
where ‗[t]he features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general 
name‘ (Putnam 1973: 705) are known only by the expert speakers. (DLL) thus explains why 
not everyone who uses a natural kind term, and whom we consider to be a competent 
language user, needs to be able to reliably distinguish samples of gold from samples of some 
other closely resembling substance such as fool‘s gold. There is, says Putnam, a ‗structured 
cooperation‘ (Putnam 1975: 228) between ordinary and expert speakers such that for an 
ordinary speaker their use of a particular natural kind term depends upon this cooperation. 
Putnam takes it to be a consequence of (DLL) that a descriptivist theory of reference and 
meaning is false, as (DLL) shows that for the majority of speakers their use of a natural kind 
term is not determined by a concept they have, but by the experts within their community. 
The division of linguistic labour does not itself warrant an inference to Putnam‘s 
theory of reference (cf. Mellor 1977; Zemach 1976). Putnam‘s intention is that the structured 
cooperation between non-experts and experts leads back to instances of the natural kinds 
themselves: for Putnam, the meaning of a natural kind term just is the referent, but since not 
all of the language users can identify the referents of their natural kind terms it looks like not 
all speakers know the meanings of their natural kind terms. Putnam takes (DLL) to provide an 
account of how all the language users within a community can know the meaning, in the very 
minimal sense that they are construed as competent users, of their natural kind terms by 
postulating someone within the community of which the language user is a member, who is 
able to distinguish samples of gold from samples of some similar substance, and knows the 
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conditions that are necessary and sufficient for membership into the kind. However, this is by 
no means the only way in which a division of linguistic labour might work. For example, it is 
plausible to suppose, as Mellor does, that the division of linguistic labour leads back to ‗our 
experts‘ beliefs‘ (Mellor 1977: 304), rather than to objects within the environment that only 
experts can individuate. In such cases there is still a division of linguistic labour – we are still, 
as non-experts, deferring to what the experts say – but we defer to the experts‘ beliefs rather 
than to their ability to recognise real samples of gold (although there seems to me to be no 
reason why the two cannot be combined). 
With this in mind, consider (5): 
 
(5) If tungsten exists, then tungsten is the element with atomic number 74.  
 
Given DLL we can say that the majority of normal speakers defer to the small cadre of 
chemical experts in their community when they use the term ‗tungsten‘.  Hence Sally, our 
typical language user, intends to defer to the scientist when she uses ‗tungsten‘. Let‘s say that 
what the scientist has in mind, when she uses the word ‗tungsten‘, is the description ‗the 
element with atomic number 74‘. In other words, when asked what ‗tungsten‘ means (or 
indeed what tungsten is), the expert asserts (5). Since the majority of the linguistic community 
defer to the experts when it comes to the meaning of ‗tungsten‘ when (a) they use the word 
‗tungsten‘, and (b) are asked what ‗tungsten‘ means, we can say that most speakers will not 
assert (5) because they lack the empirical knowledge that would allow them to do so. 
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For most speakers, then, sentence (5) is not known, because ‗tungsten‘ means 
whatever the experts say it means, and a normal speaker need not know that experts identify 
tungsten as the element with atomic number 74. They could, of course, come to know what 
the experts say ‗tungsten‘ means, by asking (or becoming) an expert: so Sally consults a 
scientist and she tells Sally that ‗tungsten‘ means ‗the element with atomic number 74‘. 
However, since Sally needed to ask the scientist what ‗tungsten‘ meant before she could assert 
that (5) was true, Sally‘s justification for thinking that (5) is true, which generalises to all 
normal speakers, is that an expert told her so. In effect, although the proposition expressed by 
(5) is knowable a priori, it is not known by the majority of the linguistic community who use 
natural kind terms deferentially. The application of DLL to descriptivist essentialism means 
that Kripke‘s epistemological argument – that the truth of an identity sentence is knowable a 
priori – still applies. However, drawing a decisive distinction between the fact that the 
proposition expressed by (5) is knowable a priori on the one hand, and the question of 
whether or not Sally herself knows the proposition a priori on the other, allow us to avoid at 
least some of the force of Kripke‘s argument.  Although it is a consequence of descriptivist 
essentialism that sentences like (3) and (5) express propositions that are knowable a priori, 
this is a distinct question from whether their truth is known a priori by non-expert language 
users. An application of Putnam‘s DLL allows us to give an affirmative answer to the former 
and a negative answer to the latter.  
The truth of (5) for the expert, however, is both knowable and known a priori, 
according to descriptivist essentialism. The epistemological objection, then, still applies to 
experts as Kripke intended: an expert who knows the essential description of tungsten knows 
the truth of (5) a priori. But if the expert can know the truth of (5) a priori then reflection on 
the meaning of ‗tungsten‘ should have allowed the expert to derive the description ‗the 
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element with atomic number 74‘ in much the same way as reflection on the meaning of 
‗bachelor‘ allows a competent user to derive the description ‗an unmarried man‘. An 
application of Kripke‘s epistemological objection commits the descriptivist to the a priori 
knowability of (5), but the thought that we do not take not having atomic number 74 to be 
ruled out a priori of anything to which ‗tungsten‘ truly applies is standardly thought to show 
why the descriptivist thesis is obviously false. However, I shall argue that the a priority of 
propositions such as that expressed in (5) can be made both plausible and palatable if we 
provide a new account of how substances are named within the expert community. First, 
however, it is worth considering the strategy deployed by Soames (2002) to show that 
although Extended Millianism is committed to the a priority of identities and theoretical 
identities (just as descriptivist essentialism is!) containing co-referring names, this 
consequences does not constitute a reductio of the position. My intention is to employ an 
analogue of Soames‘ strategy here, and then proceed to offer some independent justification 
for it. The key point, however, is that if the a priority of identity sentences does not constitute 
a reductio of (EM), then nor should it constitute a reductio of descriptivist essentialism. 
 
5.5 A priori knowability 
According to Soames‘ (EM), the meaning of a proper names just is its referent. Hence, the 
proposition expressed by the identity sentence ‗Harry Houdini is Harry Houdini‘ is that same 
as that expressed by ‗Harry Houdini is Ehrich Weiss‘. Identity sentences between co-
referential names, then, are ‗both necessary and knowable a priori‘ (Soames 2002: 237). 
Thus, whilst Soames does think there is a category of necessary a posteriori truth ‗identity 
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sentences involving co-referential, ordinary, linguistically simple proper names are not 
genuine instances of it‘ (ibid.: 328).  
To rescue the Kripkean claim that many identities (and by extension theoretical 
identities) are a posteriori, Soames distinguishes sharply between the proposition expressed 
by an identity sentence like ‗Harry Houdini is Ehrich Weiss‘, and the information a speaker 
intends to communicate when they assert it, what we might call the ‗assertive utterance‘.61 
Thus, when a speaker utters ‗Harry Houdini is Ehrich Weiss‘ what they intend to convey is 
not the proposition expressed by ‗Harry Houdini is Harry Houdini‘, but some contingent, a 
posteriori, descriptive information which they idiosyncratically associate with each name 
respectively. Imagine, for instance, that the speaker is Ehrich‘s neighbour, who discovers that 
Ehrich is in fact a world famous magician. Upon reporting this discovery to his wife he 
asserts ‗Ehrich Weiss is Harry Houdini‘, and intends to communicate something like ‗Ehrich 
next-door is a (particular) famous magician‘. 
Although Soames does not employ this strategy for simple-complex theoretical 
identities (although, presumably, he thinks that this strategy applies to the simple-simple 
category of theoretical identity), I propose that we borrow this strategy, and apply it to 
descriptive natural kind terms.
62
 So, when a non-expert speaker utters ‗tungsten is the element 
with atomic number 74‘, whilst the proposition expressed is knowable a priori, the 
information they are trying to communicate – for instance, that it is the steel-gray coloured, 
brittle metal which has 74 protons within the nucleus of each constituent atom – is a 
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 This solution, note, bears a significant resemblance to Michael Dummett‘s (1991) strategy for a descriptivist 
account of natural kind terms, where we distinguish the assertoric content (what Soames refers to as the 
proposition) from the ingredient sense (what Soames calls the assertive utterance). 
62
 In chapter 3, section 4 I proposed this account on Soames‘ behalf for cases like the ‗Woodchucks are 
Groundhogs‘ case.  
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posteriori and contingent. The falsity of ‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 79‘, 
then, cannot be ruled out a priori when the content of the assertive utterance such a sentence 
expresses is ‗the steel-gray coloured, brittle metal is made of atoms which have 74 protons 
within their nuclei‘. Moreover, since speakers are standardly concerned with content of the 
latter sort, rather than the former, our intuitions about a posteriority should come as no 
surprise. Nevertheless, if a commitment to the a priority of identity sentences for (EM) does 
not constitute a reductio of (EM), nor does it to the descriptivist position on natural kind 
terms. In other words, if one is willing to buy Soames‘ story about proper names, then there is 
no reason why one cannot buy the descriptivist story about natural kind terms. Furthermore, 
either both accounts have an advantage over the initial Kripkean story insofar as they actually 
offer a theory of meaning, or (EM) is the account of meaning that Kripke endorses, and so 
everyone is in the same boat. 
 
5.6 The metasemantics of natural kind terms 
Once the reductio has been blocked, we need to make the a priority of theoretical identities 
independently plausible. The main problem, of course, is that since Kripke the standard view 
of essences has been that they are discovered by science, and are thus firmly in the realm of 
the a posteriori. If theoretical identities are statements of essence, the surely they are a 
posteriori? 
This question, however, is misleading. Whilst the discoveries of science are certainly a 
posteriori, scientists‘ definitions of their terms need not be. With this in mind, the basic tenet 
of my new metasemantics for natural kind terms is that the community of experts adopts the 
practice of naming new substances on the basis of discovering things that satisfy new 
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descriptions. Thus it is only when an essence description is found to have a satisfier that a 
name is introduced. 
Consider the synthesis in 2006 of an element with 118 protons in its nucleus 
(Oganessian 2006: 889 - 904).
63
 At the time of this discovery, the New York Times reported 
that the element with 118 protons in its nucleus (or, more simply, the element with atomic 
number 118) would be known provisionally as ‗element 118‘ (for obvious reasons) until such 
time as it was confirmed by another independent laboratory.
64
 The element, to the best of my 
knowledge, has yet to be confirmed, and thus is still referred to as ‗element 118‘. In terms of 
the semantics, it looks like we have a description (‗the element with atomic number 118‘) and 
a proto-name (‗element 118‘) that has been clearly derived from the description. Since we are 
uncertain whether anything satisfies that description, we do not introduce a proper name.
65
 As 
things stand, then, an expert might assert the following sentence: 
 
(6) If element 118 exists, then element 118 is the element with atomic number 
118. 
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 I will talk more about the synthesis of elements and natural kinds in Chapter 7, when I criticise Ellis‘s 
metaphysical essentialism. 
64
 I have, here, omitted some details which do not affect the argument: there are systematic element names which 
use a very specific set of criteria for generating names (cf. Connelly et al 2005). Using these criteria one can 
generate the name ‗Ununoctium‘ for what I call ‗element 118‘. However, anyone who knows the grammatical 
rules of the system can derive ‗element 118‘ from the name ‗Ununoctium‘, and hence sentences such as ‗if 
Ununoctium exists, then Ununoctium is the element with atomic number 118‘ are knowable a priori. 
65
 Presumably because our cadre of experts have yet to agree whether the evidence warrants thinking that that 
element 118 exists, rather than its being the product of fallacious (or fabricated) data; in effect, they are unsure 
whether any actual thing does satisfy the description. 
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The truth of (6) is uncontroversially knowable a priori (at least for anyone with basic 
scientific knowledge). So what changes when we substitute ‗element 118‘ for some name or 
other? On the assumption that element 118 will be confirmed (that the description ‗the 
element with atomic number 118‘ has a satisfier) the Russian scientists who discovered the 
element with atomic number 118 have suggested the names ‗Flyorium‘ and ‗Moskovium‘. 
Let‘s say, for the sake of argument, that the name ‗Moskovium‘ is chosen. We can then 
produce (7): 
 
(7) If Moskovium exists, then Moskovium is the element with atomic number 
118. 
 
Now (7) certainly has the appearance of a posteriority, being the analogue of (3) and 
(5), but only, I claim, for the non-expert members of the linguistic community. The cadre of 
experts, when they name element 118 on the basis of discovering something that satisfies the 
description ‗the element with atomic number 118‘, will know the truth of (7) a priori. After 
all, all they have done is substitute ‗Moskovium‘ for ‗element 118‘. For the expert at least, 
meanings are firmly in the head. 
What should make this thesis palatable is the metasemantic story. According to 
descriptivist essentialism a name is not generated until such time as something has been 
found that satisfies the description ‗the element with atomic number 118‘ (reflecting actual 
practice). Thus although the truth of the proposition expressed by (7) is knowable a priori, the 
discovery that something satisfied the description in (7) was a posteriori. The reason that the 
truth of (7) is knowable a priori, however, is that new substances are not named until the 
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relevant description is judged to have been satisfied. In effect, if it turns out that the 
provisional name in (6) denotes something in the actual world we introduce a new (proper) 
name, as in (7). Since (6) and (7) express the same proposition, (7), like (6), will be knowable 
a priori. The important point, however, is that if the description in (6) is not judged to be 
satisfied then (7) is never generated. So while the truth of (6) is knowable a priori, the naming 
conventions preclude the generation of (7) until something in the actual world has been found 
to satisfy the description in (6). Unless a substance with the property of being the element 
with atomic number 118 is found, no proper name is introduced for such a substance, because 
no such substance is known to exist. 
This account of the naming of substances does not construe the discoveries of science 
as a priori. It is certainly an a posteriori matter whether a certain description has satisfiers in 
the actual world. For example, it is an empirical matter whether anything satisfies the 
description ‗the element with atomic number 180‘. However, even prior to any empirical 
investigation I can assert that ‗if element 180 exists, then element 180 is the element with 
atomic number 180‘, and know the truth of my assertion a priori. The discovery that 
something satisfies the description ‗the element with atomic number 180‘ is a matter for 
science and empirical investigation. But although this empirical investigation has a bearing on 
whether we introduce a name, on the assumption that once such a discovery is made the 
substitution of a proper (general) name, say ‗Birmingiam‘, for the placeholder or proto-name 
‗element 180‘, has no impact on the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by the 
sentences ‗if element 180 exists, then element 180 is the element with atomic number 180‘, 
and ‗if Birmingiam exists, then Birmingiam is the element with atomic number 180‘. The 
question of whether the description ‗the element with atomic number 180‘ has denotation is 
separate from the question of whether ‗if element 180 exists, then element 180 is the element 
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with atomic number 180‘ is true. Answers to the former are a posteriori, but answers to the 
latter are a priori. 
 
5.7 Intuitive Kinds vs. Theoretical Kinds 
One obvious objection to the view defended here is that there are some clear 
counterexamples. Terms like ‗water‘ or ‗gold‘, for instance, had significant pre-scientific 
currency. Hence, it seems plainly false to suppose that they could have been introduced 
systematically as outlined above, i.e. science uncovers the essence of a new kind of substance, 
and introduces a name which communicates that defining information. There are two things to 
be said in defence of descriptivist essentialism here. 
First, an observation. Whilst it may be true that some of the more pedestrian natural 
kind terms such ‗water‘ have a significant pre-scientific currency, these terms are in the 
minority when it comes to the names for natural substance-kinds. In contrast to the names for 
compounds such as ‗water‘ with which non-expert users are familiar, there are a plethora of 
natural kind terms for substances, such as ‗fluoridoargon‘, ‗cyanobromane‘ and 
‗hydroxidotrioxidoiodine‘, of which most of the linguistic community will never have heard, 
let alone know the meaning. These natural kind terms, as in the version of descriptivism I 
have expounded, are descriptive (at least according to the International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry) in that their formulation conveys both structural and compositional 
information to experts in possession of the relevant grammatical rules (cf. Connelly et al. 
2005). So, a chemist will know the truth of ‗hydroxidotrioxidoiodine is HIO4‘ a priori 
because of the systematic rules governing the formulation of compound-kind names. This, 
however, will tell us nothing about whether or not ‗hydroxidotrioxidoiodine‘ actually refers to 
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anything – in theory chemists could concoct a chemical formula and use the grammatical 
rules to derive a compound-kind name, and thereby formulate a theoretical identification 
sentence like the one above without doing any empirical investigation; in such cases it would 
be wrong to claim that they do not know the truth of the theoretical identity a priori, despite 
the fact that they may not know whether anything actually has the chemical composition 
HIO4. 
Secondly, a direct response to the objection. The descriptivist answer is to adopt 
elements of a strategy recently defended by LaPorte (2004, 2010), and claim that pre-
scientific natural kind terms, such as ‗water‘, do not mean the same thing as scientific natural 
kind terms. The crux of LaPorte‘s thesis is that pre-scientific uses of natural kind substance 
terms are vague, or what he calls ‗open texture[d]‘(2004: 97), and that there are various 
criteria associated with the pre-scientific kind term that could figure in the determination of its 
extension. Those criteria, whatever they were, certainly were not the same as those of the  
modern chemist. More importantly, it is not obvious that they – pre-scientific language users, 
that is – were aiming at carving out natural kinds; as Dupré observes, typically ‗the kinds of 
ordinary language do not coincide with those of a scientific taxonomy‘ since the kinds of 
ordinary language are introduced with ‗a variety of grounds for classification‘ in mind (Dupré 
1995: 36). 
This suggests the following general strategy for dealing with terms like ‗water‘ and 
‗steel‘, that have significant pre-scientific currency. Following LaPorte, the descriptivist 
essentialist claims that the pre-scientific use of words like ‗water‘ were vague, and further,  
following Dupré, that the pre-scientific term ‗water‘ may well have been introduced with a 
different set of classificatory interests (although these, too, might have been vague) to those of 
the modern chemist. Contemporary chemistry, as has already been stated, tells us that 
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chemical composition (the conjunction of the constituent atoms, and the molecular 
arrangement of those atoms) is the decisive, defining feature of substances, and as such that 
scientific substance terms latch onto kinds delimited by those properties. 
In contrast, the classifications of ordinary language users, especially pre-scientific 
language users, were more likely informed by quite different interests. For instance, it might 
have been that the surface properties of objects formed the basis of a pre-scientific language 
user‘s classifications of substance kinds. LaPorte, in his (2004), invites us to draw just this 
sort of conclusion with regard to the kind ‗jade‘. According to LaPorte, despite discovering 
that the extension of ‗jade‘ includes two micro-structurally distinct substances – jadeite, with 
the composition NaAl(SiO3)2, and nephrite, with the composition Ca(Mg,Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2 – 
language users did not revise their use of the term ‗jade‘ in light of this discovery, concluding 
that that the word ‗jade‘ could ‗apply clearly to jadeite as well as to nephrite‘ (LaPorte 2004: 
96). Hence, the considerations of modern chemistry are not always decisive for the reference 
of substance terms, and the example illustrates that our classificatory interests concerning 
kinds sometimes diverge from the scientists‘. As LaPorte sees it, the Kripke/Putnam intuition 
is that ‗microstructure trumps superficial properties in determining reference‘ (ibid.: 98), as 
articulated in Twin Earth style thought experiments, are false. The jade case ‗presents a 
historical counterexample to Putnam‘s Twin Earth lesson‘ (ibid.: 94) since speakers retained 
the use of ‗jade‘ to pick out a kind of substance, despite discovering that nephrite and jadeite 
were compositionally distinct.  
Whilst LaPorte views the jade example as to be a counterexample to Putnam‘s Twin 
Earth thought experiment, the descriptivist essentialist uses it merely to confirm the earlier 
hypothesis that ordinary language users are not always interested in the terms for the natural 
joints in nature: if we accept that science is interested in the joints in nature, that it has 
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discovered that ‗jade‘ does not pick out such a joint, but that ‗jadeite‘ and ‗nephrite‘ do, and 
that despite this discovery ordinary language users have persisted in using the term ‗jade‘ to 
denote a kind, then it is clear that the interests of ordinary language users and scientists can 
and do come apart. As Segal (2005, Ch. 2) has noted, outside of science, ordinary language 
users do not have a good grasp of what natural kinds are, and of which objects of their 
acquaintance fall within which natural kinds. 
Zemach‘s (1976: 119-20) illuminating discussion of Putnam‘s account of substance 
terms, for example, distinguishes between the considerations of the normal language user and 
the expert within the community, pointing out that the normal language users‘ use of 
‗substance words is not determined by chemical considerations‘ (Zemach 1976: 119). This, 
says Zemach, means that the stuff denoted with an English substance-word, say ‗water‘, may 
not have a common nature (indeed, he claims that ‗[a]s a matter of fact, ―water‖ is used in this 
way‘ (Zemach 1976: 120), although this seems more controversial), being unified by the 
kinds of consideration LaPorte outlines in the jade example. But if bona fide natural kind 
terms are those that pick out natural kinds demarcated by their essences, and it turns out that 
there is no essence unifying the stuff we have been denoting with a general term, then it looks 
like we should say that that general term was never a natural kind term (although we might 
have thought that it was). 
Take the kind denoted by the term ‗water‘. As Zemach notes, we have eighteen 
isotopic varieties of a single water molecule given the three isotopes of hydrogen, protium 
(H), deuterium (D), and tritium (T), and the three stable isotopes of oxygen O
16
, O
17
, and O
18
. 
These variations constitute different kinds of water (in some sense), and since they could all 
occur in a single sample of water in various proportions, there looks to be ‗no chemical 
constitution common to all bodies of water‘ (1976: 120). The chemist, unlike a typical 
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language user, does distinguish between H2O, D2O and T2O in the laboratory, referring to 
them (respectively) as ‗diprotium oxide‘, ‗dideuterium oxide‘ and ‗ditritium oxide‘, rather 
than as ‗water‘.66  
Since we are interested in natural kind terms, rather than non-natural kind terms or 
practical kind terms, and examples like ‗jade‘, and perhaps even ‗water‘, provide good 
grounds for thinking that the taxonomy of ordinary and pre-scientific language users are 
informed by a variety of interests, we should not be interested in the kind terms of the 
ordinary language user. Rather, since we are interested in the terms that designate natural 
kinds, and are confident that it is the scientists who discover nature‘s joints, it is the semantics 
of those terms with which we should be concerned. 
So, given the vagueness of pre-scientific kind terms, the often different interests of 
ordinary language users, and the additional confidence we have in modern science (that it has 
discovered at least some of nature‘s joints), the focus of this discussion appropriately targets 
chemical nomenclature – the branch of chemistry dedicated to the naming and classification 
of substances. The question we need to ask is: what does chemistry have to say about the use 
of what we might call ‗local names‘ – that is, names with significant pre-scientific currency – 
for classifying substances? According to the most recent guidelines from the International 
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC): 
 
                                                          
66
 Although presumably the chemist‘s usage will depend on what she is doing: she may ask for dideuterium 
oxide (or heavy water) if she is working with a nuclear reactor, where deuterium absorbs less neutrons, allowing 
the use of unenriched uranium; however she may just ask for water if she is making a cup of tea. 
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Local names do not necessarily convey structural and compositional information to a 
wider audience. To be widely useful, a nomenclature system must be recognisable, 
unambiguous, and general; the unnecessary use of local names and abbreviations in 
formal scientific language should therefore be discouraged. (Connelly et al 2005: 3) 
 
Despite discouragement, scientists and ordinary language users alike persist in their use of 
local names – terms like ‗water‘ – which do not convey the structural and compositional 
information indicative of the relevant kind. But if the goal is an unambiguous system of 
classification, why persist in using these local names? 
The explanation is that certain kind terms have significant natural language currency, 
and that scientists interested in naming are sensitive to the standard usage of certain general 
terms by the linguistic community. As IUPAC‘s most recent guidelines on nomenclature 
state, the ‗public needs and common usage must also be borne in mind‘ (Connelly et al. 2005: 
3) when naming substances. Since terms like ‗water‘ and ‗steel‘ have such significant natural 
language currency, scientists have decided to retain these terms, rather than introduce new 
systematically generated names in light of discoveries concerning the defining characteristics 
of such substances. 
Nevertheless, and vitally for the version of descriptivism defended here, scientists also 
stipulate that when local names are retained, experts must come to understand, and associate 
with the relevant term, ‗the devices used for [the] identification‘ (ibid.) of the substance in 
question. When the term is systematically introduced, as, for instance, 
‗hydroxidotrioxidoiodine‘ was, these conditions of application are associated with the name a 
priori, using the grammatical rules of the nomenclature system. However, since terms like 
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‗water‘ do not conform to this grammar, it is not obvious that those conditions are associated 
with the term a priori. But, since the scientist is required to associate the conditions for the 
identification of the substance with that term as if it conformed to the proper grammar, the 
suggestion here is that the scientist‘s natural kind term ‗water‘ has come to mean something 
substantially different from the pre-scientific language user‘s term ‗water‘. 
The key claim is that scientific natural kind terms like ‗water‘ are homonyms – that is, 
terms with the same spelling but different meanings – of their pre-scientific counterparts. The 
name ‗water‘, as it is used by the scientist, has the same meaning as ‗dihydrogen oxide‘, and 
since the theoretical identity ‗dihydrogen oxide is H2O‘ is something the scientists can know 
to be true a priori, so too is ‗water is H2O‘ knowable a priori. This, of course, does not imply 
that scientists discovered a priori that there was a substance with the chemical composition 
H2O. The key move, remember, was to separate the question of whether a natural kind has 
denotation from the question of how we come to know the truth of theoretical identifications. 
Successfully isolated, an a posteriori answer to the former need not imply an a posteriori 
answer to the latter. However, the descriptivist essentialist‘s metasemantics ensures that a 
natural kind term is not introduced until the scientist is certain that a substance has been 
discovered. In cases where the substance was ostensibly discovered before science, the term 
used to denote it is re-coined (if it has significant natural language currency) where, and 
when, modern science confirms that there is a unique natural kind to be denoted.   
Of course, this does not constitute an account of what normal speakers mean when 
they use natural kind terms. In a sense, this question is irrelevant to the thesis articulated here: 
it has already been assumed that it is science that uncovers the real natural kinds, and that as 
such it is the semantics of scientific terms we should be interested in. However, putting this to 
one side, the descriptivist essentialist can, following Mellor (1977) , simply adopt Putnam‘s 
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socio-linguistic hypothesis, the ‗division of linguistic labour‘ (1973: 704) in order to give the 
account wider application. 
The basic idea of (DLL), as discussed earlier, is that there is a structured cooperation 
between members of a linguistic community and an expert sub-community, where it is only 
that sub-community that know what the criteria associated with a particular kind term are. In 
the Putnam story, this expertise amounts to the ability to successfully discriminate between 
samples of the kind, and samples of some other substance that closely resembles the kind, for 
instance gold and fool‘s gold. To employ this general strategy, all the descriptivist essentialist 
need do is maintain that although there is a division of labour, it is a ‗Fregean labour for all 
that‘ (Mellor 1977: 304), since the division leads back to a description that the expert speaker 
has in mind, and associates a priori with the relevant term. Thus the extension of a natural 
kinds term is still a ‗Fregean function of our experts’ beliefs‘ (1977: 304), rather than being 
fixed via the standard Kripkean metasemantic story, and the practical expertise of the 
scientist, provided the expert knows the description that uniquely identifies the kind a priori. 
And this is precisely what the metasemantic story presented here allows the descriptivist 
essentialist to say: natural kind terms are not introduced until (or, in cases like ‗water‘, are re-
coined when) the essence of a hypothesised substance is confirmed. When it is confirmed 
(that such a substance exists) the name introduced (or re-coined) adheres to particular set of 
grammatical rules that ensure the name communicates information about the kind‘s essence; 
hence, experts who are competent with the grammar know the essence of the substance a 
priori when they come to understand the meaning of the term. Normal language users, by 
entering into a structured cooperation with the experts, qualify as competent users of the term 
because the expert knows how to use the term. Since what it is for an expert to know the 
meaning of, say, ‗hydroxidotrioxidoiodine‘ is to know that hydroxidotrioxidoiodine is HIO4 a 
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priori, the same is knowable (although not necessarily known) a priori for normal language 
users.       
Admittedly the sketch I have offered here certainly leaves work to be done. So far I 
have said nothing about biological kinds or mineralogical kinds, for instance, and work would 
certainly be required to adapt the account to such cases. Nevertheless, the account I have 
sketched does work for a large class of natural kind terms. It endorses Soames‘ analysis of 
complex natural kind terms, claiming that they are indeed descriptions, and employs the same 
essentialism required to make Soames‘ account work. It employs LaPorte‘s notion of ‗open 
texture‘, agreeing that pre-scientific terms are vague, and that they undergo a process of 
precisification via redefinition. Like Extended Millianism, it offers a story concerning the a 
priori knowability of theoretical identities, borrowing Putnam‘s division of linguistic labour 
to make it more plausible. Finally, descriptivist essentialism produces intuitively correct 
results where Kripke‘s account will not. For instance, on Kripke‘s account if ‗element 118‘ is 
a name, and a de jure rigid designator, then even if the element we were investigating, 
thinking it was element 118, had turned out to have atomic number 119, the name ‗element 
118‘ would rigidly designate it. Thus we are committed to saying that ‗if element 118 exists, 
then element 118 is the element with atomic number 119‘, but this seems obviously wrong. 
What we should say is that element 118 turned out not to exist, and that the proto-name 
‗element 118‘ was mistakenly applied to what we should have called ‗element 119‘. Indeed 
had we known that the element we were investigating had atomic number 119 we would have 
derived the name ‗element 119‘.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
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In this chapter I have offered a novel version of descriptivism that avoids Kripke‘s modal and 
semantical arguments by endorsing the same brand of essentialism found in the important 
versions of (CDR). Then, rather than attempting to avoid the epistemological argument, I 
endorsed Putnam‘s division of linguistic labour (DLL), arguing that only a small sub-
community of experts know the truth of theoretical identifications like (3), (5) and (7) a 
priori. The key point was that although theoretical identifications are knowable a priori for 
the entire community, it is only the experts that know them a priori: the majority of normal 
language users just don‘t know them, thereby maintaining the important intuition that 
Kripke‘s objection originally highlighted. Meanings, then, are in the head for experts, but not 
for the normal language user. 
To make the consequence that theoretical identifications are both knowable and 
known a priori by experts palatable, I first pointed out that (EM) is also committed to this 
consequence across a range of important cases, and that if a priority does not constitute an 
objection to that thesis, then neither does it to the descriptivist thesis. I then presented a novel 
metasemantic story, where we start with descriptions, investigate the world to see whether 
that description has any attributive denotation, and then, when (and if) it does, generate a 
name for that natural kind. The key move is to separate the question of whether a natural kind 
term has denotation, from how we come to know the truth of theoretical identifications such 
as have been presented here. Successfully isolated, an a posteriori answer to the former does 
not imply an a posteriori answer to the latter.  
The version of descriptivism defended here works by wedding descriptivism with 
metaphysical essentialism, but if my argument that Kripke‘s own account relies on 
essentialism to get the necessity of theoretical identification sentences off the ground is 
correct, then the account is no worse for that. Moreover, the point of this chapter was not to 
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defend or endorse any version of essentialism per se. Rather, the point was to demonstrate the 
work that some version of essentialism can do, when combined with a descriptivist theory of 
reference. 
My concern now, then, is to look at precisely what essentialism is, since it has been 
employed by Kripke, Putnam, Soames and myself, without much in the way of explication. 
From the analysis in previous chapters we have established that there were two brands of 
necessary a posteriori truth within Kripke from the outset, and that one of them concerns the 
essences of individuals and natural kinds. Hence we can expect the essences of objects to be 
knowable only a posteriori. Furthermore, Kripke explicitly differentiates his notion of 
‗essence‘ from Peter Geach‘s (1957: S16) ‗nominal essence‘, claiming that Geach‘s ‗nominal 
essence should be understood in terms of a prioricity, not necessity, and this is quite different 
from the kind of essence advocated here‘ (Kripke 1980: 116 n. 58). Presumably the 
distinction Kripke intends is the fairly standard distinction attributed, although I shall claim 
falsely attributed, in the following chapter, to Locke: namely, that there is a dichotomy 
between ‗real‘ and ‗nominal‘ essences, that real essences concern the underlying properties of 
objects that explain why they are the way they are, and that nominal essences are only to do 
with our concepts. Hence the obvious place to start in attempting to articulate just what this 
notion of essence is, is with John Locke. It is to this I now turn in chapter 6, where I shall 
claim that the whilst those working in the Kripke-Putnam tradition might appeal to the 
Lockean notion of ‗real‘ essence to capture this notion of an a posteriori non-definitional 
essence, they have simply misunderstood Locke, and are actually appealing to something 
more like the Aristotelian notion of essence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
As we have seen in the previous five chapters, talk of ‗essences‘ has, since Kripke and 
Putnam, gained significant currency in contemporary philosophy. It is no longer 
unfashionable to talk about the essence of this or that (natural) kind, and we now find a 
variety of brands of essentialism on the market including Ellis‘s (2001) Scientific 
Essentialism, Oderberg‘s (2007) Real Essentialism, Bird‘s (2007) Dispositional Essentialism, 
and the Contemporary Essentialism of Kripke and (early) Putnam. 
Almost all these brands of essentialism share a particular gloss on Locke‘s famous 
objection to Aristotle that natural kinds are demarcated by nominal essences not real essences. 
Thus Oderberg claims that ‗[e]mpiricists take [real] essences to be paradigmatically 
unobservable‘ and that this ‗objection goes back at least to John Locke‘ (Oderberg 2007: 21). 
Bird, presenting his dispositional essentialism, defines a notion of ―being‖ as ‗the reverse of 
Locke‘s definition of essence‘ which he takes to be ‗the being of any thing, whereby it is what 
it is‘ (Bird 2007: 100). LaPorte, discussing nominal and real essences, claims that ‗Kripke and 
Putnam seem to affirm something more substantive: that biological kinds have ―real essences‖ 
in Locke‘s terminology‘ (LaPorte 2004: 49). Even avowed anti-essentialists such as Dupré 
sanction the standard criticism of Locke that his scepticism about the knowability of real 
essences was ‗premature‘, and claim, when describing the essentialist position, that ‗genuine 
natural kinds provide the extensions of many terms of natural language, where these natural 
kinds are determined by true Lockean real essences‘ (Dupré 1995: 22). 
All of these essentialisms (even Dupré‘s anti-essentialism) are wrong about Locke. 
Oderberg is wrong to claim that Locke thought that real essences were paradigmatically 
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unobservable; Bird is wrong to think that Locke‘s notion of essence is the being of anything 
whereby it is what it is; LaPorte is wrong to think that Kripke and Putnam are talking about 
Lockean real essences (although so are Kripke and Putnam); and Dupré is wrong to think that 
genuine natural kinds (if by genuine he means objective or mind-independent) are determined 
by true Lockean real essences.
67
 
The mistake stems from a standard, but ultimately incorrect, interpretation of Locke‘s 
discussion of essences in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
68
 This mistaken 
interpretation (Lowe 1995, 2006, Von Leyden 1973, Wiggins 1974) takes Locke to mean, by 
‗real essence‘, the Aristotelian notion i.e. ‗the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is‘ 
(Essay III.iii.15), and interprets his objection (to Aristotelianism) as epistemological: we 
cannot come to know what real essences are, and therefore they cannot figure in our 
classifications of things into kinds. 
In this chapter I will present and defend the following two claims: i) that Locke‘s 
notion of ‗real essence‘ is not the Aristotelian notion, and ii) that Locke‘s objection to the 
Aristotelian notion was not merely epistemological. The first claim can be defended by 
presenting and applying Vienne‘s (1993) terminological revision. Vienne argues that Locke 
did not introduce a dichotomy between real and nominal essence, but a trichotomy between 
real essence, nominal essence and real constitution. This terminological revision will be 
employed to highlight where ambiguous uses of the phrase ‗real essence‘ have caused some 
serious misunderstandings of Locke‘s philosophy. In particular, it will undermine the appeal 
to ‗real essence‘ made by metaphysicians working in the Kripke-Putnam tradition, chiefly 
                                                          
67
 Although, as it turns out, Dupré‘s Promiscuous Realism, or pluralism, is close to Locke‘s own account of 
essence. However, that conclusion will not be explicitly argued for here. 
68
 Referred to from here on simply as the Essay. 
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Brian Ellis, who attempt to load the notion with significant metaphysical clout. The second 
claim (steering Locke around what is the classic objection to his thesis) can be defended by 
presenting a novel way of splitting up Locke‘s objections to the Aristotelian notion of 
essence. The analysis will show that Locke‘s anti-essentialism is still in good shape, and of 
contemporary significance. Further, it will show that so-called a posteriori essentialists 
cannot appeal to the Lockean notion of real essence, since Locke‘s notion, or so I shall argue, 
is conventionalist in a way contemporary a posteriori essentialists simply cannot accept. 
 
6.1 Real Essence, Nominal Essence and Real Constitution 
There is a consensus among Locke scholars that Locke‘s motivation for introducing a 
distinction between types of essence was his objection to the Aristotelian theory of 
classification. The Aristotelian view, characterised by Ayers (1991), is as follows: for 
Aristotle, the fundamental objects of scientific investigation are substances which have 
natures that, when grasped, reveal what is essential to that substance i.e. its essence. 
Furthermore, these essences (substantial forms or universals) can be multiply and wholly 
instantiated in different parcels of matter. This explains why (in our experience) there appear 
to be kinds of substances. When two parcels of matter instantiate the same essence, which is 
to say they have the same intrinsic nature, they qualify as members of the same kind. 
The role played by an essence on the Aristotelian view is twofold: (i) it explains the 
properties exhibited by a thing, and (ii) it classifies that thing as a member of a natural kind. 
Locke‘s objection to the Aristotelian picture is standardly interpreted as claiming that there is 
a sharp distinction between explanation and classification, and that we need two distinct 
notions of essence to play each role respectively. 
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First, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what 
it is. And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances) unknown constitution of 
things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence. This 
is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; 
essential, in its primary notation, signifying properly, being. And in this sense it is still 
used, when we speak of the essence of particular things, without giving them any 
name. 
Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been in much 
busied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary 
signification: and, instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly 
applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily 
supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt there must be 
some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must 
depend. But, it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species, 
only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, 
the essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the 
general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do genera from 
genus), names stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word essence 
imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not 
unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other nominal essence. (Essay III.iii.15) 
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These two passages are usually interpreted as introducing a dichotomy. On the one 
hand we have what Locke terms a real essence, which is the unknown constitution of a thing 
upon which the observable qualities (causally) depend (an explanatory-essence); on the other 
hand, a nominal essence, which is an abstract idea that we have formulated, and annexed to a 
particular kind term, such as ‗water‘ or ‗gold‘, that serves to classify things that conform to 
that idea (a classificatory essence). Locke‘s mention of the original signification of the word 
―essence‖ is taken to be alluding to the Aristotelian notion of essence, and his reference to real 
essences is thought to maintain that original signification. This interpretation has led 
contemporary commentators to object to Locke on the grounds that his ‗unknown 
constitutions‘ are now known, and that we can now classify according to these constitutions. 
But this objection conflates real essence with real constitution, and thus misunderstands 
Locke‘s notion of real essence. 
As Vienne (1993) and Guyer (1994) have observed, Locke‘s introduction of the 
essence distinction appears to contain a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy. In the second 
paragraph of the previously quoted passage Locke uses the terms ‗genus‘, ‗species‘ and ‗sort‘ 
which can all be treated as synonyms for ‗natural kind‘. He then makes a distinction between 
the real constitution of an individual, and the artificial constitution of a (natural) kind. For 
Locke the notions of ‗General and Universal, belong not to the real Existences of Things‘ 
(Essay III.iii.11), but are rather products of mental abstraction. Hence, whilst Billy the Bear 
has a real constitution qua individual, the species Bear, of which Billy is a member, is a 
general idea generated via mental abstraction, and thus the constitution of the species will be 
artificial. For Locke, natural kinds are co-existent sets of simple ideas that have been 
abstracted and annexed to our natural language natural kind terms. We use these names to 
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rank the things (particulars) into sorts, and as the sorts are ideas (nominal essences) they can 
only have artificial constitutions (real essences). Thus we have the following trichotomy: 
 
Real Constitution: the totality of the insensible particles of a particular that explains 
the totality of its sensible qualities. 
 
Real Essence: the aspect of a particular‘s real constitution which explains the sensible 
qualities that have been singled out by the nominal essence. 
 
Nominal Essence: the abstract idea of a kind that singles out certain properties as 
defining characteristics of the kind. 
 
The supposition in the background motivating Vienne‘s analysis is Locke‘s nominalist 
ontology: the principle that ‗all things that exist are only particulars‘ (Essay III.iii.6). The nub 
of Locke‘s initial objection to the Aristotelian ‗hinges on the denial of real universals and on 
the intuitive ontological principle that everything that exists is particular‘ (Ayers 1981: 254). 
Since it is only particulars that we should admit into our ontology, and since (Aristotelian) 
natural kinds have essences that are exactly not particular – they are universals – they should 
not be in our ontology. Particular things (like Billy) have real constitutions, and it is these 
constitutions that explain all the properties of a particular. Real constitutions do provide 
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natural boundaries, but only between one particular and another.
69
 Natural kinds, being 
precisely not particular, do not have real constitutions. Rather, they have real essences, which 
are ‗similitudes arbitrarily picked out by the mind‘ (Ayers 1981: 524). Consider two pieces of 
what we refer to as gold. Regardless of what attitude we adopt towards them as individuals, 
our identification of them as of a kind comes with, as Quine (1977) noted, the notion of 
resemblance. This notion of resemblance can, on Locke‘s view, be subdivided into 
classificatory resemblance and explanatory resemblance. But, as kinds are mental abstractions 
any explanatory resemblance will be as arbitrary as the classificatory resemblance. As Ayers 
notes, ‗[r]eality can supply resemblances, but resemblances do not constitute natural 
boundaries‘ (Ayers 1981: 256). For instance, Billy the Bear and Tony the Tiger resemble each 
other in various ways: both are four legged, carnivorous, furry, large, fierce, vertebrates, with 
a similar central nervous system. They also differ in a variety of other ways: Tony is tawny 
and stripped, Billy is brown; Tony always walks on four legs, Billy sometimes walks on two; 
Tony only eats meat, Bill will eat plant matter. The point is that none of these resemblances or 
differences mark a natural boundary between Tony and Billy – we only get a boundary one 
some classificatory decision (involving abstraction) has been made. 
The notion of an essence as ‗the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is‘ only 
has application, for Locke, as it applies to individuals. Locke‘s famous introduction of 
essences can be read as commenting on how the use of the term ‗essence‘ has changed, and 
how it is being applied to natural kinds and not to individuals. Locke‘s notion of real essence 
does bear some resemblance to Aristotle‘s notion of essence insofar as both refer to the 
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 Consider, for example, people. On Locke‘s view there is a clear distinction between, say, Robert Boyle and 
Thomas Willis: as both are individuals both have distinct real constitutions. Thus there is a natural boundary 
between Robert Boyle and Thomas Willis, which distinguishes them both as unique individuals. 
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‗cause‘ or ‗internal principle‘ (Vienne 1993: 142) of a natural kind. But Locke‘s notion, in 
contrast to Aristotle‘s, does not ‗concede that the real essence could, independently of any 
human decision, determine ontologically the boundaries of a species‘ (Ayers 1981: 259), and 
thus  his notion of real essence is not ‗the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is‘: 
that is real constitution. 
Nevertheless even Ayers appears to conflate the distinct notions of ‗real essence‘ and 
‗real constitution‘ when he says that ‗the defining properties of a species comprise what 
Locke calls the ―real essence‖ or ―constitution‖ ‘ (Ayers 1981: 256). While  real essences do 
pick out properties at the same ontological level as constitution, and Ayer‘s is right to point 
out that Locke‘s notion is not the Aristotelian notion, it is a mistake to equate real essences 
with constitutions. Constitutions, on Locke‘s view, are the properties of particulars which 
exist independently of us; real essences are abstracted from the properties of particulars, but 
are ultimately products of the understanding.  
For Locke both the real and nominal essences pick out certain subsets of the properties 
of particulars. The nominal essence picks out (some of) the observable properties that we use 
to classify particulars into groups, while the real essence is what explains the observable 
properties picked out by the nominal essence. The result is that the real essence also picks out 
a subset of properties, but at the level of constitution (rather than observation). However, this 
only reveals that there is some relation between the properties identified at the level of 
nominal essence and the properties at the level of real essence. It does not tell us whether 
there is a general correspondence between a type of observable property and a type of 
constitutional property. Consider, for example, discussions of whether jade is a natural kind 
(see LaPorte 2004: 94-100) where there are two constitutionally distinct substances 
(substances with different atomic constitutions) which share the same (or almost the same) 
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observable properties. So far Locke‘s thesis does not commit us to ruling out constitutionally 
distinct substances as members of the same kind. In the jade case, the two different 
mechanisms that generate the observable similarities between jadeite and nephrite might 
simply not matter to the classification of jade as a single kind, since it is the nominal essence 
that fixes the classification. Hence the ‗real essence‘ of jade could be the disjunction of the 
chemical constitution of jadeite and that of nephrite. 
With this distinction in place it is possible to formulate a novel interpretation of 
Locke‘s objections to the Aristotelian. There are three distinct arguments against the 
scholastic in Locke: The first, the Knowledge Objection, is a traditional empiricist objection 
to a priori knowledge of substances, combined with some standard empiricist tenets. I shall 
argue that Locke‘s objection does not stand or fall on whether or not we actually come to 
know the constitutions of things, avoiding what has traditionally been construed as a knock-
down argument to his thesis. The second, the Ontological Objection, builds on arguments 
from Ayers (1981, 1991) and Uzgalis (1988), and presents Locke‘s enterprise as a unified 
anti-essentialist thesis that it is clearly incompatible with Aristotle‘s metaphysics. The final 
objection, labelled the Better Candidate Objection, has its roots in work by Downing (1998) 
and Atherton (2007), and claims that Locke adopted a corpuscularian account of internal 
constitution because it is a better explanation of the properties of things than is Aristotle‘s 
notion of substantial form. However, since Locke has no special reason for thinking that the 
corpuscularian hypothesis – the view that objects are made up of tiny particles or corpuscules 
– is true, his objection to Aristotle is best construed as the thought that there is a superior 
explanation available. Presented in this manner, Locke‘s third objection can be updated in 
light of current science, and his examples can be recast in the language of modern chemistry 
and physics. Consequently, Locke‘s anti-essentialism, albeit with a notion of ‗real essence‘, is 
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still a viable brand of realism about science. This will be particularly important in chapters 7 
and 8, when I criticise Ellis‘s scientific essentialism, and offer what I take to be a more 
metaphysically reasonable alternative. 
 
6.2 The Knowledge Objection 
Locke‘s epistemological objection to the Aristotelian stems from his empiricist denial that we 
can have a priori knowledge of substances. For Locke (as for all empiricists) our knowledge 
of substances comes from empirical investigation. He agreed with Aristotle that the primary 
objects of scientific investigation are substances, and that something explains why particulars 
have the observable properties that they do. But he thinks that investigation of substances 
must be a matter of empirical research, rather than something we come to know a priori. Thus 
we find (in the Essay) a second distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is 
intended to explain why things appear (to us) to have the properties they do. 
According to Locke there are different types of qualities, and these can (for the most 
part) be divided into two distinct categories: the primary qualities, which include ‗solidity, 
extension, figure, motion or rest, and number‘ (Essay II.viii.9), and the secondary qualities, 
which are the powers of objects to ‗produce various sensations in us by their primary 
qualities, i.e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, 
sounds, tastes, etc‘ (Essay II.viii.10). The secondary qualities are obviously the types of 
properties that figure in the nominal essences of natural kinds (although some primary 
qualities such as figure, extension and number, are obviously observable, and so could be part 
of the nominal essence too). Locke‘s claim that it is the insensible (primary) properties that 
are responsible for the observable (primary and secondary) properties clearly relates to his 
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notion of a real essence: an aspect of a particular‘s constitution that explains the properties 
singled out by the nominal essence. The reason why real essences cannot be employed in the 
classification of particulars into kinds for Locke is that real essences are mostly aspects of the 
constitution of particulars, and the constitution of a particular consists of collections of 
primary qualities that are insensible. Therefore, since knowledge of substances is achieved via 
observation and empirical investigation, and the constitutions of particulars are insensible, 
they cannot form the basis of classification.  
The nub of Locke‘s knowledge objection to the Aristotelian is the classic empiricist 
objection to a priori knowledge of substances. Locke‘s apparent epistemological scepticism 
about the knowability of real essences is an additional problem caused by the state of 
scientific investigation in the seventeenth century, rather than an objection to Aristotle.
70
 As 
Lockean-real essences are aspects of the constitutions of particulars, and particulars are the 
objects of scientific investigation, it is plausible to suggest that our not knowing those 
constitutions is directly related to the state of our scientific investigation. So Locke is not 
endorsing a view of real essences such that they cannot be known in principle. Rather, he is 
claiming that the contingent epistemic state of seventeenth century science stops us from 
knowing the real constitutions of particulars, and therefore stops us abstracting away from 
these properties to formulate real essences of natural kinds. But since the real constitutions of 
particulars are made up of primary qualities, and primary qualities are not, in principle, 
unknowable it would be surprising were real essences to turn out to be so. To quote Locke: 
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 Although the corpuscularian hypothesis was on the table in the seventeen century, there were no specific 
claims about this particular being constituted by such and such corpuscles, in such and such a structure, moving 
in such and such a manner. Claims about particular constitutions were not available. 
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The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex idea, is 
something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man, 
from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, 
and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is 
certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence that what now 
is contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will… (Essay III.vi.3) 
 
Although this is not a decisive statement that we can come to know real essences, it 
clearly expresses the conditional that if an agent had knowledge of the constitution of the 
particulars we classify as, say, gold, then that agent would have a different idea of the essence 
of that natural kind.
71
 However, there is an additional argument, from Atherton (2007), which 
can be applied here, albeit slightly out of context, to clarify Locke‘s attitude towards our 
knowledge of real essences. Atherton observes that  
 
an important element in Locke‘s deployment of the concepts of real and nominal 
essences is the clarification that he believes they give to a proper understanding of 
ideas of mixed modes and simple ideas, as well as ideas of substances. Our 
understanding of the notion of real essence and its relation to nominal essence should 
apply equally perspicuously to what Locke says about the nominal and real essences 
                                                          
71
 It should, again, be stressed that even if we classify on the basis of the explanatory properties (the properties 
that explain the standard observable properties upon which we initially based our notion of kind), on Locke‘s 
view this still involves a choice on the part of the classifier. Locke‘s view is that ‗nothing on earth could possibly 
perform the function that the Aristotelian ascribed to their specific essences or forms‘ (Ayers 1981: 256) in that 
there are no ontological boundaries between natural kinds, only more or less resembling particulars that invite 
sorting. 
 223 
of mixed modes and kinds of simple ideas, as well as of substances. (Atherton 2007: 
274) 
 
The important point here is that the notions of ‗real essence‘ and ‗nominal essence‘ do 
not just apply to substances; they also apply to mixed modes and simple ideas. A mixed 
mode, according to Locke, is a compound of simple ideas of several kinds put together to 
make a complex idea. Examples include ideas like ‗beauty, consisting of a certain 
composition of colour and figure, causing delight to the beholder; [and] theft, which being the 
concealed change of the possession of anything, without the consent of the proprietor, 
contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds‘ (Essay II.xii.5). Simple 
ideas are ‗the materials of all our knowledge‘ (Essay II.xiii.1), and include the familiar 
category of sensations, e.g. sound, taste and colour. The colour red, divorced from, say, the 
figure in which it inheres (e.g. a red apple) is an example of a simple idea. 
The clearest way to get at the kernel of Locke‘s distinction is to think of mixed modes 
as things like emotions (e.g. joy, anger, and so on) and various other human concepts (e.g. 
theft, beauty, triangle, etc..), and to think of simple ideas as things like powers (e.g. colour, 
taste, smell, etc.).
72
 There is a clear dissimilarity between simple ideas and mixed modes on 
the one hand, and substances on the other, when considering how Locke‘s discussion of 
essences relates to them. With mixed modes our ideas of them ‗cannot but be adequate‘ 
(Essay II.XXXI.14) as they are products of the mind. Locke‘s discussion of Adam‘s 
introduction of ‗kinneah‘ illustrates this point. Adam invents two words which he attaches to 
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 Powers are considered to be simple on Locke‘s view because the power to produce such-and-such a sensation 
in us simply is to produce just that sensation. If it produces a different sensation it is a different power (cf. Essay 
II.xxxii.14). 
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two ideas: ‗kinneah‘ meaning suspicion of a husband in his wife’s disloyalty to him, and 
‗niouph‘ meaning the act of committing disloyalty. In the story Adam misapplies one of his 
words to a particular situation. Locke considers whether his idea was adequate given this 
misapplication, and concludes that it is adequate. This highlights the difference between ideas 
of mixed modes and those of substances. According to Locke: 
 
[F]or it [kinneah] being a combination of simple ideas, which he [Adam], without any 
regard to an archetype, without respect to anything as a pattern, voluntarily put 
together, abstracted, and gave the name kinneah to, to express in short to others, by 
that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must 
necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. (Essay III.vi.44) 
 
Although Adam misapplies ‗kinneah‘ in a given situation, the error is in 
misdiagnosing the situation, not any inadequacy of the idea. The nominal and real essences of 
mixed modes coincide, and thus ideas of mixed modes are always adequate: whatever idea we 
have of a given mixed mode is all there is to that mixed mode. 
Similarly, simple ideas also have nominal essences that coincide with their real 
essences. According to Locke a simple idea, such as red, must be ‗perfectly adequate to that 
power; or else that power would produce a different idea‘ (Essay II.XXI.12). What this means 
is that because powers are so simple, and the sensation we have of, for example, a colour is 
precisely the effect it has on our senses, our idea of that sensation cannot but be adequate 
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because our idea applies to the effect the power produces in us, and any other power 
producing a different effect would produce a different idea.
73
 
Atherton uses this example to draw conclusions about the status of corpuscularianism 
within Locke‘s Essay. By adopting the univocal understanding of Locke‘s notion of ―real 
essence‖, as Atherton counsels, we are led to a notion that ‗undercuts an identification [of real 
essences] with corpuscularian structures‘ (Atherton 2007: 276). The example also undercuts a 
notion of real essences that are in principle unknowable, as the real essences of mixed modes 
and simple ideas are both knowable. It is only in the case of substances that we run into 
epistemological difficulties. Substances have observable qualities, but these qualities are ‗not 
the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it‘ (Essay II.XXXI.13). 
Locke‘s stance, as an empiricist, is that if we have no idea of the causal basis from which the 
observable properties of a substance flow then we cannot classify that substance as of one 
kind or another on that basis. But this is not the same as claiming that we can never classify 
kinds on the basis of the causal base of their observable properties. As Locke says: 
 
The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so 
distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we ought to have ideas of them. But 
since we are ignorant… the supposed real essences of things stand us not in stead for 
the distinguishing substances into species. (Essay III.vi.18) 
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 Locke is not entirely clear on his account of powers and simple ideas insofar as it is not obvious whether our 
idea of, say, red sensation is of the sensation itself, or the power to produce said sensation. However, for my 
purposes this is not particularly important. All I am interested in is the observation that there is more to the 
category of things that have real essences than just substances, and that typically the real essences of kinds from 
these other areas are known. 
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Thus Locke does not claim that the real essences of substances are unknowable in 
principle, but merely that they are unknown in (seventeenth century) practice. Locke‘s 
objection to the Aristotelian (that the real essences of substances cannot be known a priori) is 
distinct from his assessment of seventeenth century science, and the preceding analysis has 
demonstrated that these two points can be coherently isolated.  
 
6.3 The Ontological Objection 
What I am calling the Ontological Objection is a principled objection to the Aristotelian 
substantial form or essence that is an integral element of the scholastic thesis. Locke construes 
Aristotle‘s thesis as claiming that distinct ‗species of substance had their [own] distinct 
internal substantial forms, and that it was those forms which made the distinction of 
substances into their true species and genera‘ (Essay III.vi.10). In other words, there are 
distinct (internal) essences that distinguish substances into natural kinds, and these 
distinctions carve nature at the objective (ontological) joints. The substantial form or essence 
is, on the Aristotelian view, a universal, i.e. a quality that can be instantiated by multiple 
particulars, yet wholly instantiated in each. Locke endorses the nominalist principle that 
everything that exists is particular, and thereby denies the existence of real universals. This, as 
Ayers says, ‗is enough to refute Aristotelianism‘ (Ayers 1981: 254). According to Locke the 
Aristotelians have made the mistake of thinking that their theory of essences gets at bona fide 
distinctions in nature. They have taken ‗distinctions in thought for real distinctions, 
abstractions for realities‘ (ibid.). 
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Confusion over Locke‘s terminology has led some commentators to take Locke to be 
endorsing the Aristotelian view that essences carve nature at the (true) joints (Von Leyden 
1973, Wiggins 1974, Lowe 1996/2006). The first section of this chapter demonstrated how 
that terminology should be understood in a bid to establish that Lockean real essences are not 
Aristotelian essences. Uzgalis (1988) provides a useful way of carving up the positions by 
distinguishing between a ‗two-cloth‘ interpretation of Locke, which he attributes to Lovejoy 
(1974) and Wiggins (1974), and a ‗one-cloth‘ interpretation, which he himself defends. The 
basic distinction is that proponents of the ‗two-cloth‘ interpretation claim that Locke‘s notions 
of real and nominal essence are cut from separate pieces of cloth, with only the latter being of 
a nominalist weave. Uzgalis, as an exponent of the ‗one-cloth‘ interpretation, claims that 
Locke‘s treatment of kinds is entirely nominalist, and that the distinction between real and 
nominal essence is that of explanation and classification. However, Uzgalis seems to rely on 
there being a sharp distinction between explanation and classification to get Locke‘s 
nominalism off the ground. He interprets Locke as saying that although real essences do 
explain the properties of kinds, we suffer from an ‗ignorance [of them, that] is incurable‘ 
(Uzgalis 1988: 333), and this is why Locke‘s thesis of kinds ‗treats classes as nominal rather 
than real‘ (Uzgalis 1988: 331). Further, he comments that arguments that purport to 
demonstrate that real essences could be knowable ‗make the Lovejoy/Wiggins interpretation 
plausible‘ (Uzgalis 1988: 333).  
On my interpretation of Locke he does not hold that real essences are in principle 
unknowable, and thus he cannot think that our ignorance of them is incurable. If this is correct 
there is no sharp distinction between explanation and classification, as claimed by Uzgalis. 
However, this does not invite a two-cloth interpretation of Lockean essences, contrary to 
Uzgalis‘ claim. By introducing Vienne‘s terminology, and accepting the previous analysis of 
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Locke‘s Knowledge Objection, and the simple Ontological Objection that Locke has to 
universals, Locke‘s arguments against Aristotle‘s metaphysics can be isolated from his 
arguments against Aristotle‘s epistemology. Locke‘s nominalist ontological principle is 
clearly inconsistent with Aristotle‘s metaphysics, and therefore whether or not we come to 
know the constitutions of particulars has no bearing on this metaphysical inconsistency. 
Uzgalis is right to point out that Locke ‗refuses to identify the real essence or even 
part of the real essence of things as their essential properties as opposed to their accidental 
properties‘ (Uzgalis 1988: 334) independently of classifying them into kinds by contrast with 
the Aristotelian view that the world comes pre-carved into kinds on the basis of essential 
properties. But the motivation behind this refusal should not be construed as epistemological. 
It is, rather, conceptual: 
 
That essences, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and that it is considered 
in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from hence: 
that, take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them 
under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them 
instantly vanishes: we have no notion of one without the other, which plainly shows 
their relation. (Essay III.vi.4) 
 
Essence and classification are, for Locke, interdependent notions. There can be no essential 
properties until the natural kind has been classified, because ‗all things that exist are only 
particulars‘ (Essay III.iii.6), and particulars have nothing that is essential to them. There 
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simply is no fact of the matter concerning what is, and what is not, essential to a natural kind 
until we determine what that kind is. Real essences are not mind-independent.
74
 
Locke‘s positive thesis, that classification is always relative to naming, is expressed 
clearly with his example of the watchmaker: 
 
It will be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different 
between these two [watches], which the watchmaker has a clear idea of. And yet it is 
plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is 
sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? There are some watches 
that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the 
workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance 
loose, and other regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs‘ bristles. Are any or 
all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that know each of 
these and several other different contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches? 
It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an 
essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea to which the 
name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for, 
and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under it, 
they are not essentially nor specifically different … Just thus I think it is in natural 
things. (Essay III.vi.39) 
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 The properties that constitute the real essence could, of course, be mind-independent, although that will 
depend upon your view of the theoretical posits of our current (best) science, given that the standard examples of 
essences in contemporary metaphysics are things like atomic numbers and the like. The point, however, is that 
Locke is not claiming that the constitutions of particulars are not mind independent, just that real essences, being 
abstractions from the constitutions of particulars, are not mind-independent. 
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The underlying point of the example is that both artificial and natural things can have 
differences in internal constitution that are real but nonetheless non-essential, provided they 
still agree with the idea to which the kind-name has been annexed. Uzgalis takes this passage 
to be a suggestion by Locke that ‗a continuous distribution of different properties among the 
internal mechanisms of watches prevents the watch-maker from finding gaps or clear 
differences between groups, which would mark the boundaries between species in a non-
arbitrary way‘ (Uzgalis 1988: 336). However, such an interpretation is not necessary.  
What we should note is that Locke‘s reference to the ‗internal constitutions‘ (Essay 
III.vi.39 emphasis added) is distinct from his notion of an essence. Differences in internal 
constitution may or may not be significant when we are talking about kinds and species, and 
asking whether, say, some distinct particulars, with different internal constitutions, are 
members of a single species. An answer to this type of question will depend on whether the 
particulars correspond to our idea of the kind. For example, if the watch-maker distinguishes 
between four-wheel watches and five-wheel watches (say, the former are relatively easy to 
fix, whereas the latter are not) then she could form different ideas of each, and annex different 
names to each idea, say ‗quadruclocks‘, and ‗quintuclocks‘ respectively. If it is part of the 
idea of a quadruclock that it has four wheels, then any watch without four wheels would be 
essentially different, with respect to the kind essence, and so not a quadruclock. However, 
since nothing in the idea annexed to the term ‗watch‘ concerns the number of wheels within 
the internal mechanism, wheel number is inessential relative to ‗watch‘. 
There are no facts of the matter about which of the properties that are part of any 
particular‘s constitution are essential or accidental until we have formulated an idea of the 
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kind. For Locke, the classification of particulars into natural kinds using real essences is just 
as arbitrary as the classification of those same particulars in virtue of their nominal essences. 
His positive view can be characterised as follows: we classify things into kinds based upon 
known similarities. The process of classification is achieved by abstracting away from 
resembling particulars until we have a general enough idea to pick them out as a class. With 
that idea in place we can introduce a name for our kind, and label the properties that are left 
over from the process of abstraction as the essential properties. In some cases, the process of 
abstraction reveals the nominal essence but not the real essence, whilst in other cases it 
reveals both the nominal and the real essence. In the case of substances, the real essential 
properties tend to be internal (atomic) constitutions, which are causally responsible for the 
observable properties. Thus, whether the process of abstraction reveals both the real essence 
and the nominal essence will often depend upon the ontological level at which they occur: if 
explanation and classification occur at a single level then the real and nominal essences 
automatically coincide; if they occur on different levels, and our knowledge of the 
explanatory level in incomplete, then our classification is based upon the known (probably 
observable) level. Irrespective of the level, when we abstract away from the properties of 
particulars, we decide which properties to abstract, and which not to abstract. Therefore, there 
is a strong sense in which the classification of particulars into kinds at any level is 
conventional. 
 
6.4 The Better Candidate Objection 
Locke‘s final objection to Aristotle‘s thesis is to the intelligibility of the notion of a 
‗substantial form‘ or ‗Aristotelian essence‘, and as Atherton (2007) has pointed out, Locke 
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was contiguous with many seventeenth century scientists in relocating the role of explanation, 
and thereby rejecting notions of a substantial form,  in this respect. The importance of this 
objection is multifaceted: (i) it presents an additional reason why Lockean real essences are 
not Aristotelian-essences, (ii) it demonstrates the difference between explanation and 
classification, and (iii) it offers a clear strategy for modernising Locke‘s general thesis. 
According to Atherton: 
 
The explanatory virtues of substantial forms or natures had been replaced by the far 
more powerful notion of qualitatively undifferentiated, quantitatively distinguishable 
matter in motion. Under this pressure, the substantial form had come apart. Things are 
still classified into kinds according to our abstract ideas, but the explanation for the 
existence of that whereby they are as they are is to be sought in terms of the far 
different theoretical framework of matter in motion. (Atherton 2007: 261) 
 
Locke, like his contemporaries, is adopting this theoretical framework (the 
corpuscularian hypothesis) within his philosophical thesis. However he offers no special 
reason to think that the new theoretical framework was true referring to it consistently as a 
hypothesis, rather than as fact. As such there is a prima facie case to be made that Locke‘s 
reference to the corpuscularian hypothesis is intended as an illustration of a general objection, 
rather than as ‗is close to becoming a contemporary orthodoxy that Locke‘s motive in writing 
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the Essay was to provide a foundation or defence for corpuscular mechanism‘ (Atherton 1991: 
33).
75
   
To demonstrate that Locke is only referring to the corpuscularian hypothesis as an 
example we need to return  to his notion of real essence. According to Downing the Lockean 
notion is a metaphysical one: ‗the real essence of something is its fundamental principle or 
constitution, the source of its other qualities, and, thus, what makes it the thing that it is‘ 
(Downing 1998: 384). Construed as a general notion, a Lockean real essence can, Downing 
says,  be cashed our differently by different hypotheses, including both the Aristotelian thesis 
– there is a substantial form, from which the properties of an object flow, and which all 
members of a particular kind must possess to be members of that kind – and the seventeenth 
century scientists‘ mechanistic, corpuscularian hypothesis – there is a corpuscular internal 
constitution, which serves as the ‗causal source and ultimate explanation of all of the thing‘s 
other qualities, and this, is that which makes it the thing that it is‘ (Downing 1998: 385). 
If we take this in conjunction with Atherton‘s argument for a unified notion of ‗real 
essence‘ the case (that Locke‘s endorsement of corpuscularianism was merely to illustrate his 
point, rather than a commitment to its truth) looks convincing. Atherton‘s argument was, 
roughly, that there are three types of things, according to Locke, that have real essences: (i) 
simple ideas (powers such as red), (ii) mixed modes (emotions such as anger) and (iii) 
complex ideas (substances such as gold). However, only members of the last category have 
real essences that are corpuscularian. Since the notion of ‗real essence‘ is intended to be a 
single, unified notion, being corpuscular cannot be a necessary condition of being a real 
essence. Thus the corpuscularian hypothesis is not necessary to Locke‘s theory of essence.   
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 See also Alexander (1985) and Mandelbaum (1970). 
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The problem with Downing‘s analysis, however – as should be clear by now – is that 
it conflates real essence with constitution, and then states that the constitution of a thing 
‗makes it the thing that it is‘. Downing is right to treat Locke‘s notion of a real essence as a 
general metaphysical notion that could be satisfied by different hypotheses, but wrong to 
think that the Aristotelian notion of essence is one of those hypotheses. The Aristotelian 
notion of an essence construes them as mind-independent divisions in natural, that divide the 
objects of our experience into kinds. The Lockean notion of real essence, in contrast, is 
always relative to the nominal essence, where nominal essences are produced by a process of 
mental abstraction, which reflect the decisions made by classifiers to group objects together in 
virtue of a particular subset of resemblances, rather than the entire set (which would leave us 
with individuals).
76
  
The classic passage recommending an interpretation of Locke as endorsing the 
corpuscularian hypothesis merely as the best idea on the market in the seventeenth century, 
rather than asserting its truth, is the following: 
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 There are effectively two strands to Locke‘s original objection Aristotelian essences: the first is that 
Aristotelian essences are universals, and Locke, as a nominalist, denies the reality of universals (cf. Ayers 1981, 
1991). Downing‘s mistake is to think that Locke‘s metaphysical notion includes the clause ‗that which makes it 
the thing that it is‘ (Downing 1998: 385). As all ‗things‘ that exist are particular, that which makes a thing the 
thing that it is, is its particular real constitution. Ontologically speaking there are no natural kinds, as such there 
is no-thing whereby a natural kind is what it is. Downing is right to analyse Locke‘s use of the corpuscularian 
hypothesis merely as an illustration of the broader thesis that Lockean real essences are defined in terms of their 
explanatory role, and that real essences explain the properties of natural kinds. But she is wrong to attribute, by 
implication, constitutions to natural kinds. Only particulars have constitutions. The second strand to Locke‘s 
objection, however, can be cast independently of his nominalism. For Locke the Aristotelian notion of an 
essence that is itself mind-independent, objectively carving nature at the joints, is pure sophistry. Essences are 
relative to classificatory interests, and the decisions of the classifiers, since all nature provides is resemblance, 
not mind-independent natural divisions. This general point, I take it, is what motivates objections like Mellor‘s 
(1977) and Dupré‘s (1995) to essentialism. 
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I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go 
furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the 
weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will 
afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and coexistence of 
the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is 
certain, that, whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my 
business to determine,) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very 
little advanced by any of them… (Essay III.iii.16 emphasis added)77 
 
In the above passage Locke refers to corpuscularianism as a hypothesis, and gives his reasons 
for endorsing  as that it ‗is thought to go furthers in intelligible explication of those qualities 
of bodies‘. He also observes that it is not his business to determine which hypothesis is 
clearest and truest. These two points seem to be central to Locke‘s thesis, and constitute his 
third and final objection to the Aristotelian. 
For Locke, part of what makes his notion of real essence more intelligible than the 
Aristotelian notion is that real essences come with a hypothesis – the corpuscularian 
hypothesis – to characterise real essences (albeit in rather general terms, since the 
‗corpuscular constitutions of particular bodies remain undiscovered‘ (Downing 1998: 386)). 
The scholastics, in contrast, fail to illustrate their notion of ‗settled and fixed species in nature, 
we know not what‘ (Essay IV.iv.16), leaving it, as far as Locke is concerned, highly 
mysterious. Hence, it is (in part) the apparent intelligibility of the corpuscularian hypothesis 
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 The quoted passage has a definite sense of pessimism about the development of science. However this should 
be viewed as a reaction to the science of Locke‘s time, and not as the nub of any substantial objection. 
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as an illustration of the notion of a real essence, in comparison to the unintelligibility of the 
Aristotelian notion of eternal essence ‗we know not what‘ that recommends real essences, 
rather than Aristotelian essences, to Locke.
78
 Thus we can characterise Locke‘s final objection 
to the Aristotelian as a Better Candidate Objection: we should endorse whichever theory of 
substances that goes furthest in intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies. 
 
6.5 Locke’s Contemporary Relevance 
The consequence of this analysis is that contemporary examples of natural kinds, such as 
gold, that are usually taken to demonstrate how Locke‘s thesis was wrong because we now 
know the real essences of natural kinds (Ayers 1991, Kripke 1980, Lowe 1996, 2006) can be 
accounted for by re-applying the Better Candidate Objection. Locke conceded that it was not 
his business to decide which hypothesis was clearest and truest, but the job of the scientist. As 
such we can say that whatever hypothesis science currently holds is the one we will endorse 
to explicate the notion of real essence. Consider gold as an example. Contemporary chemistry 
tells us that gold is the element with atomic number 79 (meaning that there are 79 protons in 
the nucleus of one atom of that substance). Since Kripke it has become popular to say: 
 
[A] material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is 
that with atomic number 79. Here the ‗if and only if‘ can be taken to be strict 
(necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find 
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 Of course, Locke also objects to the Aristotelian notion of essence on the grounds that it views nature as have 
mind independent natural joints, carved out by the mind-independent essences of natural kinds. For Locke, we 
carve out the natural kinds, since all nature provides is resemblance. 
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the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. (Kripke 1980: 
138) 
 
Assuming that having 79 protons does explain the observable properties of the kind 
gold, and further that we know that members of the gold-kind really do have 79 protons 
within their nucleus, does this establish that the ‗real essence‘ of gold is having atomic 
number 79, as LaPorte and Dupré claim? The answer is yes – but not in the way that they 
(LaPorte and Dupré) believe. If science tells us that atomic theory is the best candidate 
hypothesis, then, according to Locke, this is the hypothesis we should adopt for our 
philosophical account of substances. If we know what the internal constitutions of particulars 
are, and have discovered what explains the observable properties of substances, then we can 
use the real essence to classify particulars into kinds (given the Knowledge Objection). 
However, does this establish that there are objective natural kinds, delineated by their 
essences, and that we are carving nature at its actual joints? 
Locke‘s answer must be no. For Locke there are no natural joints, only resemblances. 
Thus, if by ‗natural kind‘ we mean something like the Aristotelian notion i.e. a universal that 
can be wholly and multiply instantiated in different parcels of matter, there are no natural 
kinds. For Locke natural kinds, regardless of the level at which we characterise them, are 
abstract ideas that we have formulated in order to group particulars together, and which 
subsequently allow us to refer to them with a single kind-term, thereby facilitating 
communication (cf. Guyer 1994). The properties that figure in our specification of essences 
are real properties of objects (particulars have real constitutions). But it is an aspect of the 
real constitution of some particular that is abstracted to formulate the essence of a natural 
 238 
kind. Since we decide which properties to abstract, which to employ in our classification, and 
what elements of the explanation of a particular‘s properties we consider important, Lockean 
real essences evidently do not come with a commitment to objective natural kinds. The term 
‗real essence‘ is a piece of terminology unique to Locke, and intended to refer to an abstracted 
idea that explains why a natural kind, which is also an abstract idea, has the properties it does. 
However, natural kinds do not mark out objective natural joint in the world, since for Locke 
there is no reason to think that there are such natural joints. Moreover, these points can be cast 
quite separately from Locke‘s nominalist ontology – one need not be a nominalist to think 
that there are no natural joints to be carved, and that classifications are the product of mental 
abstraction. 
When Brian Ellis says of his Scientific Essentialism that ‗[I]ts closest historical 
predecessor is the kind of essentialism described by Locke‘, and further that Locke was 
concerned with ‗what makes a thing the kind of thing that it is‘  but that he was ‗unduly 
pessimistic‘ about the knowability of real essences, he completely misunderstands Locke 
(Ellis 2007: 55). Locke‘s anti-essentialism is not the predecessor of Ellis‘s radical 
essentialism. Locke was concerned with the question of what makes a thing the kind of thing 
that it is, but to think, as Ellis does, that Locke was anywhere near realism about kinds is to 
forget the relation between real and nominal essence, and that both are products of mental 
abstraction. There is nothing in Locke to motivate a view like Ellis‘s; in fact Locke‘s thesis is 
thoroughly anti-essentialist, strongly conventionalist, and intended to show just why we 
should not endorse essentialism. 
Consider, for example, the classic theoretical identity ‗water is H2O‘. For 
metaphysicians in the Kripke-Putnam tradition, such as Ellis, the orthodox view is that given 
the truth of the theoretical identity and the standard (but, as I have argued, incorrect) 
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interpretation of Locke, we have discovered that H2O is the real essence of water, and had 
Locke been alive he would have agreed (cf. Mackie 1974). But this is incorrect. On Locke‘s 
view, when we discover that water is H2O there are two options: (1) we say that H2O is the 
real essence of water, since molecular constitution explains the observable characteristics of 
water that figure in its nominal essence. Hence ‗water is H2O‘ is a posteriori, but contingent. 
(2) water is reclassified on the basis that the real essence is now known, so the nominal 
essence and the real essence coincide. On this view ‗water is H2O‘ comes out as necessary, 
since this is how ‗water‘ has been defined, but it is also a priori, since the definition is fixed 
by stipulation. The key thought, however, is that in neither case do you get anything remotely 
like the Kripkean story. 
The majority of the essentialists, then, listed in the introduction to this chapter, who 
take themselves to be referring to the Lockean notion of ‗real essence‘ are, in fact, referring to 
something more like the Aristotelian notion of essence, where nature comes pre-carved into 
natural kinds. This raises some important questions about the implications of their theories. In 
particular the classic conclusion from Kripke concerning necessary truths that are knowable a 
posteriori. If the notion of essence at work there is not the Lockean notion (which does rely 
on empirical investigation) but the Aristotelian notion (which does not rely on empirical 
investigation), then we have to wonder why the contemporary essentialists‘ ‗essences‘ are not 
just as a priori as the Aristotelians‘ – at the very least essentialists owe us a comprehensive 
account of what natural kinds and essences are. Furthermore, even if it was the Lockean 
notion of a real essence at work in the Kripke/Putnam thesis, this would not generate anything 
like their standard story of natural kinds and the necessary a posteriori. On Locke‘s view our 
ideas of natural kinds can change depending upon what scientific theory we subscribe to, and 
what the overall state of our knowledge is. Our classifications of kinds can change, as 
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demonstrated by the division of quadruclocks and quintuclocks, depending upon the practical 
interests of the classifiers. Finally, taking the watchmaker example as an analogy, there is no 
reason why a Lockean could not decide to have a disjunctive real essence (imagine the 
watchmaker draws no linguistic distinction between clocks with four cogs and clocks with 
five cogs), and as such any ‗real essence‘ manifestly will not carve nature at the joints. 
Locke‘s real essences, as situated in the Aristotelian tradition, are essences in name alone, and 
thoroughly anti-essentialist in spirit. As such they should not figure in any version of 
contemporary essentialism. 
The important consequence of this chapter is that although Locke appears to be, 
broadly speaking, a scientific realist, endorsing the idea that for substances and the like there 
will be some underlying features that (causally) explain the observable features of objects, 
this does not imply that there are mind-independent divisions in nature. In effect, then, what 
Locke shows is that although real essences are a commitment of scientific realism, 
Aristotelian essences are not.  
This still leaves it an open question as to precisely what notion of essence and 
essentialism for natural kinds is being appealed to both by the now dominant tradition within 
the philosophy of language, and the Kripkean tradition. However, Locke‘s notion of real 
essence, with its minimal metaphysical commitments, fits neatly with the version of 
descriptivism I presented in chapter 5. Employing the Lockean notion, where kinds are 
initially classified in terms of nominal essences rather than real essences, when real essences 
are not known, but where those natural kinds can be reclassified when real essences become 
known, coheres particularly well with the story I gave about the re-coining of natural kind 
terms. However, I will return to this in chapter 8. 
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I now turn, in chapter 7, to a much more substantive version of essentialism. Since it is 
a key feature of the whatever essentialism is being appealed to in the Kripke-Putnam tradition 
that essences be discoverable a posteriori, following the model of theoretical identity 
inherited from Kripke, I am ignoring brands of essentialism, defended, for example, by 
Jonathan Lowe (2004), that are a priori. Instead, I concentrate on a recent brand of 
essentialism defended by Brian Ellis – so-called scientific essentialism – which purports to be 
concerned with theoretical identity and maintains that such identities must be a posteriori. In 
chapter 7 I will present and criticise this thesis, and conclude that it is, in fact, untenable. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
In chapter 6 I raised a question about the notion of ‗real essence‘ philosophers typically 
appeal to in contemporary discussions of metaphysical essentialism, claiming that they were 
not appealing to Locke‘s notion with all their talk of de re modality, but something more 
metaphysically substantive. In section 1 I begin by sketching out the logical geography 
between different brands of essentialism, before presenting, in section 2, one recent version of 
metaphysical essentialism that purports to underpin scientific realism, namely Brian Ellis‘s 
so-called scientific essentialism (SE). In section 3 I present an alternative metaphysics for 
scientific realism, promiscuous realism (PR), that rejects the metaphysical trappings of 
essentialism. In sections 4, 5 and 6 I present a series of objections to (SE),  demonstrating 
that, in light of certain key empirical examples, its version of natural kind essentialism is 
untenable. By demonstrating that even paradigm examples of essentialist natural kinds are 
liable to counterexamples I will establish that scientific essentialism‘s restrictions of natural 
kinds are unwarranted. In section 7 I claim that the counterexamples pose a further problem 
for (SE)‘s notion of necessity, and in section 8 I ask whether, by undermining scientific 
essentialism, I have undermined the essentialism appealed to in chapter 5. The overall project 
of this chapter is effectively two-fold: firstly, to raise some specific concerns about the 
restrictions scientific essentialism puts on natural kinds and their essences; secondly, to raise 
some more general worries about commitments to what I label, in section 1, thick 
essentialism. 
It is worth noting, however, that scientific essentialism is not the only available brand 
of essentialism: see, for instance, Lowe‘s (2004) a priori essentialism, Bird‘s (2007) 
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dispositional essentialism or Oderberg‘s (2009) Aristotelian essentialism. What makes 
scientific essentialism ripe for investigation here, though, is (i) its claim to be interested in ‗an 
examination of the scientific practice of theoretical identification‘ (Ellis 2001: 54) and (ii) it‘s 
claim to be thoroughly a posteriori. There is also, or so it seems to me, a clear and obvious 
parallel between Ellis‘s project and the Kripke-Putnam programme discussed during the first 
five chapters of this thesis, specifically the necessity of theoretical identities, and the claim 
that science discovers essence. Oddly, however, Ellis explicitly disavows himself from the 
Kripke-Putnam tradition, claiming that his interests are completely different (Ellis 2001: 54). 
Given his interest in theoretical identification, however, this seems obviously false (although 
for a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary 2010b). First, 
though, a brief sketch of the logical geography on types of essentialism. 
 
7.1 Trivial Essentialism, Non-trivial Essentialism, and the Thick/Thin Distinction 
Chapters 1-5 of this thesis were marked by a broadly unexplicated appeal to essentialism. The 
initial definition of essentialism offered was simply that there are kinds with essences, where 
those essences are necessary and sufficient conditions for  being a member of the said kind. 
Furthermore, the essences of kinds hold as a matter of metaphysical necessity, which is to say 
that where E is the essence of the kind K, the E is the essence of K in all possible worlds. 
However, such a minimal definition tells us very little. For instance, bachelors form a kind in 
some sense, and the necessary and sufficient conditions on being a bachelor are being both 
unmarried and male. Moreover, these conditions on being a bachelor hold as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity – there are no possible worlds where people that lack the conjunction 
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of the properties being unmarried and being male are bachelors. Hence, it is high time for a 
sketch of the logical geography. 
The first distinction to be drawn is between trivial and nontrivial essentialism, since 
this has already been mention. As I noted earlier (in chapter 4, section 4), the distinction 
between trivial and nontrivial essentialism comes from Salmon (2005: 82-87), and is roughly 
as follows: consider our old friend Winston Churchill. One property the Churchill certainly 
has essentially, if he has any, is the property of being Winston Churchill. Indeed, the property 
of being Winston Churchill is one property that almost everyone is happy to attribute to 
Churchill necessarily, and a priori. That being said, trivial essential properties need not be 
attributable to an individual (or kind) a priori. For example, since Bruce Wayne is Batman, 
Wayne has the property of being Batman essentially. However, since we might not know that 
Bruce Wayne is Batman, attributing the property of being Batman to Bruce Wayne is not 
something we could do a priori, despite it still being a property that Wayne has necessarily. In 
both cases, the important point is that the property we are attributing to either Churchill or 
Wayne is merely the property of being self-identical – and surely anything that exists has this 
property. Hence attributions of essence on this basis are surely trivial. 
The contrast is with cases where the attribution of essential properties to an individual 
or kind requires some additional metaphysics. In the case of individuals, for instance, when 
we say of Churchill that he has his actual origin necessarily, or essentially, we are committing 
ourselves to the further, general metaphysical hypothesis that the origin of an individual is 
essential to it. Hence, the truth of the claim that Winston Churchill necessarily comes from the 
(particular) sperm of Randolph Churchill and the (particular) ovum of Jennie Jerome is 
predicated both on the empirical discovery of Churchill‘s actual origin, plus the general 
metaphysical principle that the origin of an object is essential to it. Similarly, early-Putnam‘s 
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claims that sameness of substance consists in possessing the same microstructure (see chapter 
2, and chapter 4,  section 4.5) suggests a further, general principle of essentialism, over and 
above the claim that everything is self-identical. The topic of this thesis, quite obviously, has 
been nontrivial essentialism. However, there is a further division to be drawn between 
varieties of nontrivial essentialism.  
According to Paul (2006) there are two brands of (what I have called nontrivial) 
essentialism: on the one hand deep essentialism, on the other hand shallow essentialism. 
However, I prefer to distinguish these brands of nontrivial essentialism as thick essentialism 
and thin essentialism, in line with my (Leary 2007). The bones of the distinction, however, 
are fundamentally the same. As Paul carves things us, nontrivial essentialism itself is a belief 
in de re modal properties (although I shall argue, in chapter 8, that this is not quite right). 
Deep or thick essentialism is the view that there is an essence E of an object o such that (a) E 
is an assortment of (general) properties in virtue of which o is the object that it is, (b) E is a 
gauge of what is required for o to exist, and (c) E is entirely mind-independent. Thus, when 
we discover that water is H2O, or that tungsten is the element with atomic number 74, and 
judge these facts to be necessary (but knowable only a posteriori), one way to understand that 
claim is that we have literally discovered some deep, objective fact about reality, such that 
independently of us there exists a natural kind, water, demarcated in this and all worlds by its 
essence, the microstructural property of being composed of H2O. The contrast with shallow or 
this essentialism is that whilst thin essentialists can accept (a) and (b), they reject (c), claiming 
instead that where some property P is part of the essence E (or, for that matter, the entire 
essence) of an object o, P is only an essential property of o given the context c, but might 
equally have been accidental under some alternative context c1. On this view, once we 
discover that water is H2O, or that tungsten is the element with atomic number 74, we 
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stipulate that the essence E of either kind is fixed relative to our interests (although these  
might well be the interests of the scientist). Thus while (a) and (b) are still true, (c) is false. 
We do classify the kind water on the basis of its essence H2O, but whilst the property being 
H2O is a real property of objects that posses it, that we classify the kind water on that basis is 
not a mind-independent fact about reality; in other words, being H2O is not the deep essence 
of water, since there is no such thing. Thin (or shallow) essentialism, then, trades in the mind-
independent essences of the thick (or deep) essentialist, for ‗context-dependent truths‘ (Paul 
2006: 333), where essences are relative to project and purpose. This, as I demonstrated in 
Chapter 6, is what Locke had in mind when he introduced the notion of ‗real essence‘.  
The project now, then, is to explore upon what side of the thin/thick divide scientific 
essentialism falls, given that, like Kripke, it purports to be interested in the scientific practice 
of theoretical identification. I will argue that scientific essentialism clearly falls upon the thick 
side of the divide, but that this is not required to do justice to our intuitions about both 
scientific realism and Twin Earth style thought experiments. 
 
7.2 Scientific Essentialism 
According to scientific essentialism (SE), what it is to be a natural kind is captured 
exhaustively by six theses (Ellis 2001: 19-21). The theses constitute a set of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something‘s being a natural kind. The 
conditions are: 
(T1) Natural kinds are objective insofar as they are made distinct by their ‗essential 
natures or structures‘ (Ellis 2001: 19) that are independent of us. 
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(T2) Natural kinds are ontologically ‗categorically distinct‘ (ibid). There are no 
ontologically vague boundaries between natural kinds, and our classificatory 
system should ‗carve them [natural kinds] according to their natural divisions‘ 
(Plato, Statesman, 287c), and not to our inclinations or practical needs. 
(T3) Natural kinds are demarcated by ‗intrinsic difference‘ (Ellis 2001: 20), which 
entails that natural kind demarcation cannot be based on extrinsic relational facts 
of the matter (which Ellis construes as accidental circumstances) but only on the 
intrinsic natures of its members. 
(T4) Natural kinds have a ‗speciation requirement‘ (ibid.) that allows for the variation 
between members of a single kind. For example, two isotopes of a single element 
differ intrinsically from one another. Since this difference cannot be either 
obtained or lost by members of the kind, both isotopes must be members of a 
higher order kind in virtue of possessing the relevant essential features. 
(T5) Natural kinds have a ‗hierarchy requirement‘ such that if any particular is a 
member of two or more different natural kinds, those ‗natural kinds must both be 
species of some common genus‘ (ibid.), or else one must be a species of the other. 
(T6) Natural kinds have an ‗essentiality requirement‘: kind membership is dependent 
on intrinsic nature, and possession of this nature is both necessary and sufficient 
for membership of the kind. In other words, all natural kinds have a ‗real essence‘ 
(albeit not in Locke‘s sense) which determines what it is to be of that kind.  
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Consider, by way of illustration, the classic example of a natural kind, water. We have 
discovered empirically that water is H2O. This discovery amounts to the claim that the 
substance, water, is made up of collections of molecules with particular constituents 
(hydrogen and oxygen atoms), and has particular composition (spatial arrangement of the 
parts). Since the molecular structure and constituent atoms of the H2O molecules that make up 
water are clearly independent facts about the world, water satisfies (T1). Since H2O molecules 
do not have ontologically vague boundaries, being, as they are, clearly delineated from all 
other kinds of molecules by a unique conjunction of constituents and structure, water satisfies 
(T2). Further, the H2O-kind, of which all molecules of H2O are members, is demarcated by its 
intrinsic properties (structure and composition), thus satisfying (T3). H2O molecules also 
satisfy the speciation requirement set out in (T4), since members of the H2O kind can 
constituted by different isotopes of hydrogen and oxygen (there are 18 variations in total), yet 
still be members of the H2O-kind: so H2O and D2O are intrinsically different from one another 
(since the latter, but not the former, has a neutron in the nucleus of each hydrogen atom), and 
so form their own species of the genus H2O . H2O molecules also satisfy (T5), the hierarchy 
requirement, since each of the 18 possible (isotopic) variations of an H2O molecule forms a 
natural kind which is, in turn, a member of the higher-order H2O kind. Thus, a 
1
H2
16
O 
molecule is a member of at least two natural kinds: the 
1
H2
16
O-kind, and the H2O kind. (T5) 
states that this is only possible where either both kinds are species of some common genus, or 
where one kind is a species of the other. In our example (T5) is trivially satisfied since ‗one of 
the two kinds is a species of the other‘ (Ellis 2001: 20); finally, H2O molecules satisfy (T6) 
since being constituted of two hydrogen molecules and one oxygen molecule, connected by 
polar covalent bonds, and with a tetrahedral molecular structure, is both necessary and 
sufficient for, and thus the essence of, the kind water. 
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7.3 Promiscuous Realism 
Scientific essentialism can usefully be contrasted with promiscuous realism (PR), an 
alternative, realist view of science, which actively rejects a thick (or deep) notion of essence. 
According to (PR), the notion of a natural kind is not wedded to a thick notion of a 
metaphysical essence, but rather to the notion of explanation. (PR) thus rejects the 
Aristotelian notion of an essence, and the ‗realist myth of the self-differentiating object‘ 
(Wiggins 2001: 150), endorsing instead a Locke‘s much thinner notion of a ‗real essence‘ 
(Leary 2009), and a pluralism concerning scientific classification.
79
 
The pluralism of (PR) can be divided into two distinct pluralist claims: The first is 
delivered in direct opposition to an ‗essentialist doctrine of natural kinds‘ and claims that 
‗there are many equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into kinds‘ (Dupré 1995: 6), 
endorsing a ‗metaphysics of radical ontological pluralism‘ (ibid.:18); The second, closely 
related to the first, is the claim that systems of classifications ‗may cross-classify one another 
in indefinitely complex ways‘ (ibid.), illustrating the disunity of science. Robert Wilson 
(1996: 305), in his analysis of (PR) identifies these two distinct brands of pluralism, and 
captures them with two negative theses: 
 
(A) There is no one criterion for membership of a given natural kind, i.e. that provided by 
the essence of the kind. 
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 This claim – that (PR) endorses Locke‘s notion of ‗real essence‘ – is somewhat controversial. After all, Dupré 
explicitly attributes the Lockean notion to Kripke and (early) Putnam, both of whom are a posteriori 
essentialists. However, as I argued in chapter 6, and in Leary (2009), this interpretation of Locke is, I think, 
ultimately mistaken. As such, I think the Lockean notion is metaphysically innocuous enough to be compatible 
with (PR). 
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(B) There is no one way of ordering the natural kinds that there are in the world so that 
they constitute a unity. 
 
There are two ways to understand (A): The first is to view (A) as the flat denial that 
natural kinds have essence. Hence, although we classify water, say, as via its chemical 
composition, H2O, there is no reason to think that this is the essence of the kind. The second 
is to view (A) as the claim that there are no mind-independent essences, in the sense intended 
by the thick essentialist. Thus while we might classify some substances kinds via their atomic 
composition, we need not do this with all substances. Since I have argued, in chapter 6, that 
there is a metaphysically thin (innocuous) notion of real essence available, I am opting to 
interpret (A) in the second fashion. Moreover, the second interpretation of (A) seems more 
reasonable, since there are clear cases in science (such as the periodic table) where we have 
singled out one criteria for kind membership. To illustrate thesis (A), as I understand it, 
consider the substance olivine. In 2003 a joint team from Arizona State University and 
NASA, led by Todd Hoefen, claimed to have found large quantities of the substance olivine 
on Mars.
80
 But what is olivine, and more importantly is olivine a natural kind? The general 
term ‗olivine‘ is used to denote the substance that makes up the majority of Earth‘s crust. 
More specifically, it refers to an isomorphic group of substances that includes iron rich 
fayalite (Fe2SiO4) and magnesium rich forsterite (Mg2SiO4). Whilst fayalite and forsterite are 
made of distinct elements, that they are isomorphic means they have an (almost) identical 
molecular structure, and analogous (rather than identical) composition. Moreover, since 
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 These quantities, later research has shown, are much larger than was first thought (cf. Hamilton and 
Christensen 2005: 433-36). 
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almost all naturally existing samples of olivine are a mixture of fayalite and forsterite, and the 
difference in constituent elements makes almost no difference in physical properties, olivine 
is often represented using the chemical formula X2SiO4, where ‗X‘ is employed as a 
placeholder denoting a variable. 
For (SE), since the essence of a substance-kind consists in the conjunction of the 
constituents of each molecule, plus information about ‗how the atoms are arranged within the 
molecule‘ (Ellis 2001: 69), the constitutional difference between fayalite and forsterite rules 
out olivine as a natural kind. But this seems to be somewhat at odds with the attitudes of 
experts, such as Hoefen, and too restrictive given the physical facts (e.g. that the vast majority 
of natural samples occur as a mixture, and that even separated, the properties of fayalite and 
forsterite are remarkably similar). (PR)‘s pluralist promiscuity, and the claim made in (A) – 
that there is no one criterion for membership in a given kind – leaves scope for treating 
olivine as a natural kind, based upon the rationale that it plays an important role in 
explanation, and is reliable for scientific induction. Although empirical investigation has 
shown us that what we call ‗olivine‘ occurs naturally as a mixture of two constitutionally 
distinct substances, fayalite and forsterite, (PR) reasons that since fayalite and forsterite have 
(almost) identical crystallographies (molecular structures), and exhibit very similar 
macroscopic properties, there are good empirical reasons to count olivine as a natural kind. 
Moreover, since (PR)‘s metaphysics seems to more accurately capture actual attitudes, 
reflecting bona fide scientific practice, there is a prima facie reason to favour (PR) over (SE). 
To illustrate (PR)‘s second thesis, (B), we need an example where some individual x 
belongs two or more taxonomic categories, but those categories fail to fall into so-called 
‗subsumption relations‘ (Khalidi 1998: 40), where one of the kinds of which x is a member 
turns out to be a species of the other. It is worth noting that if there are examples of cross-
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cutting, these examples will stand in direct tension with (SE)‘s thesis T5) – the claim that if 
some individual a is a member of two (or more) natural kinds, those kinds must enter into 
some sort of genus/species relationship. Hence any example that confirms (B) automatically 
disconfirms (T5). So, are there examples of crosscutting? 
Consider, for instance, the category (or group) chalcogen. According to the periodic 
table, the category chalcogen consists of any and all elements, atoms of which have 6 
electrons on their outer shell. Chalcogen, however, crosscuts the category metalloid – the 
group of elements that divide the metals and non-metals – in virtue of possessing properties 
indicative of both groups. For example, selenium and tellurium are chalcogens, and tellurium 
and antimony are both metalloids, but neither category – chalcogen or metalloid – includes all 
three elements. Thus, we have a prima facie case of a crosscutting taxonomy, since neither 
category can be subsumed within the other. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (1998: 33 – 50) offers an 
alternative example: the category parasite, he observes, crosscuts that category insect: 
tapeworms and fleas are both parasites, fleas and flies are both insects, but the category insect 
cannot be subsumed by the category parasite (since not all insects are parasites), and neither 
can the category parasite by subsumed by the category insect (since not all parasites are 
insects). Again, then, we have a prima facie case of crosscutting (see also Tobin 2010). 
The problem these examples generate for (SE) are obvious: according to (SE) there is 
a unified hierarchy of natural kinds. This notion of a unified hierarchy of kinds is captured by 
(T5), which states that for any individual x, if x is a member of two natural kinds, NK1 and 
NK2, then those kinds must be ordered into a hierarchy, where one of the kinds, NK1 say, is a 
member of the other NK2 (or, alternately, that NK1 and NK2 are both species of some common 
genus NK*). Since neither parasites and insects, nor chalcogens and metalloids, can be so 
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ordered, (SE) must either say that none of these categories pick out natural kinds, or that T5) 
is false. 
The most likely response to examples like those outlined above is to deny that the 
categories considered pick out natural kinds. So, the categories chalcogen and metalloid do 
indeed crosscut, but since neither category is a natural kind, this fails to threaten (T5). But the 
response appears ad hoc. The metalloid group forms what is known as the amphoteric line on 
the periodic table, separating the metals from the non-metals. The metalloids – boron, silicon, 
germanium, arsenic, antimony, tellurium and polonium – are grouped together on the basis of 
a shared similarity; they all have properties that are intermediate between those of a metal and 
those of a nonmetal. What this means is that if we discover of some object, x, that it is a 
metalloid, this tells us that x will have electronegativity (an atom‘s ability to attract electrons) 
and ionization (the energy required to remove the outermost electron of an atom or molecule) 
properties between those of a metal and a nonmetal. It will also tell us that x‘s reactivity will 
depend upon the properties of other elements within the reaction. Similarly, the chalcogens – 
oxygen, sulphur, selenium, tellurium – are grouped together on the basis that each has six 
electrons on its outer shell (and similar electron configurations more generally), which 
determines their bonding patterns and chemical behaviour. Hence, discovering that x is a 
chalcogen will reveal that x has precisely six electrons on its outer shell, which, in turn, 
reveals certain facts about chemical behaviour, particularly how x will bond with atoms of 
other elements .   
Of course, that is not to say that knowing x is a either a metalloid or a chalcogen will 
tell us everything about x. For example, silicon and arsenic are both metalloids, but whilst the 
latter boils at 613°C the former boils at 2355°C. Hence, knowing that x is a metalloid will not 
tell you at what temperature x will boil. But then, knowing that x is H2O will not tell you 
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whether x is a liquid, solid or a gas. Hence this seems entirely unproblematic. Thus, there is 
no reason to think that metalloids or chalcogens cannot also be a natural kinds. If that is 
correct, then (T5) must be false. A cross-cutting taxonomy, then, undermines one of (SE)‘s six 
necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions on what it is to be a natural kinds. It also, recall, 
undermines one of Soames‘ assumptions (his special auxiliary assumption) as discussed in 
chapter 3, section 7. 
 
7.4 Causal Intrinsicality 
Give the interpretation of (A), above, it is obvious that (PR) is hostile to the notion of an 
Aristotelian essence, which is precisely the notion endorsed by (SE) (Ellis 2001: 170). In the 
previous section I outline the motivation of (PR)‘s scepticism, but here I focus on precisely 
what (SE) means by ‗intrinsic‘, given condition (T3). I will argue that this places 
unreasonable restrictions, by (SE)‘s own lights, on what properties can play the role of an 
essence. 
According to (T3), the only properties fit to play the essence role for natural kinds are 
those that members of the kind possess intrinsically. The restriction that natural kinds are 
unified via intrinsic (sometimes called ‗natural‘) properties is not a new one (see Bird and 
Tobin 2010), and as such (T3) might appear to be a fairly typical restriction. The problem is 
that (SE)‘s notion of ‗intrinsic‘ is rather idiosyncratic, and invites some special problems. For 
(SE), the notion of intrinsic at work is a causal one (so, by ‗intrinsic‘ Ellis means causally 
intrinsic), apparently motivated by appeal to the ‗common structure of causal explanation in 
science‘ (Ellis 2006: 91). Thus, for some object x, there is a distinction to be made between 
the properties that x has in and of itself, and those that x has as the product of extrinsic 
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(causal) factors. The proposal is to divide properties, broadly speaking, into two categories: 
those which x bears causally independently (intrinsically), and those that x bears causally 
dependently (extrinsically). More formally, (SE) offers the following definition of what it is to 
be an intrinsic property: 
 
P is an intrinsic property of x = df x would display P in the absence of any accidental 
forces that might otherwise affect the property that is displayed by x. 
 
The idea is simply enough. Consider, for instance, a polyurethane foam rubber (the 
material used to make stress balls) sphere, call it a. Typically a has the property of being 
spherical, call that S, and exhibits that property provided there are no external influences. 
However, with the application of sufficient pressure a can (and does) exhibit an alternative 
squished shape, call that S*. The claim is that since a only exhibits S* when there is sufficient 
force, call that F, we can say that a bears S* extrinsically. In contrast, when a exhibits S, since 
S is ‗logically independent of anything external to it‘ (Ellis 2001: 26), a bears S intrinsically. 
Moreover, for S to be part of the essence of a, a must bear S intrinsically. In other worlds, it is 
a necessary condition of S‘s being part of the essence of a that a bears S intrinsically. 
However, the construal of intrinsic as causally-intrinsic, and the treatment of it as a necessary 
condition on what category of properties can feature in an essence claim, generates some 
serious problems for apparently paradigm natural kinds. 
Standard essence claims about a chemical compounds include information about both 
what constituents the compound has, and how those constituent parts are arranged. This latter 
condition is motivated by the empirical discovery of isomers, that is substances ‗with the 
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same composition by different chemical properties and different physical properties‘ 
(Needham 2000: 14). This discovery guaranteed that defining substances in terms of 
constituents alone was insufficient for demarcating natural (chemical) kinds. Let me define, 
for the purposes of this discussion, ‗constitution‘ as the parts from which something is made, 
and ‗composition‘ as the arrangement of those parts. The discovery of isomers, 
philosophically speaking, demonstrates that constitution provides, at best, merely ‗a necessary 
condition for sameness of kind‘ (ibid.), rather than a necessary and sufficient condition, as 
suggested by Kripke and Putnam‘s discussion of theoretical identification (see chapter 1 and 
2). For instance, the theoretical identity ‗propanol is C3H8O‘ identifies the essence of propanol 
as consisting of three parts carbon, eight parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. However, taken 
just as a description of constitution, C3H8O fails to demarcate propanol from some other 
kinds. Methoxyethane has an identical constitution, but markedly different physical 
properties. For instance, methoxyethane boils at 7.4°C, whilst propanol boils at 82.3°C. What 
explains this difference in physical properties is that propanol and methoxyethane differ is 
their molecular structure: 
Propanol      Methoxyethane 
 H H H     H H  H 
H    O H  H   O  H 
 H H H     H H  H 
 
(SE) readily concedes that isomerism entails that it is ‗necessary to say how the atoms are 
arranged within the molecule‘ (Ellis 2001: 69) in order to specify the essences of compound 
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substances. In conjunction with (T3) it follows that molecular geometry must be a causally 
intrinsic property of substances. In other words, a molecule of a substance must have the 
geometry it has independently of any extrinsic forces. However, I will argue that molecular 
bonds (which are a necessary condition of molecular geometry – no molecular bonds, no 
molecule, and hence no geometry) are not always intrinsic in the sense required for (T3), and 
thus that since substance kinds are paradigm natural kinds for (SE), (T3) must be rejected. 
To begin, consider the famous H2O case: science has shown us that each molecule of 
H2O consists of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms, bonded via a polar covalent bond. 
The bond is ‗covalent‘ because each bond (between two atoms) is maintained by a pair of 
shared electrons, one donated from each atom. The bond is polar since the shared electrons, 
which are negatively charged, are normally closer to the oxygen nucleus than to the hydrogen 
nuclei, giving the molecule an overall polarity that is negative at the oxygen ‗end‘ of the 
molecule. The specific geometry of the H2O molecule is tetrahedral, and the bond angle is 
104.5 degrees. 
The bond angle of H2O molecules at normal pressures and temperatures, however, is 
anomalous. The perfect tetrahedral angle is 109.5 degrees, given the conservation of energy 
law; 109.5 degrees is what the bond angle of an H2O molecule should be, based upon ab initio 
calculations. The difference between the actual and ideal bond angles is explained by the two 
lone pairs of valence electrons – electrons on the  outer shell of the atom, not involved in the 
covalent bond – and their mutual repulsion, which effectively bends the angle of the bond. 
Since electrons are part of the atoms that possess them, the bending of the bond angle on that 
basis is not an extrinsic influence, but an intrinsic one. Hence the anomalousness of the bond 
angle does not pose a problem for (SE). What is most interesting is that many of the actual 
bond angles of molecules are anomalous, some much more so than H2O. For example, the 
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bond angle of an H2S molecule, which also has a tetrahedral geometry, is a mere 92 degrees. 
The key is that actual bond angles of molecules must be investigated empirically, and 
determined at ambient pressures and temperatures, rather than calculated ab initio. 
However, pressure and temperature can influence the bonding patterns of atoms, and 
by extension molecular geometries. Moreover, the requirement that molecular geometry be 
determined empirically at ambient pressures and temperatures provides the impetus for 
generating counterexamples to (T3). Schematically, what we need is a Twin Earth style case 
where (i) the ambient pressure and temperature are different, and (ii) the molecule being 
investigated only exists at that pressure and/or temperature. 
To find such an example we look to high-pressure chemistry. We know, from modern 
science, that the electrons on the outer shell are responsible for the bonding of atoms into 
molecules. Recent research has shown that at high pressures the electron shells of atoms are 
susceptible to what is known as ‗pressure-induced mixing‘ (McMillan 2006: 855), where two 
or more electron shells are forced together. Calcium, for instance, at pressures greater than 
200kbar, takes on the chemical and physical properties of a transition metal, rather than an 
alkali earth metal, since it no longer has two valence electrons on its outer shell. The blending 
of electron shells means that atoms of calcium, at the appropriate pressure, will exhibit 
‗unusual valencies and bonding patterns‘ (ibid.). More simply, since the increasing pressure 
blends the outer shells of a calcium atom it changes that number of valence electrons on the 
outer shell, and since valence electrons are what determine the formation of molecular bonds, 
a calcium atom with more valence electrons available can bond with atoms of other elements 
that it could not bond with at pressures less than 200kbar. The upshot is that there will be 
compounds consisting of calcium, formed at high pressures, where that molecular bond, and 
hence the molecule, is only possible at high pressure. But in such a case the molecular bond, 
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which is a necessary feature of the essence of a compound, will not be an intrinsic property in 
the sense outlined by (T3) – after all, that bond could not exist were it not for the pressure, 
and pressure is surely an extrinsic force for (SE). 
More formally, then, the counterexample runs as follows: imagine a possible world 
w1, where the ambient pressure is 200kbar. At w1 let c be a compound of calcium, let F be the 
extrinsic force produced by 200kbar of atmospheric pressure (that produces pressure-induced 
blending), and let m be the molecular bond that c has. The definition (SE) has of intrinsic, 
recall, is that a property P is only borne intrinsically by an object o if o has P in the absence of 
any accidental force. Given that the molecular bond of c must figure in any essence claim 
about c, but c has m only as a result of F (c could not exist without F) m cannot be an intrinsic 
property of c. However, c is as much a natural kind of compound as, say, H2O is. Thus, either 
both c and H2O are natural kinds, or both are not natural kinds. Given (SE)‘s claim that H2O is 
a paradigm natural kind (this follows from the more general claim that chemical compounds 
are paradigm natural kinds), c must qualify by the same lights as H2O does. However, if c is a 
natural kind, and m is part of the essence of c, then (T3) – the claim that all essential 
properties are causally-intrinsic properties – is false. Again, then, (SE)‘s notion of a natural 
kind is undermined.
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7.5 Are kinds impoverished without (thick) essences? 
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 Of course, there might be other, more promising notions of intrinsic, which an alternative version of 
essentialism could endorse, that are not affected by this objection. For my present purposes, though, this is 
irrelevant. The point is that Ellis argues explicitly for the treatment of the notion of ‗intrinsic‘ as a causal one, 
ruling out all others as inadequate. On that basis, then, the objection fielded here is particularly serious. 
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(SE), as we have seen, claims that what it is to be a natural kind is captured by the conjunction 
of (T1) – (T6). So far I have shown that there is a prima facie case for thinking that (T5) is 
false (given crosscutting), and a clear counterexample to (T3) (given the pressure induced 
mixing of electron shells, and the new bonding patterns that result from it). This effectively 
undermines the treatment of (T1)-(T6) as individually necessary jointly sufficient conditions 
on what it is to be a natural kind. 
Here I would like to return to one of the possible responses that (SE) could make to 
crosscutting, which I earlier dismissed as ad hoc, at least in the case of the groups on the 
periodic table. The general strategy, recall, would be to reject the examples of crosscutting as 
bona fide natural kind categories. (SE) employs precisely this strategy to reject biological 
species as natural kinds, thus eliminating perhaps the most significant pool of examples of 
crosscutting. 
The scientific essentialist‘s rejection of biological species as natural kinds is as 
follows: the best candidates for species (thick) essence are the genetic features of those 
species (since it is only the causally intrinsic properties that explain manifest properties – 
which effectively rules out the dominant method of classification in biology, cladism, which 
groups species together via their ancestry. For (SE) species demarcated by clades cannot be 
natural kinds since their essences are not intrinsic – being, as they are, delineated by ancestry 
– nor are they categorical – presumably there is some vagueness in the classification of 
species via ancestry, since the actual ancestry will not always be known). However, the 
genetic variation between individual members of a single species means that there is no 
univocal genetic feature that all the members share. Since thick essences are sets of 
(metaphysically necessary) necessary and sufficient conditions, and biological species have 
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no intrinsic genetic features that can play the role of a thick essence, they fail to qualify as 
natural kinds. 
Since concerns over the status of biological species as natural kinds have been so well 
discussed (Dupré 1995; Ereshefsky 1991; Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976; LaPorte 2004; Mayr 
1970), it would be unreasonable to accuse (SE) of being ad hoc in rejecting them as natural 
kinds. However, it is not necessary to defend biological species as natural kinds to, again, 
undermine (SE). Rather, all that is required is an analysis of the consequences of (SE)‘s 
concession that despite not being natural kinds, we can ‗reason about them [biological 
species] as if there were strict Aristotelian natural kinds‘ (Ellis 2001: 170). This concession, I 
claim, generates a problem for (T6), the claim that for something to be a natural kind it must 
have a thick essence. The objection targets the rationale for (T6), rather than (T6) itself. 
However, by undermining the rational for (T6) my intention is to appeal to metaphysical 
parsimony: if a metaphysics with thin essences can do the same job as one with thick 
essences, then, via an appeal to parsimony and simplicity, the former is a better system than 
the latter. The rationale for a metaphysics of thick essence, according to (SE), is two-fold. 
Firstly, that scientific essentialism is the best metaphysics to underpin scientific realism. 
Secondly, that natural kinds without thick essences explain very little. 
The first part of the rationale has already been criticised, by implication, in chapter 6, 
where I demonstrated that there is a metaphysically innocuous notion of ‗real essence‘ that is 
sufficient to underpin a broadly scientific realist view of the world.
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 The point, recall, was 
that scientific realists need not subscribe to the existence of an ‗elite set of facts‘(Psillos 2006: 
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 Locke was, I think, a scientific realist, at least broadly speaking. After all, he was at least willing to entertain 
that the corpuscularian hypothesis might be true. 
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17) for classification, despite having Kripke-Putnam intuitions about essences. Rather, they 
can merely concede that being a scientific realist comes  with a commitment to real essences 
in Locke‘s sense (i.e. an explanatory essence, which might be extrinsic, as ancestry is), but 
that a belief in real essences is separable from a belief in de re modal properties – that is, 
properties that objects have as a matter of mind-independent, metaphysical necessity.
83
 
The second part of the rationale, upon which I wish to focus, is (SE)‘s claim that 
‗essences are the postulated intrinsic sources of the manifest properties and behaviour[s]‘ 
(ibid.) of natural kinds, and that since science is in the business of explanation, a metaphysics 
with essences fares far better than one without; hence, we should be (scientific) essentialists. 
The nub of (SE)‘s claim is that any metaphysics which denies that natural kinds have thick 
essences will seemingly lack the ability to explain why the members of natural kinds behave 
in the fashion that they do. To put it another way, since thick essences are the intrinsic 
(categorical) causal base of the manifest properties and/or behaviours of natural kinds and 
their members, any view of kinds that denies that there are thick essences apparently jettisons 
the explanatory usefulness of natural kinds. 
However, given the analysis of real essence in chapter 6, there is a much more 
minimal notion of essence that is precisely explanatory, but comes without the additional 
constraints imposed by (SE), i.e. (T1)-(T5). The problem for (SE) is that although it rejects 
biological species as natural kinds, given the weight of empirical evidence (SE) is forced to 
concede that ‗biological species are more or less salient clusters of intrinsically similar natural 
kinds – sufficiently similar in fact ... [to] reason about them as if there were strict Aristotelian 
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 As Psillos (2006) notes, the debate over whether to be an essentialist can, and should, be conducted quite 
independently from the debate over whether to be a scientific realist. There is nothing inconsistent, Psillos 
claims, with being a pluralist about scientific classification whilst still being a realist (2006: 18). 
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natural kinds‘ (Ellis 2001: 170). This concession has serious consequences, since it effectively 
amounts to the recognition that a much more minimal notion of essence can underpin 
scientific realism. The argument can be expressed as follows: Biological species do not satisfy 
(T1)-(T5), and hence cannot be natural kinds with thick essence. In spite of this, their 
explanatory utility is such that we can reason about them as if they had thick essences. In 
other words, individual species concepts are sufficient to ground successful scientific 
inductions and explanations. However, if biological species do not have thick essences, but 
are nevertheless susceptible to natural kind-style reasoning concerning induction and 
explanation, then clearly it is not an essential feature of an explanatorily useful kind that it 
have a thick essence. Consequently, thick essences cannot be a prerequisite of scientific 
realism. 
This concession about biological species is one that (SE) must make, since the 
scientific credentials of biology in general, and the species concept in particular, are very well 
established. But once the concession is made, as the preceding argument shows, there is room 
for a view of natural kinds that satisfies the rationale that natural kinds should be explanatory 
– which both (SE) and (PR) agree on – without positing thick (metaphysically controversial) 
essences. Hence, it is possible to have a view of natural kinds with all the explanatory benefits 
of (SE), but without the metaphysical costs. This is sufficient, I claim, to reject (SE) as the 
preferred metaphysics for scientific realism. 
 
7.6 The erosion of the natural/artificial distinction, and the epistemology of essence 
Although not a feature of (T1)-(T6) per se, (SE) also endorses an erroneous assumption about 
the epistemology of alleged natural kind essence claims, based upon the traditional division 
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between natural and artificial kinds. The standard distinction between natural and non-natural 
kinds is grounded in two key features: (1) the mind-independence of natural kinds, as opposed 
to the mind-dependence of non-natural kinds, and (2) the restriction that natural kind essences 
are only knowable a posteriori, whereas non-natural kind essences, if there are such, are 
knowable a priori. For (SE) it is ‗of course, a posteriori what properties are essential to a 
given [natural] kind‘ (Ellis 2001: 219), and such truths ‗have to be discovered by the methods 
of empirical science‘ (ibid.: 220). The intuitive distinction is evident if we consider some 
typical examples. Take the pencil-kind. The important thing about pencils is not what material 
they are made of, nor their internal constitution. Rather, the key feature of a pencil, and what 
it is to be a member of the pencil-kind, is roughly that it can be held in the hand and, given the 
relevant pressure, it will leave semi-permanent marks on (appropriate) plain surfaces. 
Provided an object, x, satisfies these conditions we, as classifiers, are happy to call x a pencil. 
However, the pencil-kind is clearly not mind-independent, and so does not carve out a natural 
joint in nature, depending, as it does, upon human artifice. Nor is the pencil-kind‘s essence 
knowable only a posteriori. What it is to be a pencil is something fixed by stipulation and 
arbitration, and is therefore knowable a priori. 
Natural kinds, on the other hand, are characteristically thought of, since Kripke (1980) 
and Putnam (1973), as having essences that are discovered (only) a posteriori by scientists. 
The well discussed gold/fool‘s gold example (Kripke 1980: 118) neatly illustrates the 
natural/non-natural kind distinction. In the gold/fool‘s gold case, despite the two substances 
being imperceptibly different to the untrained eye – both are shiny, metallic, gold coloured 
substances – we do not, as we would in the pencil case, take the immediately observable 
qualities to be indicative of kind membership. Gold, we say, forms a kind on the basis of 
atomic number, and since fool‘s gold is a compound and does not have an atomic number, it 
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fails to qualify as gold. Furthermore, that gold has atomic number 79 is taken to be an 
objective fact about the world, and something discoverable only a posteriori. 
There is, then, both a metaphysical and an epistemological difference between natural 
and non-natural kinds. However, the achievements of modern science, I claim, have almost 
entirely eroded this distinction. The elements of the periodic table, according to (SE), provide 
the archetypal examples of natural kinds. However, examples like the transuranium elements 
– for instance Einsteinium, Mendelevium and Nobelium – challenge the standard distinction 
between natural and artificial kinds. Each transuranium element is a synthetic element, whose 
essence was cognised before any sample existed. Transuranium elements, then, do not exist 
independently of us, being dependent upon human artifice, and hence fail to satisfy (1). 
Similarly, their essences are not knowable only a posteriori, since the atomic numbers of 
synthetic elements were known prior to their synthesis; hence they fail to satisfy (2). To 
illustrate, consider the recent confirmation but the International Union of Physical and 
Applied Chemistry that scientists have successfully synthesised the hypothesised element 112 
– the element with 112 protons within its nucleus. Prior to the synthesis of element 112 
scientists had a clear idea of what they were attempting to synthesise. Indeed, then knew that 
its essence was to have 112 protons within its nucleus. Had the experiment to synthesise 
element 112 yielded a substance with more or fewer protons, then that substance would not 
have been element 112 (see Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary 2010b for a more in-depth 
discussion). 
Since there is no significant relevant difference between element 112 on the one hand, 
and gold on the other, both being elements, neither (1), mind-independence, nor (2), a 
posteriority, successfully demarcate the natural from the non-natural kinds. The consequence 
of this argument is that both (T1) – the claim that it is a necessary condition of natural kinds 
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that they be mind-independent – and the assumption that the alleged essences of natural kinds 
are knowable only a posteriori, are false. If the essence of an element is its atomic number, as 
(SE) supposes, then examples like element 112 demonstrate that natural kind essences can be 
dependent upon human cognition, and can also be knowable a priori. 
 
7.7 Challenge to necessity 
The earlier example of the transuranium elements not only undermines (T1) and (SE)‘s 
underlying assumption about the a posteriority of natural kind essence claims, but also has 
implications for (SE)‘s notion of necessity. 
One of the main aims of (SE) is to examine the ‗scientific practice of theoretical 
identification‘ (Ellis 2001: 54), and the apparent necessity of theoretical identities. The claim 
that theoretical identities are necessary when true is, of course, familiar from Kripke and 
Putnam. However, the claim that some essences are knowable a priori challenges (SE)‘s 
account of this apparent necessity. The challenge is one of grounding. For (SE) there are two 
types of necessity: the first is ‗radically non-linguistic and objective‘ (Ellis 2001: 36), whilst 
the second is a matter of linguistic convention and stipulation. As has already been said, the 
former category of necessity, which includes propositions about the essences of natural kinds, 
is supposed to be further typified by its a posteriority. However, as Beebee and I have argued, 
in Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary (2010b), (SE) has simply assumed that all such truths are only 
knowable a posteriori. The previous example (of the transuranium elements) illustrates that 
this is clearly not the case. This generates a tension for (SE), given the claims that real 
necessities are ‗grounded in the world‘ (Ellis 2001: 48), and metaphysically necessary truths 
are ‗true in virtue of the essential natures of things‘ (ibid.: 235). 
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The problem here is that according to (SE) de re metaphysically necessary 
propositions follow the standard Kripkean model – they are metaphysically necessary, but 
knowable only a posteriori. However, theoretical identities concerning the transuranium 
elements are not knowable only a posteriori, but can be known a priori. To know the truth of 
the theoretical identity ‗ununbium is the element with atomic number 112‘ requires only 
‗some rudimentary knowledge of the mechanics of chemical nomenclature‘ (Beebee and 
Sabbarton-Leary 2010b: 173). If such theoretical identities are also necessary, which 
according to (SE) they are, then they are analytic (being both necessary and knowable a 
priori).
84
 But the grounds of analytic truths, according to (SE), are merely ‗conventionally 
established criterion for including something in some linguistically defined class‘ (Ellis 2001: 
235). Since (SE) cannot consistently deny that ununbium is a natural kind whilst using gold as 
paradigm example, it appears that (SE) does ‗not have a story about what distinguishes de re 
necessity from other kinds of necessity – and in particular analyticity‘ (Beebee and Sabbarton-
Leary 2010b: 174). Again, then, (SE) is unsuccessful. 
 
7.8 A problem for descriptivism about reference? 
In the preceding sections of this chapter we have seen that (SE)‘s essentialist notion of a 
natural kind is untenable. Cases of synthesised elements threaten the objectivity and a 
posteriority of natural kinds; cases of crosscutting threaten (SE)‘s conception of the world as a 
hierarchical structure of natural kinds; cases of pressure induced blending for paradigm cases 
of natural kinds refute (SE)‘s notion of ‗intrinsic‘; and the concession that biological species 
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 This, of course, fits neatly with the account of descriptivism I presented in chapter 5. 
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concepts have explanatory utility despite lacking essences refutes (SE)‘s claim that natural 
kinds require thick essences to have explanatory utility. This leaves scientific essentialism in 
disarray. As a consequence of these criticisms, however, have I also raised problems for the 
theory of reference defended in chapter 5? 
In chapter 5, recall, the descriptivist theory of reference was predicated on some 
version of essentialism. Of course, showing that the central tenets of (SE) are false does not 
show that essentialism tout court is false. For instance, versions like Lowe‘s (2004) or 
Oderberg‘s (2009), are untouched by the criticisms fielded here. It might be that the notion of 
essentialism Kripke and early Putnam have in mind is similar to (SE), and if so these 
criticisms apply equally to them. However, since neither Kripke nor Putnam fully articulated 
what they meant be essentialism, this seems doubtful. Soames, as I showed in chapter 3, 
seems to endorse elements of (SE), in particular the hierarchy thesis, and hence the objection 
fielded here against (SE) applies to Soames. 
Descriptivist essentialism, however, claimed only to employ the same version of 
essentialism as Kripke and Putnam. As I identified in chapter 4, all this definitely amounts to 
is a commitment to a nontrivial brand of essentialism: that is, a version of essentialism that is 
to be distinguished from the trivial variety that says of, for instance, Harry Houdini (and 
Ehrich Weiss), that he has the property of being Harry Houdini essentially. As things stand, 
all descriptivist essentialism is committed to is the truth and necessity of theoretical identities 
like ‗ununbium is the element with atomic number 112‘. In the final chapter I attempt to 
sketch a version of natural kind essentialism, building upon the work done in chapter 6, which 
is robust enough to underpin the theory of reference proposed in chapter 5, do justice to our 
modal intuitions about substances, without committing the metaphysical faux pas made by 
(SE). More simply, my aim is to retain the modal force of essence claims, and the determinacy 
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of reference, without having to make anything like the substantive metaphysical commitments 
of (SE).  
 270 
CHAPTER 8 
In chapter 7 I argued that scientific essentialism is untenable, and that the conjunction of (T1)-
(T6) – (SE)‘s individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on natural kind hood – 
are liable to a variety of counterexamples. Given that (SE)‘s notion of an essence, and of a 
natural kind, has turned out to be so problematic, in this final chapter I will propose some 
modifications of both notions. The main aim of this chapter is to sketch a notion of ‗essence‘ 
that is sufficient to ground the semantic thesis expounded in chapter 5, without incurring 
unwelcome metaphysical commitments. The notion of essence employed here will, to all 
intents and purposes, be the Lockean notion I argued for in chapter 6, and which, in chapter 2, 
I attributed to later-Putnam: that is, a notion of nontrivial essence that is conventionalist about 
essence, but realist about the constituents of essence.
85
 The notion of a natural kind endorsed 
here will be forged on the basis of (i) the points of agreement between promiscuous realism 
and scientific essentialism, and (ii) the counterexamples deployed against scientific 
essentialism in chapter 7.  
8.1 Distilling kinds  
Upon what conditions of being a natural kind, then, do (SE) and (PR) agree? In the first 
instance, both views agree that the properties of objects that figure in theoretical identities, or 
essence claims, are real properties. For example, nobody denies that water has the property of 
being composed of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom, or that magnesium is the 
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 In some respects the view expressed here is similar to that expounded by Ronald De Sousa in his (1984), 
although there his concern is with what kinds are natural kinds, and he claims that the epithet ‗natural‘ is always 
relative to our interests. Here the claim is that natural kind ‗essences‘ are relative to classificatory and 
explanatory interests. However, the views are clearly related. 
 271 
element with atomic number 12. The nub of the disagreement is whether nature comes pre-
packaged into discrete natural kinds – what Wiggins calls the ‗realist myth of the self-
differentiating object‘ (2001: 150) – or whether the classification of substances and the like 
into natural kinds is a reflection of the ‗theoretical and explanatory interests‘ (Hendry 2005: 
35) of the relevant scientific discipline.  
Since both (SE) and (PR) agree about the properties of objects, both qualify as brands 
of realism; that much is uncontroversial. However, (PR) claims that ‗there are many equally 
legitimate ways of dividing the world up into kinds‘ (Dupré 1995: 6), whilst (SE) maintains 
that there is a single unified hierarchy of natural kinds. Cases of crosscutting natural kinds 
(provided you accept that the categories are in fact natural kind categories) show that the 
hypothesis of a single unified hierarchy of natural kinds is false. Moreover, as I observed in 
chapters 6 and 7, all that a belief in scientific realism requires is a minimal commitment to the 
entities of science (molecular structures, sub-atomic particles, and so on), and so a 
commitment to Lockean real essences, which are metaphysically thin, explanatory essences, 
rather than metaphysically thick, fundamentalist essences. Since (SE)‘s commitments to 
essence are far beyond the thin, minimal notion, whilst (PR)‘s are not, (PR) trumps (SE) in 
this respect. Hence we can reject the idea of an objective hierarchy of natural kinds as a 
prerequisite of a metaphysics of scientific realism (contra Ellis), and admit, instead, a notion 
of natural kind that is at least consistent with pluralism about classification (see also Psillos 
2006). 
The distinction between synthetic and non-synthetic elements, and the apparent 
analyticity of theoretical identities concerning the former (Ununbium is element 112), 
illustrates that a posteriority is not a mark of natural, rather than artificial, kinds, as has been 
traditionally thought. Hence it cannot be a necessary condition on being a natural kind that the 
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truth of a theoretical identity sentence concerning that kind be knowable only a posteriori. 
Perhaps this should come as no surprise, particularly in light of my earlier discussion of 
Extended Millianism (as endorsed by Salmon, Soames and perhaps Kripke), which entails 
that all identities between co-referring terms, theoretical or otherwise, are actually knowable a 
priori rather than a posteriori. Moreover, in chapter 5 I presented a plausible account of 
theoretical identities between natural kind terms, where one of those terms was a description 
of the essence of the kind, but where none of those identities were a posteriori. Hence this 
condition on theoretical identities that they be only a posteriori is clearly false. 
Similarly, the example also illustrates that not all chemical elements exist 
independently of human artifice. If elements are paradigmatic natural kinds then, by 
extension, it will also turn out that natural kinds can be the product of human artifice. What 
we require, then, is a notion of a natural kind that is permissive enough to capture both 
synthetic and non-synthetic elements (a) without including all kinds that are the product of 
human artifice, such as the mug-kind or the laptop-kind, and (b) without including all kinds 
with essences that are knowable a priori, such as the bachelor-kind or the triangle-kind. In 
effect, we need to find a way around the trivialisation problem identified in chapter 4, section 
8. 
The most obvious feature that synthetic and non-synthetic elements have in common 
is that both have an equal currency in scientific explanation and induction. The intuition, 
shared by  both (SE) and (PR), that elements are paradigmatic natural kinds, seems to be a 
good one, and should not be rejected. There is no relevant distinction between a synthesised 
element like mendelevium, say, and a non-synthesised element like tungsten, either on the 
grounds that the essence of the former (but not the latter) is knowable a priori, or that the 
existence of the former is the product of human artifice. They are unified, as elements and 
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natural kinds, by (i) their demarcation via atomic number, and (ii) the role they play in 
explanation and induction. Of course, the first similarity is only indicative of element-kinds, 
rather than natural kinds in general, so the pertinent question is whether (ii) successfully 
demarcates the natural from the artificial kinds. 
Prima facie it would seem that it does. There is indeed a stark contrast between 
artificial kinds like table or mug, which are not obviously kinds that have scientific (and 
explanatory) utility, and element kinds like plutonium. Knowing of some object, o, that it is a 
member of the mug kind will tell you very little; after all, mugs are made of myriad materials, 
come in various sizes, and even fulfil different functions. In effect, all one can really predict 
from the fact that something is a mug is that one can drink from it (and of course that it has 
whatever properties that constitute mughood, e.g. that it is light and small enough to be lifted 
by a human hand). In contrast, knowing that o is a member of the plutonium kind will reveal 
various interesting facts about o, and will allow a huge variety of inductive predictions. For 
example, members of the plutonium kind are highly radioactive, and hence toxic to biological 
life. Samples of plutonium also have an extremely high boiling point, of 3505 Kelvin,  are 
warm to the touch (because of alpha decay), and can bond, and hence form compounds, with 
carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, silicon and the halides. Finally, if you detonate 1kg of plutonium, 
the explosion will be equivalent to 10000 tonnes of chemical explosive.
86
 
The unification of synthetic and non-synthetic elements via the role they play in 
explanation, fits well will LaPorte‘s recent proposal that the ‗real distinction between natural 
and non-natural kinds seems to have to do not with where they are found ... but with their 
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 Information obtained from the Royal Society of Chemistry web resource: 
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theoretical significance‘ (2004: 19). Following LaPorte, then, I endorse the hypothesis that 
natural kinds are precisely those kinds ‗with explanatory value‘ (ibid.), rather than, for 
instance, those kinds with essences that are knowable only a posteriori, or those that have 
independent existence in nature. 
Since both (SE) and (PR) agree that natural kinds are key to explanation, this 
demarcation criterion marks out some common ground between the views. Moreover, we 
have already seen that (SE)‘s initial claim, that essences are a prerequisite of explanation, is 
undermined by the concession that ‗biological species are more or less salient clusters of 
intrinsically similar natural kinds – sufficiently similar in fact … [to] reason about them as if 
they were, strict Aristotelian natural kinds‘ (Ellis 2001: 170). Hence the proposal that the 
natural kinds are the explanatory kinds looks promising for demarcating the natural from the 
non-natural kinds. 
However, this proposal is not free from problems. The most obvious problem is that 
explanatory utility comes in degrees. Compare, for example, mendelevium and tungsten. 
Mendelevium was synthesised in 1955, but only a few atoms were ever made (by bombarding 
einsteinium with alpha-particles). Atoms, in and of themselves, do not behave like substances. 
They do not, for instance, have boiling points or melting points. So, knowing that some object 
o is a member of the mendelevium kind will not reveal information about boiling and/or 
melting points. In contrast, knowing that o is a member of the tungsten kind will tell you at 
what temperature o will melt (3680 Kelvin) and boil (5930 Kelvin). Knowing that o is a 
member of the tungsten kind, then, seems to explain more than knowing that o is a member of 
the mendelevium kind. However, this is entirely a product of the quantities of tungsten that 
are available, compared to the quantities of mendelevium: whilst tungsten occurs as a 
substance, and hence exhibits physical and chemical properties, the only samples of 
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mendelevium are atoms, and atoms lack many of the properties of substances. In a sense this 
is a trivial point: since more is known about tungsten than mendelevium it follows that 
knowing of some object, o, that o is an instance of tungsten will explain more than knowing 
that o is an instance of mendelevium.
87
 Nevertheless, it serves to highlight a more important 
point: if the natural kinds are the explanatory kinds, and explanatory utility comes in degrees, 
then naturalness will also come in degrees. Whilst I do not have the space to discuss this here, 
it is simply worth noting that a complete account of what it is to be a natural kind, where the 
natural kinds are the explanatory kinds, must address this question. 
 
8.2 Distilling essences  
Since (SE)‘s notion of an essence has been shown to be untenable, one option is simply to 
jettison the entire notion as a useful feature of natural kinds. As noted in chapter 7, one 
interpretation of (PR) is that it argues for the detachability of the notion of a natural kind from 
that of an essence, and is quite happy to dismiss talk of essentialism and essences as 
metaphysical mumbo jumbo. However, I have argued that there is a much thinner, less 
metaphysically suspicious notion of essence that (i) latches onto the real properties of objects, 
but (ii) only latches onto those properties as a product our some decision we make, to which 
(PR) should be amenable. 
The real metaphysical concern over essentialism, as Mellor (1977) and later Putnam 
(1983) identified, was whether there were thick essences, that is de re modal properties 
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 It is also worth noting that not everything is in the ‗essence‘, so to speak. In both cases we know the essence of 
each element, but much more is known about tungsten. Hence, not all the properties of a substance, even a pure 
substance that is a member of an element kind, are explained by its atomic number. 
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actually out there in the world. Here, I have argued that the notion of a de re modal property 
as part of the furniture of the physical world, is not required, despite (SE)‘s ruminations to the 
contrary, to underpin scientific realism. All that is required is a commitment to a 
metaphysically thin notion of real essence, where the real essence of a kind is just the subset 
of the kind‘s properties that explain its nominal essence. On this view, the real essence of the 
kind is always relative to the nominal essence, which was singled out by some classificatory 
decision we made. This, in effect, undermines the thought that it is science that discovers 
essence, and hence necessary truth.
88
 Rather, any necessary truths about natural kinds are, in 
part, the product of definition. Dupré, in his (2004), responds to LaPorte‘s related hypothesis 
(that the necessity of theoretical identities is partly the product of some semantic decision) 
with the accusation that such a view ‗says little of interest about essentialism‘ and is 
effectively ‗toothless‘ (2004). For Dupré, to ‗assert that there are real essences is, in part, to 
claim that there are fundamental properties that determine the existence and extensions of 
kinds that instantiate them‘ (1986: 62). Well, if by ‗fundamental properties‘ Dupré simply 
means, properties fundamental for explanation according to science, then this is, I think, 
consistent with (PR), provided real essence is understood as I counselled in chapter 6. 
Moreover, even if there is an element of decision in classifying a natural kind, and stipulating 
that particular subsets of properties (the ones that explain nominal essences) are the real 
essences kinds, these will still determine the existence and the extension of those kinds.  
It should be noted, however, that there is also still a further question of whether the 
objections raised to (SE) undermine any of the a priori versions of essentialism, such as 
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 The argument, I take it, is something like the following: science only investigates the physical furniture of the 
world; modal properties (e.g. essences) are not part of the physical furniture of the world; hence, science does 
not investigate modal properties/essence.  
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Lowe‘s (2004) or perhaps even Oderberg‘s (2007), which I have not addressed here. 
However, if their motivation is explicitly to provide a metaphysics for scientific realism, then 
by extension the criticisms of chapters 6 and 7 apply to them. 
It seems to me that the controversy, and stigma, attached to the notion of ‗essence‘ 
stems from two connected concerns: the first is the Mellor-Putnam worry about intra-world 
modal properties i.e. that there are no such properties; the second is a general scepticism about 
the notion of a world that comes pre-packed into natural kinds, what Hacking calls ‗Plato‘s 
unsavoury rubbish about carving natural at the joints‘ (1991: 111). 
However, the Lockean notion of essence expounded in chapter 6 is, I think, a much 
more metaphysically neutral notion, intended merely to capture a notion of explanation. As I 
argued in chapter 6 (see also Leary 2009), according to Locke the ‗real essence‘ of a natural 
kind just is the set of properties that explains the salient features of our experience, which we 
have used to classify objects into kinds.
89
 Adopting this Lockean notion, I claim, allows a 
deflationary reading of the central essentialist theses that (i) ‗members of natural kind have 
real essences, properties which make them members of the relevant kind, and without which 
they could not be a member of that kind‘ (Wilkerson 1995: 30), and (ii) that it is the essences 
of natural kinds that explain their behaviour. 
 
8.2.1 Thin vs. Thick Essences 
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 For all I have said here, it might also be that the Lockean notion can be applied to individuals. However, since 
my concern here is explicitly and exclusively with natural kinds, I leave that discussion for another time. 
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Let me, then, reiterate the distinction between a thin (or shallow) and thick (or deep) reading 
of the notion of a ‗real essence‘, both of which qualify as versions of nontrivial essentialism, 
as defined in chapter 7, section 1. The thick reading, which those of an empiricist bent find so 
objectionable, is that collections of properties qua essences are objective features of the 
world, fundamental elements of an adequate ontology that demarcate objects into kinds, and 
are a prerequisite for scientific explanation. The thin reading stems from the interpretation of 
Locke offered in chapter 6. On the thin reading of ‗real essence‘ (which I take to be Locke‘s 
own notion) the properties that constitute the essence of a kind are real, real essences do 
indeed demarcate objects into natural kinds, and trivially (given that real essences are 
explanatory) explain why objects that are members of the kind behave as they do. But, and 
this is the vital point, the status of a set of properties as the essence of a kind is the product of 
the theoretical and explanatory interests of the classifier, not some objective feature of the 
world. 
The thin notion of ‗real essence‘ can be illustrated using the following classic 
example. Consider the subatomic particles protons, neutrons and electrons, of which all the 
elements on the periodic table are composed. The elements, we have discovered, consist of 
combinations of these three species of subatomic particle in a variety of ratios. The simplest, 
hydrogen, consists of a single proton, a single electron and either 0, 1 or 2 neutrons. What 
inference does this discovery warrant concerning the essence of hydrogen? Ignoring, for a 
moment, how we actually classify the elements (via atomic number i.e. the number of 
protons), there are seven potential classificatory options on a typical reductionist programme. 
Let P stand for the number of protons, N the number of neutrons, and E the number of 
electrons. Since each element is made up of some ratio of P, N and E there are seven potential 
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options for classification: (i) P, (ii) N, (iii) E, (iv) P + N, (v) P + E, (vi) N + E, or (vii) P + N + 
E. 
Historically, of course, we have actually moved from, roughly speaking, (iv) to (i): we 
originally classified the elements via what we took to be ‗the one constant peculiar to an 
element, namely, the atomic weight‘ (Mendeleev 1869: 439). However, with the discovery of 
isotopes – that is, instances of an element with the same atomic number but a different atomic 
weight – that classification of the elements shifted, and we began to use atomic number. As is 
well known, the different notions of ‗element‘ from Lavoisier to Dalton to Mendeleev and to, 
eventually, the International Union of Physical and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), raise serious 
questions as to whether we should ‗treat the various ―definitions‖ of ―element‖ as stipulations‘ 
(Hendry 2005: 32) or discoveries. In the current literature opinions are divided: Alexander 
Bird (2010), for instance, maintains that the essences of natural kinds are discoveries, and thus 
objective, whereas LaPorte argues that, in fact, we decide to which sets of properties our 
natural kind terms attach, and so in some sense natural kind essences are stipulated (2004, 
2010).  
The view being proposed here, given the criticisms of (SE), is that properties qua 
essence are not objective i.e. their status as (part of) the essence of a kind is not an objective 
fact about the world since essence claims are modal, and the physical furniture of the world 
does not include modal properties (Mellor 1977; Putnam 1983). Empirical observation merely 
warrants the conclusion that there are ‗properties that every kind member instantiates‘ 
(Mumford 2006: 50), not that those properties are the essence of the kind. As Mellor points 
out, ‗the most that scientists can show us in fact is [the] lawful coextensiveness‘ (1977: 308) 
of properties, not that they are essences. 
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However, there is still scope for the thin notion of a real essence to be cashed out as 
metaphysically necessary. When science discovers which properties of such-and-such a kind 
are lawfully coextensive, these properties, which will presumably be a subset of the entire set 
of properties of the kind, can potentially be singled out as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the kind provided experts are (a) not willing to include anything lacking those 
properties as a member of the kind, and (b) only willing to include anything possessing those 
properties as a member of the kind. The relevant properties might turn out to be 
microstructural properties, but then again they might not. Dupré (1995) and LaPorte (2004), 
for instance, doubt that microstructural properties could ever give the essence of a biological 
kind. Similarly, Needham (2000) and Van Brakel (2000) doubt that microstructural properties 
will be sufficient (although they may be necessary) to demarcate chemical kinds. But as 
Locke noted, which properties turn out to be the best for explanation is something that will be 
decided by the scientist, not the philosopher. 
 
8.3 Grounding necessity  
In order to ground the metaphysical necessity of a thin essence claim – contrary to (SE), 
which claims that metaphysical necessity is ‗grounded in the world‘ (Ellis 2001: 248) – I 
propose to follow Lewis, and cash out the notion of necessity as a relationship between the 
actual world and other possible worlds. On this view the necessity of theoretical identities 
such as ‗ammonia is NH3‘ is fixed by the conjunction of physical facts (that the stuff we call 
‗ammonia‘ is actually constituted by molecules of NH3) and intellectual fiat (that our 
referential intentions when we use ‗ammonia‘ are such that we only want it to refer, in this 
case, to stuff with the composition NH3). The counterpart relation that holds between 
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chemical kinds across worlds will depend upon how we unpack something akin to Putnam‘s 
sameNK relation; if that relationship is unpacked as sameness of chemical composition, then 
chemical composition is what fixes the counterpart relation. Importantly, however, the 
relevant sameness relation is determined by the explanatory and theoretical interests of the 
research programme – there are no self-demarcating kinds. 
 Not all essentialists will be happy with this notion of essence. Paul, for instance, 
construes essentialism as ‗a theory of the objective, context-independent de re natures of 
objects‘ (2004: 170). As such, the general Lewisean proposal that the ‗essence‘ of a natural 
kind is relative to the counterpart relation, fixed by the explanatory interests of the research 
programme, is (for Paul) a version of antiessentialism (2004: 177).
90
 
However, the way in which Paul motivates the debate between essentialists and 
antiessentialists seems to me to be mistaken. According to Paul, there are two questions in the 
ballpark: (1) whether objects have essential properties, and (2) what properties does an object 
have essentially. The Quinean objection, says Paul, is to say that question (2) makes no sense, 
and hence that (1) too makes no sense. The classic example, recall, is Quine‘s cycling 
mathematician who, qua mathematician, is essentially rational and accidentally two-legged, 
whilst also being, qua cyclist, essentially two-legged and accidentally rational. The 
conclusion we are asked to draw from this example is that no object has a property essentially 
irrespective of some description of that object. Hence the question of what properties an 
object has essentially, divorced from any context, makes no sense, and thus neither does the 
question of whether objects have essential properties. The related anti-realist objections are 
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shallow essentialism, construing the Lewisean-style thesis as shallow essentialism, rather than antiessentialism. 
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that either (a) modal facts attach to proposition, not the properties of objects, and hence all de 
re modal claims can be translated into de dicto modal claims (Plantinga 1974), or (b) that any 
essentialist intuitions we have are the product of conditioning, based upon our conceptual 
schema.  
As Paul reads it, the anti-realist objections carry little weight, and can be effectively 
undermined by appeal to Kripke-Putnam style thought experiments. The essentialist claim, in 
effect, is that thought experiments like Twin Earth are precisely what help us to determine 
what the essential properties of objects are. Paul concedes that ‗intuitions seem to be subject 
to a wide spectrum of variability with respect to the modal status of most of the properties an 
object has‘ (2004: 177), but argues that this flexibility is the product of semantic 
indeterminacy (2004: 180). The story runs as follows: when we denote a kind NK with some 
general term a, any indeterminacy we have in our modal intuitions about what is and what is 
not essential stems for the (semantic) indeterminacy concerning the denotation of a. When we 
are precise about what we are denoting, this will automatically firm up our modal intuitions 
about which properties are essential and which are accidental. 
Some of what Paul says strikes me as correct. For instance, Paul‘s claim that there is 
semantic indeterminacy is precisely what I argued for with respect to pre-scientific kind terms 
in chapter 5. Furthermore, it seems right to suppose that semantic indeterminacy leads to a 
certain flexibility in our modal intuitions. However, I see no reason to think that the firming 
up of modal intuition via the precisification of natural kind terms uncovers the essences of 
natural kinds in Paul‘s sense, that is, the theory independent natures of objects. It is just as 
plausible to suggest that when we precisify the reference of a natural kind term we modify our 
conceptual schema, and hence the set of properties construed as the real essence of the kind 
can still be the product of the conjunction of intellectual fiat and the real properties of objects. 
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For example, imagine a scenario where we denote a kind K with a natural kind term t 
on the basis of K possessing properties p1, p2, p3 and p4, which we are calling the essence, E, 
of K. However, holding only E fixed as the essence of K results in the generation of certain 
counterfactual scenarios where we want to deny that the object in that scenario is a member of 
K, and thus is denoted by t. Perhaps we conclude that the conjunction of p1, p2, p3 and p4 does 
not capture what is important about instances of K, and thus is not a good criterion for the 
denotation of t. On that basis we precisify our use of t to only apply to objects with properties 
p1, p2, p3* and p4*, since this conjunction gives us the result we want when considering 
counterfactual scenarios. Paul‘s claim is that such a thought experiment reveals to us that p1, 
p2, p3* and p4*, rather than p1, p2, p3 and p4, constitute the mind-independent essence of the 
kind K. But an alternative interpretation of the result is to think that the thought experiment 
highlights to us a gap in our concept of K, as denoted by t, such that we revise our concept to 
plug the apparent gap. Hence, the thought experiment does not uncover some fundamental 
fact about reality, but rather invites a conceptual revision. Grant, then, that precisification of 
natural kind terms firms up our modal intuitions. Nothing about deep essentialism – the thesis 
that there are mind-independent essences – follows from this. 
Moreover, it seems to me that the standard way of carving the distinction between the 
conventionalist (or anti-realist) and the realist is too coarse. The typical dichotomy is that 
conventionalists attribute modality to propositions not properties (de dicto necessity), whilst 
realists maintain that properties are modal (de re necessity). For instance, the theoretical 
identity ‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 74‘ is necessary for the conventionalist 
only if the proposition expressed by the sentence is necessary. For the realist, on the other 
hand, the theoretical identity is necessary only if tungsten has the property of being the 
element with atomic number 74 necessarily. But neither of these views is quite right. 
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Take the claim that the truth of the sentence ‗tungsten is the element with atomic 
number 74‘ is necessary. The proposition expressed by this sentence is only necessary if it is 
true. It is true only if it is actually the case that the stuff we call ‗tungsten‘ has the property of 
being the element with atomic number 74. Since the stuff we call ‗tungsten‘ does have this 
property, the proposition expressed by ‗tungsten is the element with atomic number 74‘ is 
true. So far, so good. However, it is necessary because according to our classification of 
tungsten in particular, and the elements in general, everything with the relevant atomic 
number qualifies as a member of the kind that is demarcated by that atomic number, and 
nothing lacking that atomic number could possibly be a member of that kind. Insofar as it is 
necessary, then, this necessity is the product of the truth of the claim that the substance called 
tungsten has the property of having atomic number 74, and the force of our classificatory 
decision. That decision, of course, stems from science, and the empirical investigation of the 
actual properties of objects. As I said earlier, nobody is denying that, for instance, tungsten 
really does have atomic number 74. The point, rather, is that there was a decision to fix upon 
the property of atomic number, rather than, say, atomic weight, to demarcate the elements. 
Had we not so decided, then the proposition would not have been necessary. But, where it is 
necessary, this is a product of the conjunction of how we use language, and the properties of 
real objects. The traditional de re/de dicto distinction ignores this clear interaction, and thus 
setting up the conventionalist/realist debate in those terms is unhelpful, and only compounded 
by claims like those made by (SE) that the grounds of necessity are ‗radically non-linguistic 
and objective‘ (Ellis 2001: 36). In a sense, what (SE) says is true: since the properties or 
objects, such as atomic number, are real objective properties, and they play a role in 
grounding necessity, part of the grounding of necessity is non-linguistic and objective. 
However, the other part of the grounding is precisely linguistic and conventional. As 
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Goodman notes, questions of identity within a world are really questions about ‗identity with 
respect to what is within that world as organized‘ (1978: 8, my italics). In other words, 
identity is relative to how the world has been categorized, and categorization is a human 
endeavour informed by a variety of interests. Thus, although theoretical identities might turn 
out to be necessary, they are neither entirely necessary de re nor necessary de dicto.  
 
8.4 A final word on reference 
The theory of reference and meaning developed in chapter 5 is, I believe, fundamentally 
correct. The benefit of a version of descriptivism for natural kind terms is that it appears to 
satisfy one of the key features (and desiderata) of actual scientific practice – namely, clear and 
univocal reference to clearly demarcated natural kinds. The Kripke-Putnam programme, as 
Putnam admits (see chapter 2), relies upon the assumption that reference is unproblematic. 
However, this assumption is simply not one that scientists interested in taxonomy and 
nomenclature will make. Descriptivist essentialism, by claiming that it is the essences of 
kinds that fix the reference of kind terms, does not assume that reference is unproblematic, but 
employs metaphysics and the discoveries of science to rigidify the reference of natural kind 
terms. 
In the first instance, the modal stability of the reference of natural kind terms was 
achieved by appeal to the metaphysically controversial thesis of essentialism. The principal 
reason was that Kripke, (early) Putnam and, more recently, Soames all have the same 
commitment, so my version of descriptivism was no more metaphysically suspicious than 
their causal theory of direct reference. 
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However, in chapter 6 I demonstrated that the notion of ‗essence‘ being appealed to by 
Kripke, early-Putnam and Soames, could not be the Lockean notion, and in chapter 7 I 
critically assessed an alternate notion of ‗essence‘ from recent work by Brian Ellis (2001). I 
concluded that such a fundamentalist notion of (thick) essence was untenable, and attempted 
instead to distil a notion of a natural kind with a thin essence that (i) met the fundamental 
requirements of both promiscuous realism and scientific essentialism, (ii) avoided the 
counterexamples that afflicted scientific essentialism‘s notion, and (iii) which was compatible 
with a broadly empiricist perspective. Given the analysis of Locke in chapter 6, I concluded 
that there is a thin notion of essence available, which is still metaphysically necessary, but 
grounded in the conjunction of facts about the world and intellectual fiat. In effect, the thesis 
is that the essence of a kind is constructed from a subset of the entire set of an object‘s 
properties, but which subset is targeted is a product of the theoretical interests of the research 
discipline. In other words, the essence of a natural kind is, as Kit Fine (1994) argues, the 
definition of that type of object. However, given the thin notion of essence at work here, and 
the role of intellectual fiat in defining objects, descriptivist essentialism, where that 
essentialism is understood as thin-essentialism, garners all of the benefits with none of the 
costs. Theoretical identities are necessary and the discovery that an object as such-and-such a 
property is a posteriori. But, given the metasemantic story – that kinds are not named until 
essences are discovered – the truth of theoretical identities turns out to be knowable a priori. 
However, as I argued in chapter 5, this is not a cost, but rather a reconceptualisation of how 
naming is science, particularly chemistry, takes place. Moreover, this story does not take 
reference for granted, but rather maintains strict standards on the naming of natural kinds. 
This not only helps to facilitate communication, but also grounds, and thus helps to explain, 
our firm modal intuitions about the identities of substance. 
 287 
In effect, what I have argued for is an error theory of the Kripke-Putnam tradition 
(which includes Salmon and Soames). Whilst philosophers working in the Kripke-Putnam 
tradition assume reference is unproblematic, and think that we can make a posteriori 
discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I have rejected this assumption about 
reference, and claimed that empirical discoveries in science can result in revisions of the 
meanings of the corresponding natural kind terms. Moreover, descriptivist (thin) essentialism 
does not even attempt to carve out a semantically distinctive class of natural kind terms – 
semantically speaking, there is just no interesting distinction to be drawn between terms like 
‗pencil‘ or ‗bachelor‘, and terms like ‗water‘ or ‗tungsten‘. However, like Besson (2010) I 
think there is something distinctive about the metasemantics of natural kind terms, albeit for 
independent and substantially different reasons. What makes natural kind terms distinct is that 
there is a semantic story to be told, as articulated in chapter 5, about meaning revision in light 
of scientific discovery. In this respect there is a difference between terms like ‗bachelor‘ and 
those like ‗tungsten‘: the latter, but not the former, are revisable. Natural kind terms, unlike 
non-natural kind terms, are hostage to conceptual revisions prompted by a posteriori 
discoveries within science. However, as I argued in chapter 5, when such revisions occur, the 
natural kind term in question is re-coined, and redefined. Hence the theoretical identity 
generated is still both necessary and a priori.   
Finally, then, whilst descriptivist essentialism does come (explicitly) with a brand of 
nontrivial essentialism, it does not, itself, make any specific metaphysical claims about 
essence. What plays the ‗real essence‘ role in a theory will, as Locke noted, be down to the 
results of science, and the conceptual schema we judge to have the most explanatory utility. 
There is, then, nothing semantically distinctive about natural kind terms. What makes natural 
kinds distinctive, as I said above, is totally independent of their semantics. Hence I conclude 
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that it is possible to account for all our apparent modal intuitions about kinds and substances 
without the hefty cost of primitive, metaphysically suspicious, thick essences – sounds like a 
good deal!   
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